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On June 23, 1983, the United States Supreme Court delivered a
landmark decision in Immigration and Naturalization Service v.
Chadha,1 with wide impact on the future of congressional-executive
relations. In the process of ruling on the fate of Jagdish Rai Chadha,
an alien from Kenya of East Indian origin, the Court in fact deter-
mined the fate of the legislative veto, a device increasingly employed
in recent years by a reassertive Congress to rein in an "imperial bu-
reaucracy" and an "imperial presidency." The Court declared inva-
lid a statutory provision in accordance with which the House had
acted, by simple resolution, to reverse the Attorney General's deci-
sion to suspend deportation proceedings against Chadha. But the
Court's reasoning was confined neither to the specific case at hand
nor even to the one-House veto which had been involved in this in-
stance. It was based on the assumption that Congress can adopt no
action having "legislative . . . purpose and effect"2 unless it follows
the constitutionally prescribed route for the enactment of laws: bi-
cameral passage followed by presentment to the President. "The
Court's decision," wrote Justice Powell (who concurred in the deci-
sion on narrower grounds) "apparently will invalidate every use of
the legislative veto. The breadth of this holding gives one pause."3
Justice White complained in his dissent that the Court "sounds the
death knell for nearly 200 other statutory provisions in which Con-
gress has reserved a 'legislative veto' ";' and that the decision "strikes
down in one fell swoop provisions in more laws enacted by Congress
than the Court has cumulatively invalidated in its history."5 Shortly
after the Chadha case, the Court, true to its earlier stance, summarily
affirmed two lower court decisions invalidating the legislative veto.
In one of the cases, a two-House veto provision was at issue.
6
Most of the 200-odd legislative veto provisions which became
1. 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
2. Id. at 2784.
3. Id. at 2788.
4. Id. at 2792.
5. Id. at. 2810-11. Justice White apparently had some second thoughts regarding the
sweep of the Court's judgment and suggested ways in which a "redefined legislative veto"
might yet be salvageable. Id. at 2796 n. 11.
6. See Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council of America, 103 S.
Ct. 3556 (1983), affig Consumer Energy Council of America v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir.
1982); United States Senate v. Federal Trade Commission, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983), affig Con-
sumers Union v. FTC, 691 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (en banc). The second case involved a
two-House veto of the Federal Trade Commission's used-car rule. In both cases, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit had unanimously invalidated the legisla-
tive vetoes at issue. See also infra § V on the severability issue.
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presumptively invalid related to domestic affairs; but over the previ-
ous decade important legislative veto provisions had been incorpo-
rated in U.S. foreign-policy legislation as well.7 Among these were
provisions giving Congress veto powers in connection with the use of
force abroad (in the famous War Powers Resolution); the export of
arms to foreign governments; foreign assistance; foreign trade (in-
cluding the famous Jackson-Vanik Amendment on freedom of emi-
gration from communist countries); nuclear non-proliferation policy;
and presidential powers with respect to national emergencies. These
veto provisions had reflected congressional resolve in the post-Viet-
nam era not to permit the President to determine foreign and security
policy in a unilateral and unrestrained manner. They gave Congress
a sense of participation and co-determination. None of the foreign-
policy vetoes had ever been used, but Congress had come close to
using them on several occasions-especially with respect to arms
sales to the Middle East-and the threat of their use was widely
viewed as an important congressional weapon in negotiations with
the executive.
Apart from specific foreign-policy legislative vetoes, there were
veto provisions in acts which, though primarily "domestic," had
some bearing on foreign policy-such as the Impoundment Control
Act of 1974 which allowed a one-House veto of temporary impound-
ments or deferrrals of spending. It was therefore not surprising that
in the aftermath of Chadha, when Congress first sought to survey the
damage wrought by the decision and to attempt some damage con-
trol, the two congressional foreign policy committees joined in the
enterprise.8 Their primary concerns related to the future of congres-
7. For statistics and compilations of the relevant statutes and legislative veto provisions
in force at the time of Chadha, see INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2811-16 (1983) (Appendix to
White, J., dissenting, taken from the U.S. Senate's brief); The U.S. Supreme Court Decision
Concerning the Legislative Veto: Hearings Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (hereinafter cited as House For. Aff. Comm. Hearings); Memorandum
for the Attorney General of July 15, 1983, concerning Effects of Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service v. Chadha on Existing Laws, app. I, at 159-226; Rosenberg, Summary and Prelimi-
nary Analysis of the Ramifications of INS v. Chadha, the Legislative Veto Case, House For.
Aff. Comm. Hearings, supra, at 249-62.
8. See House For. Aff. Comm. Hearings, supra note 7; Legislative Veto: Arms Export
Control Act: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on S. 1050, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1983) [hereinafter cited as Senate For. Rel. Comm. Hearing on Arms Export Control];
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act: Joint Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
and the Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation and Government Processes of the Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) [hereinafter cited as Senate
Non-Proliferation Hearing 1983]. For a listing of further committee hearings, see Fisher, Devel-
opments after the Supreme Court's Decision in the Legislative Veto Case (INS v. Chadha), at 2-4
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sional-executive relations in the spheres of war powers and arms-ex-
port control, but their goal was more wide-ranging and encompassed
the foreign policy nexus in general. It was clear that while in one
sense Chadha drew the curtain on "a half-century constitutional tug-
of-war,"9 in another sense it raised the curtain on a new era of insti-
tutional uncertainty in which the future contours of congressional-
executive cooperation and competition remained to be defined and
elaborated.
Undoubtedly, considerably more time will have to elapse before
the dust settles and the true ramifications of the case are felt. The
present study will attempt what can only be a preliminary assessment
of the impact of the Chadha ruling on the sphere of United States
foreign relations law. After surveying the history of the legislative
veto device (especially in the area of foreign policy), and the Court's
opinion, the study will examine some of the major foreign policy pro-
visions affected by Chadha and the most prominent abortive attempts
to use those provisions. The future of the statutes in which some of
the questionable provisions appear will then be analyzed in relation
to the Court's test on "severability"-"a lawyer's word that has now
suddenly crept into the everyday parlance of Washington's lay and
news analysts, legislative assistants, and bureaucrats."10 For if all
legislative vetoes have been effectively swept away, the only remain-
ing legal question is whether the rest of a particular act or provision
can stand without the unconstitutional clause."' Finally, some atten-
tion will be given to the constitutional alternatives to the legislative
veto which Congress may be able and willing to adopt in the future.
I. THE LEGISLATIVE VETO: DEVELOPMENT AND CONTROVERSY
The term "legislative veto" is used to describe a variety of statu-
tory provisions which seek to give Congress the power to affect in a
binding manner, by means short of legislation, the actions of the
President or an administrative agency. Most typically, legislative
veto clauses have appeared in statutes delegating authority. Congress
has often required reports on certain contemplated actions and con-
ditioned the implementation of those actions on further tacit or ac-
(CRS Mimeo. Oct. 11, 1983); Fisher, One Year After INS v. Chadha: Congressional and Judi-
cial Developments, at 2-7 (CRS Mimeo. June 23, 1984) [hereinafter cited as One Year After).
9. J. SUNDQUIST, THE DECLINE AND RESURGENCE OF CONGRESS 345 (1981).
10. House For. Aff. Comm. Hearings, supra note 7, at 4 (testimony of Stanley Brand, legal
counsel to the House of Representatives).
11. See infra note 77 with respect to post-Chadha litigation.
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tive congressional approval within a specified period. Approval or
disapproval might be expressed by a simple resolution of either house
(the one-House veto), a concurrent resolution (the two-House veto),
or a committee decision (the committee veto).1 2 None of these con-
gressional resolutions are presented to the President, and if unan-
chored in legislation, they undoubtedly do not bind the President.
Are they endowed with legal force when this is provided for by prior
statute?
The debate surrounding this question sharpened in the post-
Vietnam era, when most of the legislative vetoes were adopted.I3 But
its roots go back at least to two abortive proposals during the admin-
istration of Woodrow Wilson. 4 Interestingly, the first of these, in
1919, related to American foreign relations. Among the "Lodge res-
ervations" to the Versailles Treaty reported out by the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee in 1919 was one which would have
allowed Congress, by concurrent resolution, to give notice of U.S.
withdrawal from the League of Nations. 5 This proposed innovative
use of the concurrent resolution procedure did not go unchallenged.
Doubts were immediately raised in the Senate concerning the com-
patibility of such a procedure with Article I, Section 7 (the presenta-
tion clause) of the Constitution. The matter was extensively debated,
and a substitute provision for withdrawal by joint resolution of Con-
gress was put forward. It was, however, rejected (by a 45 to 39
vote), and the original reservation was adopted. Quite obviously,
Congress wished to ensure that its will, even if expressed by a simple
rather than a two-thirds majority, would prevail against a President
who might prefer to remain in the League.16 Since the Versailles
Treaty was not approved by the Senate, President Wilson was never
required to react formally to this proposed legislative veto clause. In
12. Other less common variations include the so-called "one and one-half-House" veto
and the committee chairman's veto. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, STUDIES ON
THE LEGISLATIVE VETO PREPARED FOR THE SUB-COMM. ON RULES OF THE HOUSE RULES
COMM., 96th Cong. 2nd Sess., at 1 (Comm. Print 1980) (introduction by Fisher) [hereinafter
cited as CRS VETO STUDIES]; see also Watson, Congress Steps Out: A Look at Congressional
Control of the Executive, 63 CAL. L. REV. 983, 1020 (1975).
13. See supra note 7; Abourezk, The Congressional Veto: A Contemporary Response to
Executive Encroachment on Legislative Prerogatives, 52 IND. L.J. 323, 324 (1977) (breakdown
by decade since 1932); cf SUNDQUIST, supra note 9.
14. Most accounts date the first abortive use to the 1919-1920 period. But cf Watson,
supra note 12, at 988 n.10, 1002-3. Watson maintains that several provisions adopted at the
turn of the century (in 1895, 1903 and 1905) could be labeled legislative veto provisions.
15. 58 CONG. REC. S8074 (1919).
16. Id. at S8074-79, S8121-37; see also Ginnane, The Control of Federal Administration by
Congressional Resolutions and Committees, 66 HARV. L. REV. 569, 575 (1953).
5
Pomerance: United States Foreign Relations Law After Chadha
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1985
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
1920, however, Congress passed a domestic bill containing a legisla-
tive veto provision. The bill was vetoed by Wilson, and the veto was
sustained by Congress. 7
A dozen years after these abortive measures, the first legislative
veto provision was enacted into law. The Reorganization Act of
1932, adopted during the Hoover Administration, permitted the
President to reorganize executive departments subject to a one-House
veto within 60 days. 8 This act became the forerunner of reorganiza-
tion acts which, from 1939 on, regularly incorporated one or two-
House vetoes. Presidents apparently accepted these veto provisions
as the necessary price for receiving the extensive authority they de-
sired to reorganize the executive bureaucracy. 9
The first spate of legislative veto measures-adopted in over
thirty statutes-came in response to the outbreak of World War II
and the need felt by Congress to delegate broad powers to the execu-
tive in the sphere of national security and foreign affairs while retain-
ing a veto-proof mechanism to terminate the authority thus
granted.20 The prototype of this kind of legislative veto provision
was incorporated in the Lend Lease Act of 1941:
After June 30, 1943, or after the passage of a concurrent reso-
lution of the two Houses before June 30, 1943, which declares that
the powers conferred by or pursuant to subsection (a) are no
longer necessary to promote the defense of the United States,
neither the President nor the head of any department or agency
shall exercise any of the powers conferred by or pursuant to sub-
section (a).21
President Roosevelt signed this act without comment at the time, but
17. The Budget and Accounting Bill of 1920 would have made the Comptroller-General
and Assistant Comptroller-General removable by concurrent resolution of Congress. President
Wilson deemed the measure an illegal encroachment on the President's appointment power.
Watson, supra note 12, at 1004-05; Ginnane, supra note 16, at 575. Wilson also vetoed, on May
13, 1920, an appropriations bill containing a committee veto related to the printing of
magazines by executive agencies. Id. at 600.
18. Legislative Appropriation Act, Pub. L. No. 72-212, § 407, 47 Stat. 414 (1932). Presi-
dent Hoover did not object at the time to the legislative veto. Only subsequently, when a tax
bill incorporating a committee veto was at issue, did Hoover's Attorney General, William D.
Mitchell, raise objections to the earlier veto provision. 37 Op. Att'y Gen. 56 (1933), reprinted
in 76 CONG. REC. H2446-48 (1933).
19. See infra notes 47-49 and accompanying text on the attitudes of Presidents to legisla-
tive vetoes in reorganization acts and their attempts to differentiate such vetoes from other
legislative veto provisions.
20. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2793 (1983) (White, J., dissenting); Ginnane, supra note 16, at 587-
90.
21. Act of March 11, 1941, Pub. L. No. 77-11, § 3(c), 55 Stat. 31 (1941).
Vol. 15
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he filed a secret official memorandum with his Attorney General,
Robert H. Jackson, detailing his legal objections to the legislative
veto clause.22 Similar provisions for termination of authority by con-
current resolution were included in, among others, the First and Sec-
ond War Powers Acts, the Selective Service Extension Act of 1941,
the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, the Stabilization Act of
1942 and the War Labor Disputes Act.23
Prior to the enactment of these statutes Congress had adopted,
in the Neutrality Act of 1939, a different kind of legislative veto pro-
vision-one designed to compel the activation rather than the termi-
nation of the law concerned. In accordance with the Act (some
provisions of which are still in force), if Congress finds by concurrent
resolution that there exists a state of war between foreign States, the
President is required to issue a proclamation, thereby triggering the
various trade restrictions contained in the Act.24 This period also
saw the adoption of the first legislative veto provision with respect to
the deportation of aliens, a later version of which was involved in the
Chadha litigation.25
Following the war, the legislative veto device was a continuing,
but not particularly prominent feature of legislation. In the realm of
foreign relations, provisions allowing termination of aid by concur-
rent resolution of Congress were included, for example, in the Greek-
Turkish Aid Bill of 1947 and the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of
1949.26 Both the Middle East (Eisenhower Doctrine) and Gulf of
22. See infra text accompanying notes 50-54 for discussion of this memorandum and the
circumstances of its issuance. For Senate debate on the validity of the measure, see Ginnane,
supra note 16, at 588; Jackson, A Presidential Legal Opinion, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1353, 1355-56
(1953). See also Javits & Klein, Congressional Oversight and the Legislative Veto: A Constitu-
tional Analysis, 52 N.Y.U.L. REV. 455, 485. While defending the legislative veto device gener-
ally, Javits and Klein consider the Lend-Lease model an invalid form of the device, since it
permits the total repeal of statutory authority without presidential participation.
23. See CRS VETO STUDIES, supra note 12, at 643; Ginnane, supra note 16, at 589.
24. Pub. Res. 54, § l(a), 54 Stat. 4 (1940). Such a congressional finding was additional to
that of the President and was designed to force a reluctant President to apply the provisions of
the Neutrality Act. The constitutionality of this provision was challenged and debated in the
Senate. See Ginnane, supra note 16, at 591.
25. Alien Registration Act of 1940, Ch. 439, § 20, 54 Stat. 671 (1940). The Attorney
General's decision to suspend deportation of an alien was subject to a two-House veto.
26. Pub. L. No. 80-75, Ch. 81, 61 Stat. 105 (1947); Pub. L. No. 81-329, § 405(d), 63 Stat.
718 (1949). A similar provision was incorporated in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub.
L. No. 87-195, § 617, 75 Stat. 444 (1961) and is still in force. See infra § I1(c).
The Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-51, 65 Stat. 80
(1951), permitted Congress to act by concurrent resolution to abolish or reduce the service
obligation of any age group. See also Ginnane, supra note 16, at 589 (regarding the Economic
Cooperation Act of 1948).
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Tonkin Resolutions were repealable by concurrent resolution of Con-
gress,27 and in 1958 the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 was amended to
include a two-House veto provision with respect to agreements made
with foreign States for cooperative atomic weapons development.28
President Nixon's second administration marked a major turn-
ing point in the matter of the legislative veto. The device was seized
upon by a resurgent Congress as an effective way to restrain what
was thought to be an overly powerful presidency and bureaucracy
and to restore the original constitutional balance between the
branches. The legislative veto became "a congressional work-
horse."2 9 It was included primarily in statutes dealing with agency
rulemaking but also in many other statutes. The main purpose of
these provisions was to keep a check on powers delegated by Con-
gress and to keep the administration and agencies on a shorter, veto-
proof leash. But in the field of foreign policy there was a further
consideration prompting the inclusion of legislative veto provisions.
In such laws as the War Powers Resolution and the National Emer-
gencies Act, the concern was not with power delegated by Congress.
Rather, as Louis Fisher explained, the problem was "how the legisla-
tive and executive branches can share a responsibility that combines
elements of congressional and presidential power. Unable to define
by statute the precise boundary between the branches, Congress re-
lied on a legislative veto as a procedural link between rival and con-
flicting constitutional interpretations."30
The proliferation of legislative veto provisions led in turn to a
proliferation of scholarly articles on the subject, with the views of
scholars divided on the constitutional and policy questions in-
volved.3" On the constitutional issue, those upholding the validity of
27. Pub. L. No. 85-7, 71 Stat. 5 (1957); Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384 (1964).
28. Pub. L. No. 85-479, § 4, 72 Stat. 276 (1958).
29. Javits & Klein, supra note 22, at 496.
30. CRS VETO STUDIES, supra note 12, at 15.
31. The following were among those favorably inclined to the legislative veto device:
Abourezk, supra note 13; Fisher, A Political Context for Legislative Vetoes, 93 POL. Sci. Q. 241
(1978); Javits & Klein, supra note 22; Miller & Knapp, The Congressional Veto: Preserving the
Constitutional Framework, 52 IND. L.J. 367 (1977); Schwartz, The Legislative Veto and the
Constitution: A Reexamination, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 351 (1978); Stewart, Constitutionality
of the Legislative Veto, 13 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 593 (1976); West & Cooper, The Congressional
Veto and Administrative Rulemaking, 98 POL. Sci. Q. 285 (1983). Among those who viewed it
critically were Bruff & Gellhorn, Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation: A Study
of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1369 (1977); Henry, The Legislative Veto: In Search of
Constitutional Limits, 16 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 735 (1977); Martin, The Legislative Veto and the
Responsible Exercise of Congressional Power, 68 VA. L. REV. 253 (1982); Watson, supra note
12. For additional bibliographical references, see Chadha 103 S. Ct. 2797 n.12 (1983) (White,
Vol. 15
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the device tended to adopt a broad, non-literal interpretation of the
Constitution. They emphasized the purposes of the separation of
powers doctrine and of the system of checks and balances and urged
recognition of the need for flexible and innovative methods to redress
the skewing of the system toward the executive branch. More specifi-
cally, the following were among the major justifications presented.
Legislative veto provisions do not violate the presentment clause of
the Constitution since the original statute in which they are incorpo-
rated must be enacted by the regular legislative process and subject to
the President's veto. Action under legislative veto provisions is not
itself "legislative" in character; it is to be seen as a mere "contin-
gency" or "event" upon which the exercise of statutory authority
may legitimately be made to depend. If Congress so desires, it can
refrain from delegating authority altogether. Surely, then, it can
limit the delegation by making it conditional upon subsequent ap-
proval or disapproval by simple or concurrent resolution. To require
full legislation in relation to delegated authority would mean that
while Congress can delegate its powers by an ordinary majority, it
can limit or recover its powers only by an extraordinary two-thirds
majority. The "necessary and proper" clause of the Constitution (by
which Congress may enact laws "necessary and proper" to carry out
its enumerated powers) provides an adequate basis for legislative veto
devices, since the clause applies not only vertically (in federal-state
relations) but also horizontally (in interbranch relations).32 Even in
cases where the delegation of congressional authority may not be di-
rectly involved-as with respect to impoundments, war powers and
national emergencies-the legislative veto is constitutionally sustain-
able as a necessary means of reasserting congressional authority
against attempted presidential encroachment. 33 For decades, Presi-
dents have acquiesced in the legislative veto provisions by signing,
and at times even initiating, acts in which they were included. In
some of its forms the legislative veto is functionally equivalent to leg-
islation. It simply reverses the legislative process, with presidential
J., dissenting); SuNDQUIST, supra note 9, at 355 n.30; Martin, The Legislative Veto, at 255 n.5;
Watson, supra note 12, at 989. In the pre-1970 period, see the favorable assessments expressed
by, inter alia, CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1957 130 (4th rev. ed.
1957); Cooper and Cooper, The Legislative Veto and the Constitution, 30 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
467 (1962). Compare the critical views of Ginnane, supra note 16.
32. On this last argument, see Miller & Knapp, supra note 31, at 382-83. The "necessary
and proper" clause was the main prop of the House of Representatives' arguments in Chadha.
See House For. Aff. Comm. Veto Hearings, supra note 7, at 122-23 (testimony by Professor
Eugene Gressman).
33. Abourezk, supra note 13, at 335.
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involvement preceding rather than succeeding bicameral approval (or
non-disapproval). 3
These legal arguments were discounted by opponents of the leg-
islative veto, who rested their case primarily on a strict construction
of the Constitution's presentment clause. Congress could not, they
argued, alter by mere statute the constitutionally prescribed method
for the adoption of legislation, even with presidential acquiescence.
The repeal or modification of statutory authority was no less legisla-
tive in character than the adoption of original legislation. There was
an element of disingenuousness in the "event" or "contingency" the-
ory, since Congress could make its delegations of power conditional
only if the condition itself is constitutionally legitimate. Nor could
the "necessary and proper" clause alter the prescribed legislative pro-
cedure. The same procedure had to be followed whether Congress
was acting under the "necessary and proper" clause or pursuant to
specifically enumerated constitutional powers. In cases such as the
War Powers Resolution, where Congress was not even delegating its
own authority but attempting to set limits on the President's in-
dependent constitutional powers, the use of the legislative veto was
even more questionable."a If Congress wished to preserve or restore
the constitutional balance against an "imperial presidency" or an
"imperial bureaucracy," it had ample constitutional means at its dis-
posal for this purpose; it required only the political will to employ
them.
Some writers opted for a middle ground on the constitutional
issue, upholding some legislative vetoes while questioning the validity
34. This argument was used by the executive to defend the use of the legislative veto with
respect to reorganization legislation. See infra notes 47-49 and accompanying text. Recogniz-
ing no grounds for differentiating reorganization from other legislation, Justice White endorsed
this line of reasoning to legitimize the legislative veto device as a whole. Chadha, 103 S. Ct.
2806-7 (1983). He went on to deduce that the one-House veto was more sustainable than the
two-House variety. "Although the idea may be initially counter-intuitive, on close analysis, it
is not at all unusual . . . . Because approval is indicated by the failure to veto, the one-House
veto satisfies the requirement of bicameral approval. The two-House version may present a
different question." Id. at 2808.
35. See, e.g., T. FRANCK & E. WEISBAND, FOREIGN POLICY BY CONGRESS 80 (1979); see
also House For. Aff. Comm. Hearings, supra note 7, at 34, 47-48 (testimony of Stanley Brand);
Senate For. Rel. Comm. Hearing on Arms Export Control, supra note 8, at 23 (testimony of
Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth W. Dam). For the opposite view holding that the legisla-
tive veto is more valid where, as in the War Powers Resolution, the delegation of congressional
authority is not involved, see 119 CONG. REC. H21224-25 (1973) (views of Professor Paul
Freund); Watson, supra note 12, at 1084-86; cf Glennon, The War Powers Resolution Ten
Years Later: More Politics Than Law, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 571, 577-78 (1984).
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of others.36 Committee vetoes, especially, found fewer defenders in
the scholarly community than did one or two-House vetoes.37
Commentators were divided in their assessment of the legislative
veto on policy grounds as well. Some argued that the device was "an
efficient means of resolving the tension between the executive's need
for elasticity of action and the legislature's need to check that ac-
tion."3 Without it Congress had either to abdicate its authority alto-
gether to the executive branch or to engage in a cumbersome, time-
consuming process of legislation in minute detail.3 9 By retaining
control over the implementation of its statutorily declared policies,
Congress, it was said, heightened the government's accountability to
the electorate. On the other hand, the legislative veto's detractors
charged that it was more bluff than substance. The legislative veto
allowed Congress "to make a public show of addressing an important
issue, while yet evading direct responsibility for the necessary affirm-
ative choices."' It was basically a negative device which com-
pounded the risks of governmental impasse,41 flooded the Congress
with minutiae which it and its staff were ill-equipped to handle, at-
tentuated rather than enhanced governmental accountability by ac-
cording greater influence to powerful lobbies, and exposed individual
congressmen to conflict-of-interest positions. Without it Congress
would be forced to legislate with greater precision and to accept
fuller responsibility for congressional actions both in the domestic
and foreign-relations spheres.
The division of opinion among the scholarly community was
mirrored by the divergence of views among the wielders of political
power. Interestingly, even within the halls of Congress the legislative
veto had not been universally endorsed as a constitutionally valid de-
vice. Ever since 1919, doubts were voiced from time to time regard-
36. See, e.g., Javits & Klein, supra note 22, at 485 (questioning the validity of Lend-Lease
type veto provisions for statutory repeal by concurrent resolution); Stewart, supra note 31, at
619; Watson supra note 12, at 1049-87; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 284-86 (1976)
(White, J., concurring).
37. For a full discussion of the committee veto, see Ginnane, supra note 16, at 599-609;
Watson, supra note 12, at 1017-29, 1053-61. Committee vetoes also drew more vigorous oppo-
sition from Presidents than did other forms of the legislative veto. See infra note 44.
38. Javits & Klein, supra note 22, at 465.
39. See 103 S. Ct. 2793 (Justice White's explanation of the "Hobson's choice" facing Con-
gress after Chadha).
40. Martin, supra note 31, at 273.
41. See, especially, the five case studies, one of which relates to the disposition of the
Nixon tapes and papers, discussed by Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note 31.
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ing its legitimacy.4 2 In a few instances, these doubts apparently
prompted a decision to include a severability clause in the relevant
statute-most notably, in the War Powers Resolution.43 On the
other hand, Presidents and their attorneys-general had not uniformly
and unequivocally opposed legislative veto provisions. Until the
Nixon and Carter administrations the record was somewhat mixed,
with the greatest opposition directed at committee vetoes. These, it
was felt, sought to involve Congress in the execution of laws and
delegated to committees the legislative authority vested by the Con-
stitution in the plenary assemblies." As for other vetoes, Presidents
and their attorneys-general sometimes objected, sometimes acqui-
esced, primarily as a matter of political realism;45 and in a few in-
stances even proposed and defended legislation with legislative veto
clauses.46 Although President Hoover's Attorney General, William
D. Mitchell, challenged-after the fact-the constitutionality of the
one-House veto incorporated in the Reorganization Act of 1932," 7
subsequent Presidents came to accept the legislative veto in reorgani-
42. For relevant citations see Watson, supra note 12, at 988 n. 11; Henry, supra note 31, at
737-38 n.7; Ginnane, supra note 16, at 575, 579, 580, 588, 591, 594. On the 1919 debate, see
supra note 16. For congressional doubts regarding the constitutionality of the legislative veto
provision in the War Powers Resolution, see the minority views in HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, WAR POWERS RESOLUTION OF 1973, H. REP. No. 93-287 (to accompany H.J. Res.
542), 93rd Cong., 1st. Sess. (1973), reprinted in WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: RELEVANT DOC-
UMENTS, CORRESPONDENCE, REPORTS, SUBCOMM. ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND SCI-
ENTIFIC AFFAIRS, HOUSE COMM. ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 31-
32, 36 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter cited as WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: DOCUMENTS]
also reprinted in CRS VETO STUDIES, supra note 12, at 645-46, 650. On impoundments see
House For. Aff. Comm. Hearings, supra note 7, at 268 n.15.
43. See infra notes 105, 360 and accompanying text.
44. See, e.g., Watson, supra note 21, at 1017-29, 1064; SUNDQUIST, supra note 9, at 346-
49; FRANCK & WEISBAND, supra note 35, at 78-79. In one instance, President Kennedy pro-
posed the enactment of a committee veto over an agricultural program. Watson, supra note 12,
at 1026; cf id. at 988 n.12 (committee veto which originated with the Eisenhower
Administration).
45. See especially the case of F.D.R. and Lend-Lease, infra text accompanying notes 50-
54.
46. See, e.g., Watson, supra note 12, at 988 n.12; SUNDQUIST, supra note 9, at 359. For
relevant facts and citations concerning Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, see Chadha, 103 S.
Ct. 2793-94 n.5 (1983) (White, J., dissenting). Most executive justifications of the legislative
veto, however, related solely to the matter of reorganization. See infra notes 48-49 and accom-
panying text.
47. 37 Op. Att'y Gen. 56, 63-64 (1933), reprinted in 76 CONG. REC. H2446-48 (1933); see
also Ginnane, supra note 16, at 576; Watson, supra note 12, at 1009-10; Fisher & Moe, Delegat-
ing with Ambivalence: The Legislative Veto and Reorganization Authority, in CRS VETO STUD-
IES, supra note 12, at 165-68. A tax bill which contained a committee veto clause triggered the
retrospective objections to the veto in the Reorganization Act. See supra note 18.
Vol. 15
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zation acts as legitimate.4" Even President Carter's Attorney Gen-
eral, Griffin Bell, defended its inclusion in the 1977 Reorganization
Act while attempting, unsuccessfully, to differentiate it from other
forms of the legislative veto.4 9
A most interesting instance of a presidential objection to the leg-
islative veto occurred in 1941, when President Roosevelt felt com-
pelled to sign the Lend-Lease Act despite serious reservations
regarding the constitutionality of its provision for repeal by concur-
rent resolution. 50 President Roosevelt was then faced with an acute
political dilemma. The legislative veto provision had been included
in the statute by the President's supporters, who hoped thereby to
reassure those congressmen who hesitated to grant the President un-
fettered authority. Opponents of the bill contended that the legisla-
tive veto provision was unconsitutional, and the supposed check on
the presidential power therefore illusory. On the constitutional issue,
the President agreed with his opponents. Moreover, he did not want
to allow the precedent, in Attorney General Jackson's words, "to
ripen into a custom which would impair the powers which properly
appertained to his great office." However, publicizing his views
"would confirm and delight his opposition and let down his friends."
It would aso "strengthen fear in the country that he was seeking to
increase his personal power."'" To escape the dilemma, Roosevelt
signed the bill, but instructed his Attorney General, Robert H. Jack-
son, to have an official, but secret memorandum drafted in the Presi-
dent's name detailing his firm objections to the legislative veto
provision." In this manner, Roosevelt felt he could prevent his ap-
48. In 1938, President Roosevelt at first contemplated objecting to the legislative veto on
the grounds that a concurrent resolution could only be an "expression of congressional senti-
ment" and could not annul executive action "taken in pursuance of law." Pragmatic consider-
ations led him to reverse himself in short order. Fisher & Moe, supra note 47, at 185-95. In
1949, when Congress was introducing a one-House veto in reorganization legislation, the office
of the Attorney General upheld the constitutionality of the two-House veto in reorganization
acts. Id. at 212-13; Ginnane, supra note 16, at 581-82.
49. Attorney General Bell went so far as to uphold the one-House veto for reorganization
plans, something which previous attorneys general had been reluctant to do. Fisher & Moe,
supra note 47, at 237-38. On the untenability of applying the "reverse legislation" rationale to
reorganization statutes alone, see Fisher, CRS VETO STUDIES, supra note 12, at 4; dissenting
opinion of Justice White, 103 S. Ct. 2807 n.22 (1983); SUNDQUIST, supra note 9, at 354 n.27;
Henry, supra note 31, at 750-51.
50. See Jackson, supra note 22.
51. Id. at 1357.
52. Interestingly, Jackson himself was not so convinced of the unconstitutionality of the
legislative veto in all cases. Id. at 1355. This episode represented a rather extraordinary (per-
haps unique) reversal of the usual procedure, since in this case the President rendered a legal
opinion to his Attorney General. Id. at 1353.
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proval of the bill, which had been "due to the existing exigencies of
the world situation," from being "construed as tacit acquiescence" in
the constitutionality of the offensive provision. 5' The memorandum
was to be filed in the Department of Justice, and its method of publi-
cation was left to the discretion of Jackson, who determined in 1953
that the time was ripe for publication.54
With the administration of Richard Nixon the presidential on-
slaught against the legislative veto began in earnest. In explaining his
veto of the War Powers Resolution, Nixon included a challenge to
the constitutionality of the provision (section 5[c]) permitting Con-
gress to order removal of United States forces abroad by means of a
concurrent resolution. This clause, Nixon contended, "denies the
president his constitutional role in approving legislation." 51 Subse-
quently, Gerald Ford vetoed the Atomic Energy Act Amendments of
1974, and objected, inter alia, to a clause providing for congressional
action by concurrent resolution.56 Perhaps not surprisingly, it fell to
Jimmy Carter to enunciate the strongest opposition to the legislative
veto. The Nixon Administration may have sown the wind, but it was
the Carter Administration which was now reaping the whirlwind of
the legislative veto provisions which had been adopted in reaction to
the earlier imperial presidency and which were continuing to be
churned out routinely thereafter. In his message of June 21, 1978,
President Carter notified Congress that he would view all legislative
vetoes (apart from the one-House veto in the Reorganization Act) as
unconstitutional. He also deplored the "excessive use of legislative
53. Id. at 1358.
54. The appearance of Ginnane's article triggered Jackson's decision to publicize Presi-
dent Roosevelt's memorandum. Id. at 1353, 1361. After Lend-Lease, Roosevelt continued to
sign without comment (presumably, for similar reasons of expediency) numerous wartime acts
containing legislative veto provisions. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
55. Veto of the War Powers Resolution, Oct. 24, 1973, PuB. PAPERS OF THE PRESI-
DENTS: RICHARD M. NIXON 893 (1973). Other objections to the constitutionality of the War
Powers Resolution were based on the alleged attempt by Congress to encroach on the Presi-
dent's constitutional powers. Id. at 893-95.
Curiously, the Impoundment Control Act of 1974, which incorporated a legislative veto,
was never challenged on constitutional grounds by President Nixon, nor by his successors,
Ford and Carter. CRS VETO STUDIES, supra note 12, at 2.
56. Veto of Atomic Energy Act Amendments, October 12, 1974, PuB. PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS: GERALD R. FORD 294-95 (1974). Ford also vetoed, on May 7, 1976, a foreign
assistance bill because, inter alia, it incorporated seven legislative vetoes with respect to arms
exports. The vetoes, he held, were "incompatible with the express provision in the Consitu-
tion" on the presentation of laws to the President; moreover, they would make Congress "a
virtual co-adminstrator in operational" foreign policy decisions. Id. at 1481-83 (1976-77). In
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vetoes . . . to restrict foreign policy actions," since this "can impede
our ability to respond to rapidly changing world conditions." Hence-
forth, he declared, he would treat all existing and future legislative
veto clauses as "report and wait" provisions." Beyond that, the
Carter Administration sought a test case in the Supreme Court. Af-
ter one false start,58 the Administration, at the very end of its term,
found the case it was seeking: the question of the deportation of
Jagdish Rai Chadha. 9 It was not clear that the Reagan Administra-
tion would proceed with the challenge. During the election cam-
paign Reagan had supported the legislative veto, and similar support
had been expressed in the 1980 Republican platform." But once in
office, the Reagan Administration decided to proceed with the test
case.61 For its part, the Supreme Court, which on several earlier oc-
casions had avoided the issue," now at last picked up the gauntletwhich the Carter and Reagan Adminstrations had thrown.
57. PUB. PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS: JIMMY CARTER 1146-49 (1978). Earlier, on De-
cember 28, 1977, President Carter had indicated that he would treat the legislative veto provi-
sion in the International Emergency Economic Powers Act as a "notify and wait" provision.
Id. at 2187 (1977). See also id. at 502 (1978) (Carter's objections (on March 10, 1978) to the
numerous veto provisions in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978).
58. Congress effectively foiled the first attempt, which involved a legislative veto of educa-
tion regulations. SUNDQUIST, supra note 9, at 353-54.
59. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in December 1980, declared invalid the legisla-
tive veto provision in the Immigration and Nationality Act. Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408 (9th
Cir. 1980). Chadha involved, in the words of one commentator, "a somewhat anachronistic
and perhaps unusually vulnerable use of the legislative veto" since it also raised questions
touching on the due process and bill of attainder clauses. Martin, supra note 31, at 261 n.22.
Nevertheless, during the last week of the Carter Administration, it was announced that the
Justice Department would proceed with the test case before the Supreme Court. Sundquist,
supra note 9, at 354.
60. Martin, supra note 31, at 260.
61. The Reagan Administration also began to raise objections to committee vetoes, such
as those incorporated in the Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act of 1982, requiring the
approval of the appropriations committees for transferring funds between accounts and for
obligating special contingency funds. See Collier et. al., Foreign Policy Effect of the Supreme
Court's Legislative Veto Decision, Congressional Research Service Issue Brief No. IB 83123,
July 19, 1983, updated Jan. 5, 1984 (mimeo.), at 9-10.
62. Thus, in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.1 (1976) (the campaign financing case), the
Supreme Court deliberately avoided the issue of the constitutionality of the legislative veto, (id.
at 140 n. 176), preferring to rest its decision on the grounds that Congress had infringed on the
President's appointment power. (Only Justice White, in a concurring opinion, broached the
issue. Id. at 282-86.) In the following years, the Court again failed to grapple with the issue by
summarily affirming a Court of Appeals decision which had considered unripe a challenge to
the legislative veto question, and denying certiorari with respect to a Court of Claims decision
which had sustained a congressional veto. See Clark v. Valeo, 599 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(en bane), afl'd mem., Clark v. Kimmitt, 431 U.S. 950 (1977); Atkins v. United States, 566
F.2d (Ct. Cl. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978). For other cases in which the legislative
15
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II. THE CHADHA RULING
The Supreme Court rendered its long-awaited decision in the
case of Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha on June
23, 1983.63 It upheld the ruling of the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals and invalidated the one-House veto contained in Section 244
(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act." But the grounds
upon which the Supreme Court based its judgment were very differ-
ent from those of the lower court. The Ninth Circuit had carefully
confined itself to the facts of the case, involving congressional action
with respect to individual adjudications, and it had premised its deci-
sion on the separation-of-powers doctrine which it held to have been
violated in this case by congressional intrusion into essential execu-
tive or judicial functions.65 In contrast, the rationale behind the
Supreme Court decision-the constitutional clauses on bicameralism
and presentment to the President-could not have been more clear-
cut and definitive with respect to the illegitimacy of the legislative
veto device as a whole. In reaching its conclusions, the Court did not
address itself directly to the "rich array of inventive and subtle argu-
ments and counterarguments" on the validity of the legislative veto
device which had been proffered over the past half-century. "For bet-
ter or worse, most of this intriguing terrain . . . [was] left wholly
unexplored in the Court's opinion.
' 66
Writing for the majority of the Court, Chief Justice Warren Bur-
ger presented the following main arguments on the merits. First of
all, he dismissed as judicially irrelevant the utilitarian argument on
the usefulness of the legislative veto device:
The fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient,
and useful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone,
will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution. Convenience
veto, though unchallenged, figured significantly in litigation, see Martin, supra note 31, at 254
n.4.
63. 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983). As noted, the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
was delivered in December 1980. See supra note 59. The case was argued before the Supreme
Court on February 22, 1982, and reargued on October 7, 1982.
64. By simple resolution, either House of Congress might veto a decision by the Attorney
General to suspend deportation in hardship cases.
65. Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980).
66. House For. Aff. Comm. Hearings, supra note 7, at 137 (statement of Professor David
A. Martin). Similarly, Stanley Brand, legal counsel to the House, observed: "For a subject that
has been vigorously debated for over 50 years in law journals, opinions of the Attorney Gen-
eral, in committees, and by political scientists, all of which produced an archive of material on
the subject, the decision is uncharacteristically economical and direct on the key issue of consti-
tutionality." Id. at 12.
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and efficiency are not the primary objectives--or the hallmarks-
of democratic government and our inquiry is sharpened rather
than blunted by the fact that Congressional veto provisions are
appearing with increasing frequency in statutes which delegate au-
thority to executive and independent agencies.67
Next, Burger set out to prove the universal and uniform applica-
bility of the presentment and bicameral clauses of the Constitution to
all "legislative" acts, including acts purporting to amend and repeal
statutes.68 For this purpose he relied on the clear language of the
Constitution and the intention of the Framers. The presentment
clause, he concluded, was designed to provide a check on the legisla-
ture by allowing the President to defend himself, to prevent the pas-
sage of bad laws and to engraft a national perspective on the
legislative process. 69 "The President's participation in the legislative
process was to protect the Executive Branch from Congress and to
protect the whole people from improvident laws."' 70 Bicameralism
similarly was deemed an indispensable safeguard against legislative
despotism. 71 In all, the constitutional method for legislative enact-
ment, as embodied in Art. 1, Sections 1 and 7 of the Constitution,
''represents the Framers' decision that the legislative power of the
Federal government be exercised in accord with a single, finely
wrought and exhaustively considered procedure.
72
But was the contested House action in this case truly "legisla-
tive" in nature? It was, the Court said, because it "had the purpose
and effect of altering the legal rights, duties and relations of persons,
including the Attorney General, Executive Branch officials and
Chadha, all outside the legislative branch." It thus could have no
legal effect unless passed by means of the regular legislative proce-
dure. "Congress must abide by its delegation of authority" to the
Attorney General "until that delegation is legislatively altered or re-
67. 103 S. Ct. 2780-81 (1983). In this passage there is a clear indication that the prolifera-
tion of legislative veto provisions in recent years was a factor (perhaps the primary factor)
prompting the Court to issue so sweeping a judgment in Chadha. The Court may have been
strengthened in its resolve by its avowed skepticism as to "the long range political wisdom" of
the legislative veto "invention." Id. at 2781. It was probably easier for the Court to dismiss the
utilitarian argument as constitutionally irrelevant since the argument's accuracy was also in
doubt. In contrast, Justice White fully embraced the utilitarian justification. Id. at 2795.
68. Id. at 2785-87.
69. Id. at 2782-83.
70. Id. at 2784.
71. Id. at 2783-84.
72. Id. at 2784.
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yoked."7 3 The fact that a few exceptions to the bicameral-present-
ment process are explicitly spelled out in the Constitution (in respect
to impeachments, appointments and treaties) reinforces the conclu-
sion that in all other matters Congress must follow the strictures of
Article L" The utilitarian argument, which at the beginning of the
discussion was discounted as irrelevant, is at the end positively
scorned by Burger, who pits the requirements of democracy against
those of efficiency:
It is crystal clear from the records of the Convention, contempora-
neous writings and debates, that the Framers ranked other values
higher than efficiency. . . . The choices. . . made in the Consti-
tutional Convention impose burdens on governmental processes
that often seem clumsy, inefficient, even unworkable, but those
hard choices were consciously made by men who had lived under
a form of government that permitted arbitrary governmental acts
to go unchecked. There is no support in the Constitution or deci-
sions of this Court for the proposition that the cumbersomeness
and delays often encountered in complying with explicit Constitu-
tional standards may be avoided, either by the Congress or by the
President. 7s
Having declared Section 244 (c)(2) of the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act to be unconstitutional, could the Court properly enter-
tain Chadha's claim at all? For if Section 244 (c)(2) could not be
severed from the rest of Article 244, the Attorney General would
have had no authority to suspend Chadha's deportation in the first
place, and the Court would not be in a position to grant Chadha the
relief he requested (non-deportation). The issue of severability,
which in the Chadha case was one of several preliminary challenges
to the Court's jurisdiction which the Court felt called upon to re-
solve, 76 has since become the central issue in relation to statutes con-
taining legislative veto provisions.7' Attention has therefore been
73. Id. at 2784-86.
74. Id. at 2786-87.
75. Id. at 2788.
76. The other challenges related to the Court's appellate jurisdiction, Chadha's standing
to sue, the availability to Chadha of alternative avenues of relief, the lack of jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals, the absence of a case or controversy and the presence of a non-justiciable
"political question." Id. at 2772-80.
77. The issue was raised in post-Chadha litigation. See supra note 6; House For. Aff.
Comm. Hearings, supra note 7, at 61-62 n.lO; Fisher, supra note 8, at 14-16; Fisher, Post-
Chadha Developments. Appendix D, Litigation, 1983 CRS REV. 34 (special Fall issue). For a
scrutiny of the confusion induced by Chadha in the lower courts, see Fisher, One Year After,
supra note 8, at 25-35. Other legal uncertainties which have come to the forefront in the post-
Chadha spate of litigation have related to such issues as (1) the retroactive effect of Chadha; (2)
Vol. 15
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properly focussed on the Court's three-pronged test on severability.78
First, does the statute contain a severability clause? If it does, there
is a presumption that Congress intended the severability of the inva-
lid clause. Second, does the legislative history of the provision sup-
port severability? And finally, is what remains after severance "fully
operative as a law"? The Court concluded that the legislative veto
provision in this case was severable, on all three grounds, from the
rest of Article 244. 79
The impressive majority supporting the Court's opinion height-
ened further the impact of the ruling. Of the seven justices of the
majority, six endorsed the Court's reasoning. 0 Justice Powell con-
curred on narrower grounds related to the purported exercise by
Congress of quasi-judicial powers in this case.8 ' He thus reserved
judgment with respect to the validity of the legislative veto device in
general. Of the two minority judges, only Justice White defended, in
a vigorous dissent, the practice of the legislative veto.8 2  Justice
Rehnquist did not broach the issue directly but rested his case on the
inseverability of the legislative veto clause from the remainder of Ar-
the ability of Congress to furnish subsequent legitimation, by means of statutes or appropria-
tions, to otherwise tainted executive decisions; and (3) the validity of informal accommodations
which fall short of legislative vetoes.
78. 103 S. Ct. 2774-75 (1983). For previous Supreme Court use of some of these criteria
for severability, see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108 (1976); Champlin Refining Co. v. Corpo-
ration Commission, 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932). But compare the view of Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral Edward C. Schmults to the effect that the third prong of the Court's test was new and that
the Court had not previously seen in the full operability of a statutory scheme after severance a
presumption indicating severability. House For. Aff. Comm. Hearings, supra note 7, at 60 n.8.
For earlier discussions of severability, see Ginnane, supra note 16, at 609-11; Stern, Separability
and Separability Clauses in the Supreme Court, 51 HARV. L. REV. 76 (1937).
79. 103 S. Ct. 2774-76 (1983). On this point, Justice Rehnquist (joined by Justice White)
dissented. Congress, he held, had not intended to sever section (c) from the rest of Article 244.
Rather, the process for suspending deportation, as embodied in Article 244, was to be seen as
an integral whole. Id. at 2816-17. Presumably, then, Chadha lacked standing to sue.
80. Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and
O'Connor.
81. 103 S. Ct. 2788-92 (1983).
82. Id. at 2792-2811. Justice White saw in the legislative veto "an important if not indis-
pensable political invention that allows the President and Congress to resolve major constitu-
tional and policy differences." Far from being "a sword with which Congress has struck out to
aggrandize itself at the expense of the other branches," the veto "has been a means of defense, a
reservation of ultimate authority necessary if Congress is to fulfill its designated role. . . as the
nation's lawmaker." Without it "Congress is faced with a Hobson's choice: either to refrain
from delegating the necessary authority, leaving itself with a hopeless task of writing laws with
the requisite specificity to cover endless special circumstances across the entire policy land-
scape, or in the alternative, to abdicate its lawmaking function to the executive branch and
independent agencies. Id. at 2793, 2795, 2796.
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ticle 244.83 Thus, he may be said to have endorsed, by implication,
the Court's view of the illegitimacy of the legislative veto. Signifi-
cantly, in his pre-bench writings he had questioned the constitution-
ality of at least one form of the legislative veto.84
Is there, then, any life in the legislative veto after Chadha? Ap-
parently not, to judge by the near-consensus on this point expressed
by justices within the Court,85 legal advisers of Congress and the Ex-
ecutive, and academic commentators.86 As Professor David A. Mar-
tin concluded, "no variant of the legislative veto . . . survives this
constitutional holding."8 7 Post-Chadha Supreme Court decisions re-
inforce this assessment, especially since in one of the two legislative
veto cases summarily affirmed by the Court on July 6, 1983, a two-
House veto was ruled invalid. 8 "Report and wait" provisions re-
main unaffected, of course, and the Court specifically upheld their
validity.89 Some have suggested that it may still be legitimate to
make the appropriation or expenditure of funds dependent upon the
prior adoption by Congress of a simple, concurrent or committee res-
83. Id. at 2816-17.
84. Committee Veto: Fifty Years of Sparring Between the Executive and the Legislature,
Remarks Before the Section of Administrative Law of the American Bar Association, Dallas,
Texas (August 12, 1969).
85. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text; see also supra note 5 (regarding Justice
White's second thoughts).
86. See, e.g., House For. Aff. Comm. Hearings, supra note 7 (testimonies of Stanley Brand,
legal counsel of the House; Deputy Attorney General Edward C. Schmults; Deputy Secretary
of State Kenneth W. Dam; and Professor David A. Martin); see also Subcomm. on Administra-
tive Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, (Mimeo.), July 18, 1983
(statement of Louis Fisher), House Comm. on Rules, (Mimeo., November 10, 1983) (statement
of Louis Fisher). But cf. infra note 90. See also, e.g., the following post-Chadha comments:
Baruch, Vetoing the Veto: Legislative Veto Decision by the Supreme Court, COMMONWEAL,
Aug. 12, 1983, at 421-24; Destler, Dateline Washington: Life After the Veto, FOREIGN POL'Y
181 (Fall 1983); DeConcini & Faucher, The Legislative Veto: A ConstitutionalAmendment, 21
HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 29 (1984); Fisher, Legislative Vetoes, Phoenix Style, EXTENSIONS (Spring
1984), at 2; Mann, Authority on Arms Sales Survives Court Decision, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE
TECH., July 4, 1983, at 22-24; Quint, The Separation of Powers Under Carter, 62 TEX. L. REV.
785, 826-37 (1984) (on legislative veto); Smith & Struve, Aftershocks of the Fall of the Legisla-
tive Veto, 69 A.B.A. J. 1258 (1983); Strauss, Was There a Baby in the Bathwater? A Comment
on the Supreme Court's Legislative Veto Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 789; Sundquist, The Legisla-
tive Veto: A Bounced Check, BROOKINGS REVIEW 13-16 (Fall 1983); cf Tribe, The Legislative
Veto Decision: A Law By Any Other Name?, 21 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (1984) (suggesting ways
of limiting the impact of the Chadha decision on other statutes).
87. House For. Aff. Comm. Hearings, supra note 7, at 130.
88. See supra note 6 and 77, with respect to lower court decisions.
89. 103 S. Ct. 2776 n.9 (1983). For a recent Court of Claims decision (now under appeal)
which nevertheless casts some doubt on the validity of a provision requiring notification to be
furnished to a congressional committee, see infra note 389.
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olution. 90 Basically, however, one can only hope to find some "mi-
nor fissures in the otherwise seamless fabric" of the Chadha
decision.9' The more important, and perhaps only issue still to be
resolved with respect to the legislative veto in future cases is the ques-
tion of severability. In this matter, post-Chadha litigation seems to
point to an easing of the Court's three-pronged severability test and
to a strong tendency to presume severability. 92 Much future litiga-
tion can be expected, in which the severability issue will probably be
disposed of on a case-by-case basis.
But is such litigation apt to embrace foreign policy legislation as
well? How likely is it that the relevant legislative veto provisions will
be formally tested before the courts? In the realm of foreign affairs,
of course, the political question objection is determinative more often
than not.93 The need to establish standing and a case or controversy
would also normally limit the possibilities of litigation with respect to
foreign policy issues. True, the Court in Chadha and succeeding
cases eased the standing and adverseness requirements, so that pri-
vate litigants might now more readily challenge legislative veto provi-
sions on the grounds that they were prospective beneficiaries of the
executive decision had it remained unvetoed by Congress.94 In the
course of the House Foreign Affairs Committee hearings on the legis-
lative veto, the spectre was therefore raised of successful private suits
90. See, e.g., House For. Aff. Comm. Hearings, supra note 7, at 115, 126-27 (the statement
by Professor Eugene Gressman); and the statement of Louis Fisher before the Senate Subcom-
mittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, supra note 86, at 13-14, where it is suggested
that Congress might be permitted to use its internal rulemaking power to lend effect to congres-
sional vetoes. Cf. Cooper, Postscript on the Congressional Veto: Is There Life After Chadha?
98 POL. Sci. Q. 429 (1983); Watson, supra note 12, at 985, 1064.
91. House For. Aff. Comm. Hearings, supra note 7, at 16 (statement of Stanley Brand).
92. See infra note 353 and accompanying text; see generally § V (on severability). Lower
court judgments on the matter have been more equivocal.
93. In the Chadha case, the Court dismissed the political question argument, stating, inter
alia, that "the presence of constitutional issues with significant political overtones does not
automatically invoke the political question doctrine," and that "resolution of litigation chal-
lenging the constitutional authority of one of the three branches cannot be evaded by courts
because the issues have political implications." 103 S. Ct. 2778-80 (1983). But cf Crockett v.
Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983), aff'g 558 F.Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982), where the
"political question" doctrine prevailed in the District Court and the Court of Appeals in a suit
involving the application of the War Powers Resolution to the American presence in El
Salvador.
94. For the Court's treatment of these questions, see 103 S. Ct. 2773 n.5, 2776, 2778
(1983). In a little noticed, but significant sentence in Chadha, the Court stated that it had
"long held that Congress is the proper party to defend the validity of a statute when an agency
of government, as a defendant charged with enforcing the statute, agrees with plaintiffs that the
statute is inapplicable or unconstitutional." But once Congress does intervene, it thereby fur-
nishes "concrete adverseness" to the case. See id. at 2778.
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by disappointed arms contractors whose prospective arms sales were
barred by a President because of congressional objections expressed
by a concurrent resolution."a The plausibility of such a scenario was,
however, questioned. For even if the hurdles of standing and jus-
ticiability were overcome-and this was still very doubtful-the arms
contractor would have little hope of winning on the merits. After all,
the President has an undeniable right to heed a "sense-of-Congress"
resolution in respect to sensitive foreign policy issues.9 6
Regardless of whether the legislative veto provisions concerned
ever reach the courts, Congress itself-sworn no less than the judici-
ary to uphold the Constitution-has implicitly recognized the inva-
lidity of the legislative veto after Chadha. It was this recognition
which formed the basic premise of hearings conducted by various
congressional committees-including the Senate Foreign Relations
and House Foreign Affairs Committees-in the wake of Chadha.
The same assumption underlay some congressional moves to replace
provisions for concurrent resolutions with provisions for joint resolu-
tions.9" It is thus in point to examine the most important legislative
95. See the testimony of Stanley Brand, legal counsel to the House, House For. Aff.
Comrm. Hearings, supra note 7, at 6-7, 22-23; and of Professor Eugene Gressman, id. at 152-53.
Brand also foresaw the possibility of successful suits with respect to the War Powers Resolu-
tion, based on dicta in the District Court's decision in Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893,
901. Id. at 7-8, 24-25. But Professor Gressman expressed skepticism in this regard, stating
that "it is very difficult, if not impossible, to expect that the courts will ever enter into a dispute
between the President and the Congress over the procedures or the powers that Congress may
or may not delegate to the President in the foreign affairs area." Id. at 155. Cf. Glennon, supra
note 35, at 580 (suggesting that Congress amend the War Powers Resolution so as to confer
standing to sue on congressional plaintiffs).
96. See the views of Deputy Attorney General Edward S. Schmults, House For. Aff.
Comm. Hearings, supra note 7, at 90-93, 99-100; Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth W. Dam,
id. at 95; Professor David A. Martin, id. at 153.
97. Thus, for example, soon after the Chadha decision, on July 12, 1983, the House Rules
Committee refused to send to the floor of the House two bills-the Export Administration
Amendments Act 1983 (H.R. 3231) and the Foreign Aid Authorization bill (H.R. 2992)-
because they contained legislative vetoes. (In the latter bill, the legislative vetoes related to
military aid to El Salvador. On the Export Administration Amendments Act, see infra § III
[D]). Both bills were remanded to the Foreign Affairs Committee, which amended the bills
primarily by substituting joint for concurrent resolutions. On July 26, 1983, the House Rules
Committee adopted a resolution in which it enunciated a "general policy" not to act on bills or
resolutions incorporating legislative vetoes. 1983 CRS REV. 32 (special Fall issue). Subse-
quently, however, the House Rules Committee permitted certain bills containing legislative
vetoes to go forward because the relevant rules had been reported before the Chadha decision
was handed down. One of these bills-the Caribbean Basin Initiative-was enacted into law on
August 5, 1983. See Fisher, One Year After, supra note 8, at 12, 14-15. For a list of legislative
vetoes enacted after Chadha, see id. at 19-23; for the two veto provisions related to foreign
affairs, see id. at 20, 21.
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veto provisions which the Chadha ruling effectively wiped off the for-
eign policy slate.
III. LEGISLATIVE VETO PROVISIONS IN FOREIGN POLICY (AND
RELATED) LEGISLATION
A. The War Powers Resolution
The legislative veto provision in the War Powers Resolution was
the single most prominent foreign policy clause affected by the ra-
tionale of Chadha.98 How its invalidity would affect the rest of the
Resolution's scheme for regulating presidential use of force abroad
was a question which exercised the legislators considerably.
The War Powers Resolution was adopted as part of Congress'
"No More Vietnams" determination and in the hope of assuring that
no major American commitment of force would be effected without
substantial congresional involvement from an early stage. Its princi-
pal features related to consultation, reporting and the withdrawal of
forces; and the legislative veto was one of two methods for effecting
such withdrawal. In brief, the President was required to consult with
Congress "in every possible instance" before introducing U.S. armed
forces "into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement
in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances," and to con-
tinue to consult until removal of the forces or the end of hostilities
(Section 3). In accordance with Section 4(a), formal reports by the
President to the Congress were to be submitted when, in the absence
of a declaration of war, American armed forces were introduced:
(1) into hostilities or into situations where involvement in
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances;
(2) into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation,
while equipped for combat, except for deployments which relate
solely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces; or
(3) in numbers which substantially enlarge United States
Armed Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign
nation.
The withdrawal of forces from a situation of active or imminent hos-
tilities is provided for in Section 5. First, there is a provision (Section
5[b]) for automatic withdrawal of the forces within sixty days after a
report is submitted or required to be submitted by the President
under Section 4(a)(l)-or within ninety days, if the President certi-
98. See House For. Aff. Comm. Hearings, supra note 7, at 1-2 (opening statement of Chair-
man Zablocki).
23
Pomerance: United States Foreign Relations Law After Chadha
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1985
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
fies that the additional thirty-day period is necessary to complete the
safe withdrawal of the troops. After that, unless Congress declares
war or otherwise specifically authorizes the continued use of armed
force, such use must terminate.99 In this manner, the President is
denied the benefit of legislative inertia beyond the sixty (or ninety)
day period. But even before the end of this period, and "at any time"
when U.S. armed forces are being used without specific congressional
authorization, Congress may take the initiative under Section 5(c),
and by a mere concurrent resolution require the President to remove
the forces.
The purpose of this legislative veto provision, which was initi-
ated by the House, was to "avoid the possibility of a Presidential
veto-and resulting impasse-which would be possible on a bill or a
joint resolution."" Moreover, if action to terminate hostilities could
only come about by legislation, this would mean, as Federal District
Judge Orrin Judd observed in Holtzman v. Schlesinger, "that the
President needs a vote of only one-third plus one of either House in
order to conduct a war." ' Several congressmen openly expressed
doubts regarding the constitutionality of the legislative veto, 10 2 and
some (apparently including House Foreign Affairs Committee Chair-
man Clement Zablocki) voiced reservations in private. 0 3 Neverthe-
less, armed with a legal opinion by Professor Paul Freund that in
this case "the provision respecting a concurrent resolution is a valid
and appropriate measure,"" Congress adopted Section 5(c). At the
same time, it included a separability clause, primarily, it would seem,
because of lingering doubts with respect to Section 5(c).10 5 As noted
earlier, President Nixon pointed to the unconstitutionality of this
provision as one of the grounds for vetoing the War Powers
Resolution. 106
99. There is also no automatic withdrawal of forces if Congress is unable to meet because
of an armed attack on the United States.
100. WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: DOCUMENTS, supra note 42, at 27. The Senate version
provided for withdrawal by joint resolution or statute. For the discussion of the legislative
history of the War Powers Resolution in the context of the severability issue, see infra § V.
101. Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 361 F. Supp. 553, 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
102. WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: DOCUMENTS, supra note 42, at 31-32, 36.
103. See FRANCK & WEISBAND, supra note 35, at 70-71.
104. See 119 CONG. REC. H21224-25 (1973).
105. Section 9 provides: "If any provision of this joint resolution or the application thereof
to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the joint resolution and the
application of such provision to any other person or circumstance shall not be affected
thereby."
106. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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Unlike many of the other foreign policy statutes to be consid-
ered, the War Powers Resolution did not purport to delegate any
authority to the President. To the contrary, it specifically disavowed
any intention "to alter the constitutional authority of the Congress or
of the President" or to grant any authority to the President which
"he would not have had in the absence of this joint resolution."' 7
Nor did it effectively codify the boundaries between presidential and
congressional powers in the matter of the use of force."0 8 Those
boundaries remained as problematic as ever. Its main purpose was to
establish a procedural framework which would permit the President
and Congress to share a power whose contours were uncertain. Nev-
ertheless, as opponents of the resolution (from both the pro-congres-
sional and pro-presidential parts of the political spectrum)
recognized, the resolution did not really succeed in avoiding the is-
sues of delegation of congressional power and of codification with
respect to the "twilight zone" between the President's "commander-
in-chief" powers and Congress's war-making powers.1 0 9 Not surpris-
ingly, therefore, the constitutionality of its major provisions were,
and continue to be, hotly contested. On the one hand, it has been
argued that by addressing all uses of force abroad, Congress was at-
tempting to regulate and delegate powers which in many instances
were not its to delegate, having been vested by the Constitution di-
rectly in the President. On the other hand, congressional opponents
of the resolution, such as Senators Eagleton and Abourezk, con-
tended that Congress was, in effect, amending the Constitution by
delegating that which it had no right to delegate, and was handing
107. § 8(d). But cf the report by House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Clement
Zablocki, in which he stated: "When the President commits U.S. Armed Forces to hostilities
abroad on his own responsibility, he has, in effect, assumed congressional authority. Under this
war powers resolution, the Congress can rescind that authority as it sees fit by a concurrent
resolution and thereby avoid the problem of a Presidential veto." WAR POWERS RESOLUTION:
DOCUMENTS, supra note 42, at 30.
108. The Senate version purported to do so. But at the insistence of the House, the para-
graph defining the emergency powers of the President to use armed forces abroad was trans-
ferred to the section on "Purposes and Policy" (Sec. 2), thereby reducing its effect to that of a
"sense of the Congress" resolution. For this and other reasons, Senator Thomas Eagleton op-
posed the final version. See SUNDQUIST, supra note 9, at 258, n.6; see also Franck, After the
Falb The New Procedural Framework for Congressional Control Over the War Power, 71 AM. J.
INT'L L. 605, 613 (1977); S. 1906, 129 CONG. REC. S13244 (1983) (sponsored by Senators Cran-
ston, Eagleton and Stennis), which was intended to correct the shortcomings of the War Pow-
ers Resolution and which largely followed suggestions contained in the Franck article.
109. On the tension among the various provisions of the War Powers Resolution, see Ce-
lada, Effect of the Legislative Veto Decision on the Two-House Disapproval Mechanism to Termi-
nate U.S. Involvement in Hostilities Pursuant to Unilateral Presidential Action, in House For.
Aff. Comm. Hearings, supra note 7, at 313-15.
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the President "an open-ended, blank check for 90 days of warmak-
ing.""o In this context, the debate over the legislative veto assumes
added complexity and the device becomes doubly controversial. For
if it be conceded that, at least in some instances, employing the legis-
lative veto provision of the War Powers Resolution would mean im-
posing "a legislative check on an inherently executive function," then
in some contingencies such use would be deemed illegitimate, even
according to the criteria laid down by Justice White.'
It was generally conceded in Congress that only section 5(c) of
the War Powers Resolution was affected by the Chadha decision".2
(although Administration spokesmen continued to challenge some
other provisions of the resolution on other grounds)." 3 In order to
remove the offensive provison, the Senate, on October 20, 1983,
adopted an amendment to the State Department Authorization Bill
to replace the concurrent resolution procedure of Section 5(c) with
action by means of a joint resolution or bill. In conference, however,
a separate provision of law was substituted, in accordance with which
joint resolutions or bills to require the removal of United States
armed forces engaged in hostilities abroad without specific congres-
sional authorization would receive expedited treatment in the Senate.
This provision was signed into law on November 22, 1983. t"4 Thus,
110. Cited in SUNDQUIST, supra note 9, at 258. On Senator Abourezk's views, see CRS
VETO STUDIES, supra note 12, at 596 n.1. S. 1096, supra note 108, represented an attempt to
remedy this defect.
111. See 103 S. Ct. 2810 (1983). Justice White himself did not cast any doubt on the legiti-
macy of the legislative veto of the War Powers Resolution. Compare the views cited supra note
35.
112. Stanley Brand, House legal counsel, suggested that § 5(b), the automatic termination
provision, was also affected. See House For. Aff. Comm. Hearings, supra note 7, at 21-22 n.3,
36, 39-40. However, the consensus of other witnesses and of the members of Congress was that
Chadha touched only Section 5(c).
113. Section 5(b), especially, was seen as invalid. See id. at 68, 82 (testimony of Deputy
Secretary of State Kenneth W. Dam); see also the testimony of Secretary of State George P.
Schultz, in which he reaffirmed the Administration's reservations regarding the constitutional-
ity of the War Powers Resolution while attempting to arrive at a pragmatic compromise with
Congress on the continued stationing of American troops in Lebanon. War Powers Resolution:
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 7-8, 11, 13-14,
26-29, 31 (1983). Compliance by Presidents with the War Powers Resolution has entailed
primarily reporting, and, to a lesser degree, consultation. These provisions, the Administration
assured Congress, would continue to be observed. See, e.g., House For. Aff. Comm. Hearings,
at 83 (statement of Kenneth Dam).
114. Pub. L. No. 98-164, § 1013, 97 Stat. 1062-63 (1983). The Senate amendment (S.1342)
had been introduced by Senator Byrd on October 19, 1983, and easily passed the Senate with
an 86-11 vote. 129 CONG. REC. 14,163-65, 14,270 (1983); see Fisher, One Year After, supra
note 8, at 16-17; see also Collier, supra note 61, at 4, 14. The priority procedures to be applied
were those specified in Section 601(b) of the International Security Assistance and Arms Ex-
Vol. 15
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Section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution remains, at the time of
writing, officially unamended.
B. Arms Exports
The implications of Chadha for arms export control were poten-
tially even more significant than for war powers control. It was, after
all, in relation to arms exports that Congress had several times flexed
its legislative veto muscles, and in the case of the 1981 AWACS and
F-15 enhancement package to Saudi Arabia, the President had only
narrowly averted being handed a concurrent resolution of disap-
proval. "1 5 Moreover, whereas the President could claim independent
constitutional powers with respect to war powers, the general con-
sensus is that his authority to sell arms derives from congressional
statutory authorization."1 6 Thus, the legislative vetoes in arms ex-
port legislation conform more closely to the model of the legislative
veto invalidated by Chadha: Congress, while delegating authority,
has sought to reserve to itself the right to veto subsequent indivdual
executive decisions undertaken purusant to that authority.
Following Chadha, Congress found it necessary to clarify two
main issues. First, as long as the Arms Export Control Act remained
unamended, what did the invalidation of the legislative veto import
for the rest of the statute's provisions? Unlike the War Powers Reso-
lution, the Arms Export Control Act did not contain a severability
clause. Were the legislative veto provisions nevertheless severable? 17
Second, what alternative mechanisms could Congress adopt in place
port Control Act of 1976. Cf. the very different proposal for comprehensive overhaul of the
War Powers Resolution, incorporated in S.1906, supra note 108. It might be noted that the
Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution, signed into law on Oct. 19, 1983, was adopted in
the form of a joint, not a concurrent, resolution. See infra note 266 and accompanying text.
115. See infra § IV for a discussion of this and the preceding cases, all of which are related
to the Middle East.
116. Even Administration spokesmen conceded this point. Thus, before the House Foreign
Affairs Committee, Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam stated that "no one has ever sug-
gested that this is an inherent power of the President," and there was no reason "to raise any
question of theoretical, abstract, inherent powers, since all Presidents have proceeded under
explicit statutory grants." House For. Aff. Comm. Hearings, supra note 7, at 100. Before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Dam introduced a slight caveat. He could, he said, con-
ceive of "strictly hypothetical" situations, "in which in exercise of the Commander in Chief
power there might conceivably be some residual authority." Senate For. Rel. Comm Hearing
on Arms Export Control, supra note 8, at 24-25; see also House For. Aff. Comm. Hearings,
supra note 7, at 45-46, (fears expressed by Stanley Brand that the President might invoke, even
with respect to arms sales, his inherent Commander-in-Chief power).
117. See infra § V for a discussion of severability in relation to arms exports. On the ques-
tion of court suits by private arms contractors, see supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
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of the legislative veto to ensure for itself an effective say in the matter
of controversial arms transfers?
That the issue of arms transfers could not be left to the execu-
tive's discretion alone was axiomatic by 1983. Even before the first
legislative veto provision on the subject was adopted in 1974, Con-
gress had expressed its unease at the mushrooming of American arms
exports. Congressional concerns were at first prompted mainly by
the fear that American arms policy might lead to another creeping
involvement on the pattern of Vietnam. "The furnishing of eco-
nomic, military, or other assistance," Congress insisted in 1967,
"shall not be construed as creating a new commitment . . . to use
Armed Forces of the United States for the defense of any foreign
country."1 18 As noted by Franck and Weisband, "this was little more
effective than the Surgeon General's warning on cigarette pack-
ages."119 Nevertheless, as long as arms recipients were primarily de-
pendent on American loans and grants, Congress, in its post-Vietnam
phase, could and did control the process of arms transfers by means
of the authorization and appropriations process. However, in the
early 1970's, these first-phase legal controls became inadequate. Es-
pecially after the 1973-74 quadrupling of oil prices, Persian Gulf
States, their coffers swollen with petrodollars, rushed to procure
large quantities of sophisticated arms on a cash or commercial credit
basis. Such arms sales were doubly attractive to the United States
Administration. They were commercially rewarding and, in line
with the Nixon Doctrine of arming America's regional policemen,
they were seen as a strategic bonanza as well. From the congres-
sional perspective, however, they were worrisome because, despite
their impact on foreign policy, they were exempt from the existing
legislative controls over U.S.-assisted arms procurement. 120
Against this background, the so-called Nelson-Bingham
Amendment was enacted in 1974, giving Congress authority to dis-
approve certain large arms sales. 121 Before the issuance of any letter
118. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, § 650, 75 Stat. 424 (1960); en-
acted into law by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-137, § 303(b), 81 Stat.
462.
119. FRANCK & WEISBAND, supra note 35, at 99.
120. Pre-1974 legislation required merely retrospective, semi-annual reporting by the exec-
utive of "significant" arms sales. Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968 as amended, Pub. L. No.
90-629, § 36, 82 Stat. 1320 (1968).
121. The Amendment was enacted as part of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974. Pub. L.
No. 93-559, 88 Stat. 1795 (1974). For the background to the adoption of Nelson-Bingham, see
FRANCK & WEISBAND, supra note 35, at 98-100; Celada, Effect of the Legislative Veto Decision
on the Two-House Disapproval Mechanism Applicable to the Sale, Transfer, and Lease or Loan
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of offer to sell United States defense articles or services valued at $25
million or more, the letter was to be submitted by the President to
Congress, which could, within twenty days, adopt a concurrent reso-
lution barring the proposed sale. However, if the President certified
that "an emergency exists which requires such sale in the national
security interests of the United States," the provision would be
waived and the sale could go forward. Explaining the considerations
which prompted their initiative, Senator Gaylord Nelson and Repre-
sentative Jonathan Bingham pointed to the "galloping growth" of
arms sales in recent years; 122 the need for a "review process" which
would allow the public and Congress a role in assessing "the highly
significant foreign policy implications of these sales before the sales
were finalized and before the potential damage had been precipi-
tated;"1 23 the impact which arms sales often have on United States
relations with the purchasing country and its neighbors;1 24 the possi-
bility that by means of a large arms sales program the United States
might even contract a virtual alliance without any treaty commit-
ment or congressional participation; 25 and the fear that the Presi-
dent could thereby involve the United States, as in the past, "in
military situations throughout the world without congressional and
public . . . deliberation."'' 26 The emergency waiver, which permit-
ted the President to circumvent the legislative veto, was included
with the experience of the 1973 Middle East arms lift in mind and
was intended to allow for similar contingencies in the future.
127
When, in 1976, Congress revised and consolidated its arms ex-
port legislation by passing the International Security Assistance and
Arms Export Control Act of 1976, the legislative veto provision was
retained and expanded. 28 Congress could now block, by concurrent
of Arms, in House For. Aff. Comm. Hearings, supra note 7, at 339-43; Grimmett, The Legisla-
tive Veto and U.S. Arms Sales, in CRS VETO STUDIES, supra note 12, at 249-52, and the docu-
mentary annex at 278-91.
122. See 120 CONG. REC. S38073-74 (1974), in which Senator Nelson cited the statistics on
the growth of United States military arms sales between 1950 and 1973.
123. Id. at S38073.
124. Id. at H38771.
125. Id. at S38074-75. Senator Nelson cited Secretary of State Kissinger's reported state-
ment that the arms supply arrangements with Saudi Arabia constituted "less than a formal
alliance and more than bilateral talks," thereby "sidestepping congressional concerns about
treaty commitments" and making it possible "to give permanence to negotiations." Id.
126. Id. at S38073-74.
127. Id. at S38077.
128. Pub. L. No. 94-329, § 36(b), 90 Stat. 729 (1976). An earlier measure, containing some
seven legislative veto provisions, had been vetoed by President Ford, in large measure because
of the numerous veto provisions. See supra note 56. Congress did not attempt to override the
1985 229
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resolution, a proposed government sale of major defense equipment
for $7 million or more,' 29 in addition to proposed sales of defense
articles or services for $25 million or more. Moreover, the congres-
sional veto could now be exercised within thirty, rather than twenty,
calendar days of reciept by Congress of formal notification of a pro-
posed sale.' 3° The presidential emergency waiver was retained. 13 1
From 1977 until 1981 the scope of the legislative veto for arms ex-
ports was steadily extended until, on the eve of Chadha, it applied
not only to government arms sales, but also to commercial sales (ef-
fected through the issuance of State Department export licenses),
third country re-transfers of arms, and loans or leases (for one year
or longer) of defense articles. 132 The aim was to plug loopholes so as
to prevent presidential escape from congressional control over the
burgeoning United States arms export trade. The dollar thresholds
were raised in 1981 to $14 million for major defense equipment and
$50 million for defense articles and services. A legislative veto with
respect to design and construction services valued at $200 million or
more was introduced. NATO, NATO Member States, Japan, Aus-
tralia and New Zealand were placed in a special category. They were
exempt from the legislative veto provisions concerning commercial
sales, leases and loans of defense articles. In the case of United States
veto and instead introduced a new bill containing two of the formerly proposed legislative
vetoes. In subsequent years, most of the provisions aborted in 1976 were adopted, in piecemeal
fashion, by Congress. See Celada, supra note 121, at 343-51; see also infra note 132 and accom-
panying text.
129. Major defense equipment was defined, in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control
Act, as "any item of significant combat equipment on the United States Munitions List having
a non-recurring research and development cost of more than $50,000,000 or a total production
cost of more than $200,000,000."
130. Other changes included significant expansion of the amount of information the Presi-
dent was required to supply to Congress with respect to proposed arms sales, and expedited
treatment in the Congress for concurrent resolutions blocking arms sales. See Celada, supra
note 121, at 346.
131. From 1979 on, the President was required to transmit a detailed justification to Con-
gress for invocation of the emergency waiver. See 1981 CONG. Q. ALM. 132. Presidential
waiver authority was further expanded in 1980. See infra note 133 and accompanying text.
132. See §§ 3(d)(2), 36(b)(1), 36 (c)(l), and 63(a)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act as
amended. The provisions thus added were similar to (and even went beyond) those incorpo-
rated in the 1976 bill vetoed by President Ford. The provision on loans and leases, which was
adopted in 1981, followed a GAO finding that the Arms Export Control Act and Foreign
Assistance Act were being evaded by the practice of leasing equipment on a rent-free or nomi-
nal-rent basis to foreign governments. See Celada study, supra note 121, at 348-49. For a
summary of the relevant provisions, see Collier, supra note 61, at 10-11; HOUSE FOREIGN
AFFAIRS COMM., CONG. AND FOREIGN POLICY SERIES No. 8, STRENGTHENING EXECUTIVE-
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governmental sales and arms re-transferred to these States by other
recipients of United States arms, the period of presidential notifica-
tion and possible congressional veto action was reduced to fifteen
days.
Somewhat curiously, while Congress was moving to plug loop-
holes, it adopted a provision in December 1980 which opened wider
the escape hatch by which a President could, if he wished, evade and
override the congressional veto over arms sales. Apart from the
emergency waiver which the President possessed ever since 1974,
under the amended Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 the President
might waive the provisions of the Arms Export Control Act if he
determined that "to do so is vital to the national security interests of
the United States." Before exercising this authority, he was to con-
sult with, and provide a "written policy justification" to, the congres-
sional foreign affairs and appropriations committees.
1 33
Well before Chadha, Congress felt less than satisfied with the
formal scheme for congressional review of arms sales. There was a
lingering feeling that Congress was still not really in on the take-offs.
To put itself into the picture before its action caused serious embar-
rassment to the President and foreign States, Congress had requested
and obtained executive consent (beginning with the Ford Adminis-
tration) to an informal twenty-day pre-notification period which ef-
fectively gave Congress fifty, rather than thirty, calendar days within
which to block a sale. The executive had also been required to report
annually on expected arms sales above certain thresholds. 3 4 Never-
theless, a congressional sense of malaise and ineffectuality persisted.
Senator Byrd was therefore prompted to introduce an amendment-
predating Chadha-to require congressional approval, by joint reso-
lution, of very large sales (governmental or commerical) whose value
was $200 million or more.' 35 The Byrd proposal was not discussed
133. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, § 614(a)(2) and (3), enacted as part of the Inter-
national Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-533, 94 Stat.
3131, 3140 (1980).
134. The so-called Javits amendment, § 25(d) of the Arms Export Control Act, requires
reports regarding all government and commercial sales above certain thresholds considered
eligible during the current calendar year, as well as an indication of those sales "deemed most
likely to actually result in the issuance of a letter of offer or export license." Moreover, under
the Hamilton amendment (Arms Export Control Act § 28), quarterly reports are to be filed,
detailing the price and availability estimates which the Administration furnished to each for-
eign country with respect to sales above certain dollar thresholds, as well as a list of requests
for such arms sales received from foreign countries during the quarter.
135. S.1050, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (co-sponsored by Senators Pell, Biden, Sarbanes,
Bingaman, Cranston and Proxmire). For the text, see Senate For. Rel. CommL Hearing on
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in the Senate until after Chadha, and its consideration was then
merged with the search for a constitutionally valid method of main-
taining, and perhaps extending, the control formerly exercised
through the legislative veto mechanism. For its part, the House For-
eign Affairs Committee, while it did not single out the issue of arms
export control for separate treatment, devoted considerable attention
to this issue during its series of hearings on the Chadha decision.
It became quickly apparent during the congressional hearings
that the Administration spokesmen were determined to tread cau-
tiously after Chadha for fear of triggering more stringent congres-
sional controls over arms sales. The joint-resolution-of-approval
method-as incorporated in the Byrd Amendment-was clearly
anathema to the Administration. 36 This method, it has been aptly
observed, is the functional equivalent of a one-House veto. Moreover,
it shifts the onus of legislative inertia from Congress to the Presi-
dent. 37 Had such a provision been in effect in 1981, the AWACS
deal would not have proceeded, having been disapproved by the
House of Representatives. As it was, President Reagan could afford
to ignore the House and concentrate his efforts on preventing an ad-
verse vote in the Senate. Administration witnesses preferred, for ob-
vious reasons, either a provision requiring a joint resolution of
disapproval to block a sale 138 or the maintenance of the status quo.
(The assumption of the Administration, of course, was that the legis-
lative veto provisions were severable and that the rest of the Arms
Export Control Act, including the grant of authority to the executive
with respect to arms exports, remained valid.)139 To forestall any
Arms Export Control, supra note 8, at 3-9. As explained by Senator Sarbanes, the amendment
was prompted by "a perception on the part of some of us that even the existing scheme with a
veto attached to it was not working adequately, and that we needed to move certain large sales
out of the veto area and into the affirmative approval area." Id. at 33. In addition to previous
congressional concerns regarding arms sales, which continued unabated, Senator Byrd worried
that the accelerated sale of sophisticated systems abroad might seriously deplete the stocks of
the United States and its closest allies. Id. at 12.
136. See, e.g., id. at 27-2& (testimony of Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam); cf the
objections raised by a former Under Secretary of State, Matthew Nimetz, id. at 36-42. See also
the testimony of Deputy Attorney General Edward C. Schmults, House For. Aff. Comm. Hear-
ings, supra note 7, at 102.
The Solarz amendment, subsequently introduced, applies the joint-resolution-of-approval
method to most arms sales. See infra note 399 and accompanying text.
137. Testimony of Professor David A. Martin, House For. Aff. Comm. Hearings, supra note
7, at 148; Fisher Statement, Senate Admin. Practices Subcomm., supra note 86, at 11-12.
138. See testimony of Deputy Attorney General Schmults, House For. Aff. Comm. Hear-
ings, supra note 7, at 102. A sale could then not be effectively blocked unless a two-thirds
majority to override the expected presidential veto were forthcoming.
139. See infra § V on severability, and especially infra note 372 and accompanying text.
Vol. 15
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undesirable congressional d6marches, the Administration took great
pains to reassure the legislators that it would continue, Chadha
notwithstanding, to consult with Congress and to observe all the for-
mal reporting and waiting provisions as well as the informal pre-noti-
fication procedures. 1"
In a sense, from the executive's standpoint the legal situation
was not very different from what it had been before Chadha, when
Presidents had contested the validity of the legislative veto. Thus,
after the failure of Congress to exercise the legislative veto with re-
spect to President Carter's 1978 Middle East arms package, Admin-
istration spokesmen declared that had Congress indeed vetoed, the
President, though in his view not legally bound, would have abided
by the congressional will "as a matter of comity." '141 But these were,
of course, retrospective statements rather than advance commit-
ments. After Chadha, the Reagan Administration refused to give
any such advance commitment. In the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Senator Charles Mathias put forward the suggestion
that, as a matter of policy rather than law, the executive bind itself to
respect congressional expressions of opinion regarding arms sales.
Rejecting this suggestion, Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam
stated:
I do not think it would be very seemly for us to agree to operate as
if something were constitutional when it is not-to sort of make a
deal that we would have a different Constitution than the one writ-
ten down. 
14 2
To Mathias' counter-argument that there was nothing unconstitu-
tional in such an arrangement, Dam replied that it was preferable to
rely on the consultation provisions. "It is going to be a rare case," he
thought, "in which a President is going to want to proceed with a
sale when it becomes clear that there is a majority of the Congress
opposed to this sale."
1 43
While congressional consciences in the House seemed to be as-
suaged (for the moment at least) by executive assurances, 1" more
140. See, e.g., statement of Deputy Secretary of State Dam, House For. Aff. Comm. Hear-
ings, supra note 7, at 69, 84; the letter of Deputy Attorney General Schmults regarding arms
sales to Taiwan, id. at 94; and Dam's assurances to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Senate For. Rel. Comm. Hearing on Arms Export Control, supra note 8, at 27.
141. See the June 21, 1978 statements of Attorney General Griffin B. Bell and White House
Assistant Stuart E. Eizenstadt, cited in CRS VETO STUDIES, supra note 12, at 2.
142. Senate For. Rel. Comm. Hearing on Arms Export Control, supra note 8, at 33.
143. Id. at 33-34.
144. See the remarks of Chairman Clement Zablocki, House For. Aff. Comm. Hearings,
1985
33
Pomerance: United States Foreign Relations Law After Chadha
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1985
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
skepticism was voiced in the Senate. Senator Mathias feared that a
"voluntary kind of observance" would "change tremendously" the
"dynamics of the whole situation." '45 "All of the talk about consul-
tation," said Senator Paul Sarbanes, "may not be adequate to address
this situation."'1
46
In the meantime, Congress seemed content to follow a "wait and
see" attitude. For its part, the Administration, during this testing
period, appeared to be exercising an understandable caution. This
was reflected in the Reagan Administration's decision in March 1984
to withdraw, in the face of congressional opposition, the proposal to
sell Stinger anti-aircraft missiles to Jordan and Saudi Arabia.' 47 As
Kenneth Dam had asserted before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, "this is not a period in which any administration would
want to try to take advantage of ambiguity."' 48 "Accommodation
rather than . . . vindication"' 4 9 was the watchword-for the nonce,
at least.' 50
C. Foreign Assistance
Among the oldest legislative veto provisions in the foreign pol-
icy field are those related to foreign assistance. Apart from the clause
in the Lend Lease Act which allowed congressional termination of
foreign military assistance, legislative veto provisions were incorpo-
rated in the Greek-Turkish Aid Bill of 1947 and the Mutual Defense
Assistance Act of 1949.' 1' (The 1949 Act included a provision simi-
lar to one contained in the Foreign Assistance Act now in force.)
For various reasons, to be discussed below, the legislative veto has
not featured prominently in the sphere of foreign, non-nuclear aid.
15 2
Nevertheless, several provisions were available, pre-Chadha, for the
potential use of Congress. 
15 3
supra note 8, at 107, 108. But cf. the amendment later introduced by Representative Solarz,
infra note 399 and accompanying text.
145. Senate For. Rel Comm. Hearing on Arms Export Control, supra note 8, at 34.
146. Id. at 35.
147. Subsequently, following the bombing of ships in the Persian Gulf, Stingers were sent
to Saudi Arabia, and the United States also employed AWACS to monitor threats to Gulf
shipping.
148. Senate For. Rel. Comm. Hearing on Arms Export Control, supra note 8, at 27.
149. Statement of Matthew Nimetz, id. at 42.
150. See infra §§ VI and VII.
151. See supra notes 21, 26 and accompanying text.
152. Legislative vetoes with respect to nuclear non-proliferation are treated separately infra
sub-section F.
153. The ensuing list and discussion is based primarily on Collier, supra note 61, at 7-10;
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The broadest legislative veto with respect to foreign aid is to be
found in Section 617 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
amended.' 54 By its terms, Congress could, by concurrent resolution,
require the termination (within eight months) of aid extended under
any provision of the Act. How potentially sweeping this provision
was can be gathered from the fact that most bilateral foreign aid pro-
grams are based on this omnibus Act.
Given the comprehensive nature of Section 617, it was techni-
cally unnecessary for Congress to give itself any additional veto au-
thority in the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act. Nevertheless, to
highlight congressional concern with human rights, in 1975 Congress
adopted Section 116-an amended version of the Harkin Amend-
ment-permitting a two-House veto on assistance to human rights
violators.155 United States development assistance is not to be pro-
vided to "the government of any country which engages in a consis-
tent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human
rights," unless the executive determines that "such assistance will di-
rectly benefit the needy people in such country." But Congress, in
turn, can utilize its right under Section 617 to veto the President's
determination and, by concurrent resolution, induce cessation of the
aid.'5 6 Concern over nuclear proliferation led Congress to insert two
further legislative veto provisions in the 1961 Act. (These provisions,
known as the Symington-Glenn Amendments, will be discussed fur-
ther below.)' 57
Several legislative veto provisions appear in the statute gov-
erning food and development aid, the International Development and
Collier, Maintaining the Legislative-Executive Balance in Foreign Policy Without the Legislative
Veto, in EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE CONSULTATION, supra note 132, at 79-81; and the Attorney
General's Memorandum on the effects of Chadha in House For. Aff. Comm. Hearings, supra
note 7, at 162-64.
154. Pub. L. No. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424, 444 (1961); amended by Pub. L. No. 93-189, § 14, 87
Stat. 722 (1973).
155. Section 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act was enacted into law by the International
Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-161, § 310, 89 Stat. 860 (1975).
For the background to the Harkin amendment, see FRANCK & WEISBAND, supra note 35, at
86-88.
156. This provision, of course, did not really enhance the authority already stipulated in
§ 617. Collier, supra note 61, at 8. Section 502 B, added to the Foreign Assistance Act by the
International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (Pub. L. No. 94-329,
90 Stat. 748) also links human rights to foreign aid and the possible cut-off of funds, but by
joint rather than concurrent resolution. No reference is made to Section 617.
157. See infra sub-section F, on nuclear non-proliferation.
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Food Assistance Act of 1975.58 One allows the President, subject to
the approval of the two foreign relations committees, to provide cer-
tain funds to the International Fund for Agricultural Development.
Another provision relates to human rights. The foreign relations
committees may require reports on aid recipients' human rights ob-
servance; and if Congress thereafter disagrees with the executive's
judgment on the matter of continued aid, it may terminate such aid
by concurrent resolution. Yet another provision relates to the settle-
ment of debts owed to the United States under the statute's food and
development programs. If the President wishes to settle such debts
for less than the full amount, he is required to obtain two-House ap-
proval by concurrent resolution. 59 This last provision was prompted
by congressional resentment at the Administration's settlement of
debts owed by India, France, and the Soviet Union at less than face
value.' 6°
Finally, mention should be made of two provisions for commit-
tee vetoes in the Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act in force at
the time of Chadha.161 Under the first (Sec. 514), the Administration
was forbidden to transfer foreign assistance funds between appropria-
tion accounts without the prior written approval of the two appropri-
ations committees. Until 1977, the President's discretion in this
matter had been almost unfettered: but since Congress felt that the
President had abused his discretionary authority, especially in rela-
tion to Vietnam and Cambodia, the committee veto on transfers was
regularly inserted in spending legislation from 1977 on. 162 The sec-
ond committee veto was introduced in 1982, when Congress, acced-
ing to President Reagan's request, agreed for the first time to set up
within the Economic Support Fund (for bilateral economic aid) a
contingency fund (Special Requirements Fund) of unallocated money
158. See Pub. L. No. 94-161, §§ 207, 302(2), 310, and 321, 89 Stat. 849, 853, 857, 860, and
868 (1975).
159. Id. § 321. As noted by Collier, substituting a joint resolution of approval would not
alter the situation, since presumably the President would not veto a debt settlement that he had
initiated. Collier, supra note 61, at 9. In either event, the procedure would be the functional
equivalent of a one-House veto.
160. Collier, Legislative-Executive Balance in Foreign Policy Without the Legislative Veto,
1983 CRS REv. 10 (special Fall issue).
161. Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-121, 95 Stat. 1651,
1655; continued in FY-84 by the Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-151.
162. Collier, supra note 61, at 9.
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for use by the President in emergencies. I" Obligation or expenditure
of funds from the contingency fund, however, could not be effected
without the prior written approval of the two appropriations commit-
tees. Both of these provisions were seen as constitutionally illegiti-
mate by the Presidents concerned-Carter (in the case of the first)
and Reagan (in respect to both). Both Administrations viewed the
committee veto provision on transfers as merely a requirement of no-
tification. For their part, however, the appropriations committees
proceeded to forward their approval after notification of executive
intent. In any case, few transfers were effected, and almost all were
of a routine, non-controversial nature."6
The effect of Chadha on all of these legislative veto provisions
did not exercise Congress much during its post-Chadha reassess-
ments, for understandable reasons. 65 In the sphere of foreign aid,
Congress has possessed and used (too liberally, in the view of recent
Administrations) other, more effective and direct means to restrain
the executive. It has had recourse to the regular authorization and
appropriations process and to country-specific legislation, and in this
manner it has made its concerns (including, most prominently, con-
cern over human rights observance) felt. Not only has the broad leg-
islative veto of Section 617 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
never been employed; its use has seldom been seriously contem-
plated. 166  In one of the rare cases where recourse to it was sug-
gested-to punish Turkey for its action in Cyprus-the regular
legislative route was opted for instead. Of course, congressional re-
strictions imposed by means of authorizations and appropriations ap-
163. President Reagan wanted a fund which would allow him to extend emergency assist-
ance without diverting funds from other recipients. Id. at 9-10.
164. Mainly, funds were transferred into AID's operating expenses and disaster assistance
accounts. Also, in order to aid the OAU in its peacekeeping efforts in Chad, funds were shifted
into the peacekeeping account in December 1981. Id. at 9.
165. After Chadha, the House Rules Committee did block action on one version of a for-
eign aid authorization bill because it allowed termination of military aid to El Salvador by
concurrent resolution. See supra note 97. On the other hand, even after Chadha, Congress
adopted a committee veto in relation to foreign aid funds. The Continuing Appropriations Act
for Fiscal Year 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-107, 97 Stat. 733 (1983), enacted on October 1, 1983,
required the Administration to follow the reprogramming procedures, involving prior approval
by the congressional appropriations committees, if it wished to grant any country funds exceed-
ing "those provided in fiscal year 1983 or in the budget estimates for each country, whichever
are lower." See Fisher, One Year After, supra note 8, at 21.
166. See infra § IV. It might also be noted that Congress itself weakened the potential
scope of Section 617 by adopting in 1980 (in Pub. L. No.96-533) an amendment to the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, by which the President might waive the legislative veto if he determines
and notifies Congress that this is "vital" to U.S. national security. See supra note 133.
1985
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ply only to future funding and do not effect immediate termination of
aid; but Congress has generally been content with that. In the few
instances where more immediate action against a recipient State has
been desired, restrictions have sometimes been attached to pending
legislation in the form of riders.' 67
D. Foreign Trade
Constitutionally, the area of foreign trade falls squarely within
the congressional domain. 6 ' It also impinges on the President's con-
duct of foreign policy.' 69 While over the years Congress has liberally
delegated its prerogative "to regulate Commerce with foreign Na-
tions," in the more recent period it has sought, in several instances,
to exercise continued supervision by means of legislative veto
provisions.
The best known of these provisions were adopted as part of the
Jackson-Vanik Amendment in the Trade Act of 1974.17' This
Amendment reflected congressional dismay at the restrictions placed
by the Soviet Union on Jewish emigration, including especially an
"education tax" imposed in August 1972 (and running to about
$25,000 in some cases) on applicants for emigration. Congress de-
cided to use the commercial agreement with the Soviet Union, nego-
tiated and signed in October 1972 following President Nixon's trip to
Moscow, as the vehicle to exert pressure on the Soviet Union to liber-
alize its emigration policies. The benefits which were to accrue to the
Soviet Union under the terms of the 1972 agreement-most-favored-
nation (MFN) status and credits from the Export-Import Bank to
help finance its imports from the United States-were to be denied
unless the Soviet Union allowed free emigration. The Jackson-Vanik
Amendment did not refer to the Soviet Union by name; nor did it
apply to that State alone. It conditioned the grant of MFN status
and other trade benefits to any country having a non-market (that is,
communist) economy on the absence of serious obstacles to emigra-
167. Collier, supra note 61, at 8.
168. The two congressional powers primarily involved are the power to regulate foreign
commerce and the power to "lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imports and Excises."
169. It does so especially in relation to national emergencies. See infra sub-section E.
170. Pub. L. No. 93-618, Title IV, §§ 402, 404, 405, 407, 409, 88 Stat. 2056-65 (1975). On
the background of Jackson-Vanik, see P. STERN, WATER'S EDGE: DOMESTIC POLITICS AND
THE MAKING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (1979); SUNDQUIST, supra note 9, at 279-83;
Strawn, The Jackson Amendment: Trade, Emigration, and Detente, 7 POTOMAC REVEIW 3-18
(1975); Pregelj, Legislative Veto or Positive Approval of Executive Action Under the Trade Act of
1974 and Related Legislation, in CRS VETO STUDIES, supra note 12, at 721-27.
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tion. As a concession to the President, however, he was left with
broad authority to waive the freedom-of-emigration requirements of
the Act. 17 1 In turn, Congress, anxious to ensure that the President
did not thwart the essential goal underlying Jackson-Vanik, pre-
served for itself several legislative vetoes.
The system of legislative vetoes which Congress adopted in this
instance was quite complex.172 Exempt entirely from the legislative
veto was an initial 18-month period in which the President was given
a statutory right, under certain conditions (including a presidential
determination that the State concerned was at least substantially lib-
eralizing its emigration policies), to waive the freedom-of-emigration
provisions of the Act. Thereafter, extensions of this waiver authority
were to be subject to the legislative veto. An elaborate and ultimately
unimportant differentiation was introduced between the first exten-
sion of waiver authority and subsequent extensions. On the first,
Congress was to have the opportunity to act by a concurrent resolu-
tion of approval within certain time limits set forth in the Act. But if
Congress failed to dispose of the issue definitively by a certain date,
the waiver authority continued in effect for one year subject to disap-
proval by simple resolution of either House. Later extensions could
come into effect automatically for 12-month periods unless vetoed by
either House within sixty session days of receipt of a presidential re-
quest. Congress could veto the extension of the waiver authority in
its entirety or it could object to the application of the waiver to a
particular country. Pursuant to these provisions, the President's
waiver authority has been renewed annually, and the President has
granted waivers to Romania, Hungary and the People's Republic of
China. Although some resolutions of disapproval have been intro-
duced-and some were pending at the time of the Chadha decision-
none were adopted by Congress.
17 3
In contrast to the routine use of the Trade Act's waiver author-
ity, the provision in the statute which was to regulate the normal
procedure for granting non-discriminatory treatment and other trade
benefits to communist countries remained totally unused. According
to this provision, before extending trade privileges to a country with
a non-market economy, the President was to submit to Congress a
report indicating that the proposed recipient was complying fully
with the freedom-of-emigration provisions of the Jackson-Vanik
171. Pregelj, supra note 170, at 724.
172. Id. at 720-41.
173. See infra text accompanying notes 344-348.
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Amendment. Thereafter, for as long as trade privileges were contin-
ued, annual reports on compliance were to be filed. The initial report
and the annual reports could be vetoed by either House within ninety
session days, in which case the State concerned would immediately
cease receiving the various privileges referred to in the Jackson-Vanik
Amendment-MFN status, United States Government credits, and
the ability to conclude a commercial agreement with the United
States. No reports were filed under this provision, 174 presumably be-
cause the States concerned could not meet the requirements for certi-
fication and because the alternative "waiver authority" procedure
was available.
A further provision of the Act stipulated that a State which did
not then enjoy MFN treatment (most communist countries) could
receive it only after concluding with the United States a bilateral
commercial agreement approved by concurrent resolution of Con-
gress.1 75 A commercial agreement already concluded before the en-
actment of the Trade Act (that is, before January 3, 1975) was
subject only to one-House disapproval within ninety days. 176 By con-
current resolutions Congress subsequently approved bilateral com-
mercial agreements with Romania (in 1975), Hungary (in 1978), and
the People's Republic of China (in 1979).
The desire of Congress to retain control over trade with the So-
viet Union was also indicated by a legislative veto provision included
in the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, as amended. Congress im-
posed a limit of $300 million on Export-Import Bank loans or finan-
cial guarantees connected with exports to the Soviet Union; and it
provided that the limit could be raised by the President only with the
approval, by concurrent resolution, of both Houses of Congress.
177
Although the legislative vetoes involving commercial dealings
with communist countries are the best known in the area of foreign
trade, they are not the oldest. Another provision in the Trade Act of
174. On the difference between these reports and the annual reports required under the
waiver provision, see Pregelj, supra note 170, at 739 n.l.
175. This procedure is equivalent, in essence, to requiring that a commercial agreement
receive congressional endorsement by means of legislation.
176. The latter exception applied to the Soviet Union, with whom the United States had
concluded a commercial agreement in 1972. Presumably, Congress contented itself with a less
active role in relation to this agreement because its terms were already known and congres-
sional concerns regarding freedom of emigration were already addressed in the Jackson-Vanik
amendment. See Pregelj, supra note 170, at 736.
177. Export-Import Bank Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-646, § 8, 88 Stat. 2336
(1975). Congress feared that large loans would enhance the Soviet military potential. SUND-
QUIST, supra note 9, at 282.
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1974 relating to import relief can probably claim that distinction,
with an earlier version dating back at least to 1962.178 If, according
to the provision currently in force, the International Trade Commis-
sion (until 1975, called the U.S. Tariff Commission) finds that a do-
mestic industry is suffering, or is threatened with, serious injury from
imports, the Commission is charged with recommending measures of
relief to the President (as, for example, increased tariffs or import
quotas). The President may reject the Commission's recommenda-
tion and opt for a different remedial measure or (because of the "na-
tional economic interest of the United States") deny the relief
altogether; but if he does either of these, he must report his decision
to Congress, which may, by concurrent resolution within ninety ses-
sion days, veto the President's decision and reinstate that of the Com-
mission. 17  While the President's authority to disregard the
Commission's recommendations dates from 1951, the first attempt to
ensure a congressional review role came in 1958. However, the 1958
legislative veto provision was hardly the usual one. Because of the
impact which import relief actions might have on U.S. foreign rela-
tions, it was decided that a concurrent resolution vetoing the Presi-
dent's decision should be adopted by a two-thirds majority. The
process was thus "analogous to Congress' repassing a bill after a
Presidential veto."180 The more usual legislative veto, by concurrent
resolution on the basis of a simple majority, was introduced in 1962
and retained from then on. Basically, Congress was torn between its
recognition that "the national interest may outweigh the benefit to a
particular industry" and its fear that domestic industries might be
sacrificed because of foreign policy considerations. 18 Congress never
in fact used its legislative veto power although some attempts to in-
voke it were made.
1 8 2
At the time of the Chadha decision, the Export Administration
Act of 1979 (which was due to expire on September 30, 1983) was
still in force. The Act granted the President authority to impose ex-
178. An earlier 1958 version was not, strictly speaking, a legislative veto. See infra note
180 and accompanying text.
179. Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 203(c), 88 Stat. 2016 (1975).
180. TRADE AGREEMENTS EXTENSION ACT OF 1958, H.REP. No. 1761 (to accompany
H.R. 12591), 85th Cong., 2nd Sess. 12 (1958); noted in Pregelj, supra note 170, at 710.
181. Pregelj, supra note 170, at 710.
182. See infra § IV. For an additional veto provision provided for in the Trade Act of
1974, see id. at 742-47. The provision allowed either House to disapprove an executive decision
to waive the imposition of countervailing duties on United States imports subsidized by the
exporting country. While the executive's waiver authority was revoked in 1979, the legislative
veto on existing waivers subsisted after 1979.
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port controls for reasons related to national security, foreign policy
and the domestic supply of the goods to be exported. It included two
legislative veto provisions bearing on the two kinds of exports-agri -
cultural commodities and Alaskan crude oil-over which Congress
was particularly anxious to maintain for itself the last word. Export
controls on agricultural products were subject to a two-House
veto. 1 83 Alaskan crude oil, on the other hand, was not (with certain
exceptions) to be exported unless Congress adopted a concurrent res-
olution of approval.1 84 In both cases, congressional concerns were
domestic. In the case of agricultural products, the worry (especially
of Congressmen from farm states) was that export control policy
would be used to reduce domestic food prices and hence the income
of United States farmers. The export of Alaskan crude oil, in the
face of domestic shortages in many parts of the United States and
increased dependence on foreign oil suppliers, was something many
in Congress were not willing to sanction.
18 5
Worries about oil exports also led to the inclusion, in the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, of a provision
permitting Congress to block, by a concurrent resolution of disap-
proval, the export of oil and gas from the Outer Continental Shelf.8 6
The first legislative veto provision with respect to export control
had been adopted in 1974 and had reflected different concerns, re-
lated to U.S. national security. In the Defense Appropriations Au-
thorization Act of 1975, the Secretary of Defense was authorized to
recommend to the President non-exportation of goods or technolo-
gies which were developed with Department of Defense funds and
which would "significantly increase the present or potential military
capability of a controlled country." If the President disagreed with
this recommendation, he was to report this to Congress, which could,
within sixty session days, veto the President's recommendation and
183. Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 7(g)(3), 93 Stat. 520 (1979). The veto, which could be exercised
within 30 days of receipt of a presidential report, was introduced in the Export Administration
Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-52, § 106, 91 Stat. 238 (1977).
184. Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 7(d)(2), 93 Stat. 518 (1979). This provision replaced a 1977
provision permitting one-House disapproval of the President's decision to export Alaskan
crude oil. See Holliday, Export Administration Act: Legislative Veto Provisions, in CRS VETO
STUDIES, supra note 12, at 325. For previous restrictions regarding the export of Alaskan
Crude oil, see Legislative Vetoes in Energy Legislation, 1983 CRS REV. 16 (special Fall issue).
185. Holliday, supra note 184, at 325. From a purely economic standpoint, it was more
profitable to sell Alaskan oil to Japan since it was cheaper to ship to that country than to the
United States. 1983 CRS REV. 16.
186. Pub. L. No. 95-372, § 208, 92 Stat. 668 (1978).
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bar the proposed export. 18 7 The provision was not used and was not
incorporated in subsequent defense authorization acts.
The Chadha decision had an immediate effect on foreign trade
legislation. As noted earlier, the Export Administration Act was set
to expire shortly afterwards. A day before the Court's decision was
announced, the House Foreign Affairs Committee had reported out
the Export Administration Amendments Act of 1983 (H.R. 3231)
with several legislative vetoes incorporated therein. As a result of
objections by the House Rules Committee, a revised version of the
Act was reported out by the House Foreign Affairs Committee, in
which joint resolutions of approval were substituted for the concur-
rent resolutions (usually of disapproval) previously contemplated. In
the amended version, the executive would have to obtain joint resolu-
tions of approval before it could impose foreign policy export con-
trols,18 8 export Alaskan crude oil, cut back exports of agricultural
commodities or effect certain United States policies in South Africa.
While continuing its drafting of a new Export Administration
Amendments Act, Congress moved twice to extend the expiration
date of the 1979 Act-first to February 29, 1984, and then to March
30, 1984 (after which the President operated under emergency pow-
ers furnished by the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act). The new Act now emerging from the drafting process incorpo-
rates several provisons for joint resolutions of approval of presiden-
tial initiatives. 8 9 Thus, in this instance, Congress, denied the
legislative veto mechanism, has resolved to impose greater restraints
on the President.
In the Senate, a proposal was introduced by Senator Heinz soon
after Chadha that was designed to give Congress a constitutionally
unobjectionable method of controlling import relief decisions in
which the President differed with the International Trade Commis-
sion. The new proposal would shift the burden of legislative inertia
to the President: he would be required to implement the Interna-
tional Trade Commission's recommendation for import relief or ob-
tain congressional legislative approval for an alternative course.1 90 If
187. Pub. L. No. 93-365, § 709, 88 Stat. 408 (1974).
188. This restriction was based on increasing congressional and public displeasure, within
Congress and outside, with the executive's discretionary use of export control for "foreign pol-
icy" purposes. See, e.g., The Export Administration Act: International Aspects, AM. Soc'Y
INT'L L. PROC. 82-99 (1980).
189. See Fisher, One Year After, supra note 8, at 12, 17-18. As of June 23, 1984, the Export
Administration Amendments Act was still in conference.
190. S.1545 (June 27, 1983), cited id. at 8.
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adopted, such a proposal would obviously shackle the President far
more than the existing legislation.
Curiously, however, the Chadha decision did not prevent Con-
gress from adopting a statute which incorporates by reference the
unamended legislative veto procedure of the Trade Act of 1974 with
respect to import relief. By the terms of the Caribbean Basin Eco-
nomic Recovery Act, enacted on August 5, 1983, the President may
suspend duty-free treatment subject to the two-House veto of Section
203 of the Trade Act. 191
With respect to the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, Deputy Secre-
tary of State Kenneth Dam, in his testimony before the congressional
foreign affairs committees, declared that the Administration would
continue to submit the annual waiver reports (concerning Hungary,
Romania, and the People's Republic of China), and would observe all
the statutory waiting periods. 92 At the time of Chadha, several con-
gressional resolutions to disapprove the extension of waiver authority
to certain States were pending. Soon after Chadha, on August 1,
1983, the House postponed indefinitely its consideration of these res-
olutions (which had been reported unfavorably by the Ways and
Means Committee), although no reference was made to the Court's
ruling. 
193
Although Congress has never used its legislative veto powers to
disapprove presidential actions in the sphere of foreign trade, it seems
clear that Congress is reluctant to part with those powers. Where
called upon to do so, it has so far opted for more stringent controls
over presidential policies.
E. National Emergencies
The far-reaching economic and other powers which become
available to a United States President upon his proclamation of a
"national emergency" affect the lives not only of United States citi-
zens, but also have important consequences for foreign States and
their citizens as well. In the area of "national emergencies," as in
other areas touching foreign and security policy, Congress, in its
191. Pub. L. No. 98-67, 97 Stat. 384, 391 (1983). The House Rules Committee permitted
the bill to go to the floor in this case, because its rule had been reported before the Chadha
decision was given. See Fisher, One Year After, supra note 8, at 14-15, 20.
192. House For. Aff. Comm. Hearings, supra note 7, at 70, 86-87; Senate For. Rel. Comm.
Hearing on Arms Export Control, supra note 8, at 16, 21-22, 23-24.
193. Senate For. Rel. Comm. Hearing on Arms Export Control, supra note 8, at 24; 1983
CRS REV. 16, 33 (special Fall issue).
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post-Vietnam resurgence, was determined to assert more authority
and to heighten presidential accountability to the legislature.'94 The
result was the enactment, on September 14, 1976, of the National
Emergencies Act, containing, inter alia, an important legislative veto
provision allowing Congress to terminate a state of emergency with-
out the President's approval. 95
Congressional sensitization to the problem of "national emer-
gencies" came in the early 1970's as a by-product of concern over
presidential war powers. "Emergency" powers, it was recognized,
were also worrisome, for they provided another vehicle for enhancing
already overextended presidential authority. From 1972 to 1976, a
special committee charged by the Senate with studying the prob-
lem 96 diligently compiled and catalogued the welter of statutory
provisions (some 470-odd) granting emergency powers and of rele-
vant executive orders and proclamations. It discovered that four na-
tional emergencies had never been terminated-Roosevelt's banking
emergency of 1933; Truman's Korean War emergency of 1950; and
the emergencies declared by Nixon in 1970 and 1971 concerning, re-
spectively, postal service and the balance of payments crisis. These
could still be invoked by any President at will."' To remedy the
situation, the committee proposed legislation "to terminate certain
authorities with respect to national emergencies still in effect, and to
provide for orderly implementation and termination of future na-
194. See generally, Fuller, The National Emergency Dilemma: Balancing the Executive's
Crisis Powers with the Need for Accountability, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 1453 (1979); SENATE
COMM. ON GovT. OPERATIONS AND SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON NATIONAL EMERGENCY
POWERS, THE NATIONAL EMERGENCIES ACT, SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
TEXTS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 94th Cong., 2d Sess., (Comm. Print. 1976) [hereinafter cited
as NATIONAL EMERGENCIES ACT COMM. PRINT]; Celada, Effect of the Legislative Veto Deci-
sion on the Two-House Disapproval Mechanism to Terminate a Presidential Declaration of Na-
tional Emergency, in House For. Aff. Comm. Hearings, supra note 7, at 358-62, 368-72; Relyea,
The National Emergencies Act and the Legislative Veto, in CRS VETO STUDIES, supra note 12,
at 756-82. For a survey of national emergency proclamations and regulations up to 1976, see
id. at 758-61.
195. Pub. L. No. 94-412, § 202(a)(1), 90 Stat. 1255 (1976).
196. From 1972 to 1974, the committee was called the Special Committee on the Termina-
tion of the National Emergency. The reference was to the national emergency proclaimed by
Harry S. Truman in 1950 in connection with the Korean War. In 1974, the name of the
committee was changed to the Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated
Emergency Powers, reflecting the broader focus of the committee's concerns. Relyea, supra
note 194, at 762-69.
197. Thus, in 1968 President Johnson relied on President Truman's 1950 emergency to
impose foreign investment controls. NATIONAL EMERGENCIES ACT COMM. PRINT, supra note
194, at 156-57.
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tional emergencies. '' !98
The statute adopted on the basis of these recommendations-the
National Emergencies Act of 1976-contained several provisions,
most of which were non-controversial. Thus, all past emergencies
and almost all executive authority pursuant to them were to termi-
nate on September 14, 1978, two years after the statute's enact-
ment. 199 Other, mainly obsolete, emergency authorities were
repealed. Some eight emergency statutory provisions considered es-
sential for on-going governmental operations were left standing by
the Act but were made subject to subsequent congressional review,
revision or repeal.2°" For future emergencies, the Act prescribed a
procedure to be followed from the proclamation of a national emer-
gency until after its termination. The procedure was designed to en-
courage the circumscription of hitherto open-ended presidential use
of emergency powers and to furnish Congress and the public with all
relevant information. Among the requirements listed were: the im-
mediate transmission to Congress of the presidential proclamation;
the specification in the proclamation of the statutory provisions
which the President intended to use; the maintenance by the Presi-
dent and transmission to Congress of a file and index of all presiden-
tial orders, executive rules and regulations made pursuant to the
proclamation of emergency; and presidential reporting to Congress
(at six-month intervals during an emergency and within three
months after its termination) on total expenditures arising from the
emergency. Additionally, Congress sought a more active role with
respect to possible termination of emergencies (and consequent cessa-
tion of all statutory authorities activated by the emergency declara-
tion). Thus, the Act provided for three methods of termination:
termination by the President; automatic lapse a year after the procla-
mation, unless the proclamation is extended by the President; and
termination at any time by concurrent resolution of Congress. Every
six months, Congress was to meet to consider whether to adopt such
a concurrent resolution. It was to the third method of termination-
198. A Recommended National Emergencies Act, Senate Special Committee on National
Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers 6 (1974), noted in Relyea, supra note 194, at
768.
199. The two-year period was designed to allow the executive time to review programs
dependent on emergency statutes and to seek permanent legislation, where appropriate. In this
manner, "an orderly transition" would be assured. NATIONAL EMERGENCIES ACT COMM.
PRINT, supra note 194, at 292.
200. The review of the emergency provisions exempted from repeal in 1976 was to be com-
pleted within 270 days of the law's enactment.
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by concurrent resolution-that President Ford voiced constitutional
objections when signing the bill.20 1
The legislative veto in the National Emergencies Act was con-
sciously patterned on that of the War Powers Resolution,20 2 and in-
deed there were several similarities between the two statutes. Both
involved constitutionally gray areas, in which the President and Con-
gress each claimed broad constitutional powers.20 3 In neither case
did the statute seek to define the boundaries between the branches.
Thus, the National Emergencies Act did not purport to dictate to the
President when it was proper to declare a national emergency. Nor
was his power to proclaim future emergencies in any way circum-
scribed. The purpose, in both statutes, was to introduce a procedural
framework to govern the use of the substantive powers at issue.
Neither act purported to delegate authority while reserving a legisla-
tive right of veto; both related rather to powers granted by sources-
statutory or constitutional-extrinsic to the statute itself. But
whereas, in the case of the National Emergencies Act, at least the
scope of the statutory authorities at issue were well known by the
time the statute was enacted, in the case of the War Powers Resolu-
tion, the relevant powers were almost totally undefined. 2° The con-
cerns of Congress in enacting the two statutes were also somewhat
divergent. In the words of one observer, "the National Emergencies
Act was not motivated by an overwhelming desire to deter unilateral
presidential action in emergency situations. Instead, it was intended
to clear the air of a not inconsiderable amount of legal-historical bag-
gage. . . and to regularize the practice in this vital area of law."2 5
When the National Emergencies Act was adopted, among the
provisions exempted from termination at that time was the emer-
gency provision in the Trading with the Enemy Act, which Presi-
dents had utilized for the purpose of blocking foreign assets and
regulating foreign exchange. That act was replaced in December 28,
1977, with the International Emergency Economic Powers Act,
which applied unequivocally to non-war as well as to war situations.
If the President declares an emergency because of an "unusual and
extraordinary threat" from outside the United States, the Act makes
201. PUB. PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS: GERALD R. FORD 2249-50 (1976-1977).
202. National Emergencies Act: Hearings before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 15, 18 (1975).
203. The President's claims were premised on the Commander-in-Chief and general execu-
tive powers.
204. See Celada, in House For. Aff. Comm. Hearings, supra note 7, at 307.
205. Id. at 369.
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available to him broad powers to regulate economic transactions.
However, he is to cease exercising these powers if Congress utilizes
the legislative veto provision in the National Emergencies Act to ter-
minate the national emergency.2 °6 President Carter vigorously ob-
jected to this provision of the Act, and indicated that he would view
it as a "notify and wait" provision.2 °7
Following the seizure of the American Embassy in Teheran,
President Carter proclaimed a national emergency on November 14,
1979, and activated the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act.2 °8 On this basis he proceeded to block the assets of the Iranian
government in the United States. The proclamation was renewed in
1980, and annually thereafter. No concurrent resolution was
adopted, before or after Chadha, to terminate the emergency. But six
months after the emergency was first declared, both congressional
foreign affairs committees formally notified the President that they
supported the continuation of the emergency and would take no ac-
tion at that time to terminate it.
2 °9
The legal effect of Chadha is to throw into relief, with respect to
the National Emergencies Act and the International Emergency Eco-
nomic Powers Act, the issue of severability. A severability clause
appears in the latter, but not in the former, act. Of course, the pres-
ence or absence of such a clause is merely the beginning, not the end,
of the inquiry. Also significant in this respect is what appears to be a
total lack of concern to limit in the National Emergencies Act the
President's ability to proclaim new emergencies. Was this lack of
concern linked, in the legislators' minds, to their confidence that they
could at any time countermand, in a veto-proof manner, the Presi-
dent's determination that a national emergency existed?
210
F. Nuclear Non-Proliferation
On the subject of nuclear non-proliferation Congress adopted
more legislative veto provisions than it did with respect to any other
single area of foreign policy. There are eight such provisions in the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (seven of which amend the
206. Pub. L. No. 95-223, § 207(b), 91 Stat. 1625, 1628 (1977).
207. PUB. PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS: JIMMY CARTER 2187 (1977).
208. He also invoked the President's independent constitutional powers. Id. at 2118-19
(1979).
209. EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE CONSULTATION, supra note 132, at 78.
210. See infra § V on severability.
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Atomic Energy Act of 1954).21 One of these vetoes came close to
being used in 1980 against India.212 In addition, the Foreign Assist-
ance Act of 1961, as amended in 1981, incorporates two legislative
vetoes known as the Symington-Glenn Amendments.21 3
Even before Congress enacted the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Act in 1978, it had not abandoned the field of nuclear exports totally
to presidential discretion. Thus, for example, the Atomic Energy
Act of 1946 made a joint resolution of Congress affirming the exist-
ence of effective and enforceable safeguards a condition for the ex-
change of nuclear information with foreign States.214 A "lie-in-wait"
method, adopted in 1951 and expanded in the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, required the Atomic Energy Commission to place certain deci-
sions before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy for a specified
period. 215 In 1958 the first full-fledged legislative veto provision was
incorporated in the Atomic Energy Act, allowing Congress to veto,
by concurrent resolution, executive agreements for nuclear coopera-
tion.216 From 1974 on, however, as congressional alarm over the
prospects of nuclear proliferation grew, the existing safeguards
seemed woefully inadequate to more and more Congressmen. India's
detonation of a nuclear device illustrated how easy it was to divert
nuclear fuel and technology to military purposes, and reports of sev-
eral pending nuclear-technology export contracts between Western
States and Third-World countries confirmed the need to move swiftly
to tighten national and international controls.217
211. Pub. L. No. 95-242, §§ 104(f)(1), 303(a), 304(a), 306, 307, 401, 92 Stat. 120, 123, 130,
132-34, 137-38, 139, 144-45 (1978). The sections of the Atomic Energy Act affected are 123,
126(b)(2), 128(b)(1), 128(b)(2), 129, 131(a)(3), and 131(f)(l)(A). See CRS VETO STUDIES,
supra note 12, at 345-77. One might also add to the above list two more provisions of the
amended Atomic Energy Act which make reference to the congressional review procedures:
the provision in § 109(b) on the export of component parts having special significance for nu-
clear explosive purposes (92 Stat. 141) and the provision in § 131a(3) for Department of Energy
authorization of subsequent arrangements for reprocessing (92 Stat. 128). The first of these is
included by Collier in EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE CONSULTATION, supra note 132, at 84; the
second is enumerated in Collier, supra note 61, at 12. If both provisions are added, the total of
legislative veto provisions introduced by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act reaches ten.
212. See infra § IV.
213. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, § 669, 670, as amended by the International Security
and Development Cooperation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-113, §§ 737(b) and (c), 95 Stat.
1562-63 (1981).
214. Legislative Vetoes in Energy Legislation, 1983 CRS REV. 15 (special Fall issue).
215. Kramer, Legislative Vetoes in the Field of Atomic Energy: The Nuclear Non-Prolifera-
tion Act of 1978, in CRS VETO STUDIES, supra note 12, at 330-31.
216. Act of July 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-479, § 4, 72 Stat. 276 (1958).
217. 1983 CRS REV. 15 (special Fall issue); Collier, in EXECUTIVE LEGISLATIVE CONSUL-
TATION, supra note 132, at 84.
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Overhaul of the United States controls came in the shape of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, a comprehensive act containing
tough new directives and conditions for nuclear exports and requir-
ing renegotiation of existing United States commitments to supply
nuclear materials, equipment and technology. States observing non-
proliferation standards were offered the "carrot" of "a reliable supply
of nuclear fuel" from the United States;218 others were to suffer the
"stick" of nuclear-supply hunger or cut-offs. With that, the Presi-
dent was given the possibility of waiving the stiff requirements of the
Act in certain circumstances. But his discretion could, in turn, be
overruled by Congress-in several instances by means of a concur-
rent resolution.21 9 In this manner, Congress satisfied its felt need to
keep maximal control over the nuclear-export trigger while permit-
ting the President essential flexibility.
Most of the legislative veto provisions in the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Act appear in Title III, relating to Export Organization
and Criteria. Congress gave itself eight opportunities to act by con-
current resolution.
(1) International agreements to develop a worldwide nuclear
fuel supply under effective international auspices are to be negotiated
by the President; but, unless embodied in treaties, such agreements
are not to be binding unless approved by a concurrent resolution of
Congress.22°
(2) The issuance of an export license under the Act is essentially
the task of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). After re-
ceiving an executive branch judgment that a license would "not be
inimical to the common defense and security," it must ascertain
whether all the statutory requirements of the Act have been met. If
218. See Pub. L. No. 95-242, §§ 2(b) and 101, 92 Stat. 120, 121 (1978).
219. The original bills contained one-House vetoes to which President Carter took particu-
larly strong exception because of the potential damage to American credibility as a nuclear
supplier. Carter also entered reservations about the numerous two-House vetoes eventually
adopted. Kramer, supra note215, at 335.
Legislative vetoes began to be adopted from the mid-1970s on in relation to the President's
waiver authority in the nuclear field. These were incorporated and expanded in the 1978 Nu-
clear Non-Proliferation Act. Collier, in EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE CONSULTATION, supra note
132, at 84.
220. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act § 104 (f)(1). Section 104(a) sets forth congressional
directives for the agreements. Pub. L. No. 95-242, 92 Stat. 122, 123 (1978).
This legislative veto provision (the only one introduced in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Act itself rather than as an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act) is no different in effect from
a provision requiring approval by joint resolution or the requirement that an executive agree-
ment take the form of a congressional executive agreement.
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the NRC delivers a negative finding and refuses the license, the Presi-
dent may still decide to authorize the export on the grounds that
withholding it "would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of
United States non-proliferation objectives, or would otherwise jeop-
ardize the common defense and security." But this presidential
waiver, in turn, might be disapproved within sixty session days by
concurrent resolution of Congress.221
(3) According to the Act, from September 10, 1979 on, no non-
nuclear weapon State may continue to receive United States nuclear
fuel, materials or technology unless it accepts "full scope" IAEA in-
spection and safeguards with respect to all its peacetime nuclear fa-
cilities (that is, even those not supplied by the United States).
However, the President may, too, waive the requirement in order to
promote United States non-proliferation or defense objectives; but
again, his waiver is subject to congressional overruling by concurrent
resolution within sixty session days.222
(4) If Congress overrules the President, no further nuclear ex-
ports to the State concerned are normally to be permitted for the
remainder of the session of Congress. The President may, however,
request reconsideration on the grounds that the State has since met
the IAEA criteria, that significant progress toward adherence has
been made, or that United States foreign policy interests dictate re-
consideration. Congress might still veto the proposed export by
adopting a concurrent resolution within sixty days.
223
(5) Any U.S. commitment for storing foreign spent nuclear ma-
terial in the United States must be submitted to Congress for a sixty-
day review period, during which Congress may block the commit-
ment by concurrent resolution.224
(6) A "detailed generic plan" for storing foreign spent nuclear
fuel in the United States may be submitted by the President to Con-
221. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, § 304(a), adding § 126(b)(2) to the Atomic Energy
Act, Pub. L. No. 95-242, 92 Stat. 134.
222. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, § 306, which added § 128(b)(1) to the Atomic Energy
Act, Pub. L. No. 95-242, 92 Stat. 137 (1978). Exempt from this provision were export applica-
tions filed before September 10, 1979, for shipments of fuel to commence prior to March 10,
1980. On conflicting views as to whether the "grace period" applied to two Indian requests for
nuclear fuel, see infra note 325 and accompanying text.
223. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, § 306, adding § 128(b)(2) to the Atomic Energy Act,
Pub. L. No. 95-242, 92 Stat. 137-38 (1978).
224. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, § 303(a), adding § 131f(1)(A)(i) to the Atomic En-
ergy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-242, 92 Stat. 130 (1978). However, limited quantities of foreign spent
nuclear fuel may be stored in the United States if the President certifies to Congress that this is
warranted by an emergency situation and the U.S. national interest. § 131f(2).
51
Pomerance: United States Foreign Relations Law After Chadha
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1985
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
gress, but such a plan, too, was made subject to a two-House veto of
Congress within sixty session days.225
(7) Nuclear exports to a non-nuclear weapon State are to be ter-
minated if that State engages in certain forbidden actions, including,
inter alia, the detonation of a nuclear device and the termination or
abrogation of IAEA safeguards. This mandatory cut-off of nuclear
exports may be waived by the President if he determines that it is
required by United States non-proliferation or defense objectives.
But the waiver, which must be submitted to Congress for a sixty-day
review period, may be vetoed by concurrent resolution.226
(8) After setting forth the terms of new or amended nuclear co-
operation agreements, the Act provides that such agreements (if they
involve large reactors) must be submitted to Congress for a sixty-day
period (from the time that a Nuclear Proliferation Assessment State-
ment is submitted by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency)
and are subject to a two-House veto within that period.22 7
The multitude of legislative vetoes incorporated in the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Act caused President Carter, who otherwise sym-
pathized with the Act's purposes, considerable consternation. On
signing the bill, he expressed his reservations and made clear that he
was "not agreeing that the Congress can overturn authorized execu-
tive actions through procedures not provided in the Constitution.,
228
For its part, Congress gave further expression to its concerns
regarding nuclear proliferation by attaching, the Symington-Glenn
Amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act. Since 1981, Congress
could disapprove, by concurrent resolution, decisions of the Presi-
dent to continue to grant foreign aid to States that supply or receive
items needed for uranium enrichment or for reprocessing spent
fuel.
229
225. Atomic Energy Act § 131f(l)(A)(ii), as amended by § 303(a) of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Act, Pub. L. No. 95-242, 92 Stat. 130 (1978).
226. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, § 307, adding § 129 to the Atomic Energy Act, Pub.
L. No. 95-242, 92 Stat. 138 (1978).
227. Id. § 401, 92 Stat. 144-45 (1978), adding § 123(d) to the Atomic Energy Act.
228. PUB. PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS: JIMMY CARTER 502 (1978).
229. An earlier version of the Symington-Glenn amendments provided for disapproval by
joint resolutions. In December 1981, disapproval by concurrent resolution was substituted in
the two instances mentioned above. Within the framework of the earlier version, President
Carter acted to discontinue aid to Pakistan; but in adopting the International Security and
Development Cooperation Act of 1981, Congress, in effect, waived the cut-off for Pakistan.
Collier, in EXECUTIVE LEGISLATIVE CONSULTATION, supra note 132, at 85.
A further provision in the Foreign Assistance Act, as amended in 1981, provides for action
by joint resolution and is thus not within the scope of Chadha. Economic and military aid to a
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Following Chadha, Administration spokesmen sought to assure
Congress that they did not consider the congressional non-prolifera-
tion scheme as so much ballast which could be thrown overboard.
Nor would the Adminstration seek to take advantage of Chadha in
the context of nuclear non-proliferation policy. Of the three main
elements of the amended Atomic Energy Act- the strict standards
governing nuclear exports, the presidential waiver authority and the
legislative veto--only the third had gone by the wayside. But the
Administration would continue to keep Congress fully informed of
its actions and to observe the statutory waiting periods, thus afford-
ing Congress the opportunity to act legislatively if it so desires.23°
Such legislation, of course, would require the support of a two-thirds
majority if opposed by the President.
The Administration proceeds, understandably, on the assump-
tion that the legislative veto provisions are severable from the rest of
the statute. (The fact that the Atomic Energy Act contains a sever-
ability clause strengthens this assumption.)23 A situation in which
congressional shackles are loosened would suit the purposes of the
President, U.S. nuclear exporters and foreign nuclear recipients, all
of whom desire to enhance the reliability of the United States as a
nuclear supplier--one of the avowed goals of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Act.232 By achieving this goal, these groups argue, the
primary goal of nuclear non-proliferation is also more readily attain-
able. For in a world in which the United States nuclear monopoly
has been so effectively broken, the United States can hardly hope to
impose controls unless it re-establishes itself as the principal reliable
exporter of nuclear materials and technology.
This perspective, however, is not necessarily shared by Con-
gress, many of whose members appear no more willing today than in
the 1970's to loosen the reins over the presidency in this crucial area.
If anything, a tightening of the controls may be in the offing. Despite
Administration assurances, many senators voiced dismay in post-
Chadha debate at recent failures by the executive to consult with
State which receives or tests a nuclear device must cease within thirty days unless Congress
approves, by joint resolution, a presidential request to continue such aid. See Collier, supra
note 61, at 12.
230. See House For. Aff. Comm. Hearings, supra note 7, at 69-70, 85-86; Senate Non-
Proliferation Hearing 1983, supra note 8, at 20-21, 36, 41.
231. See infra § V.
232. On the other hand, it was sometimes convenient for the executive to have such
shackles, which tended to strengthen its stance in negotiations with foreign States. See
FRANCK & WEISBAND, supra note 35, at 114. See also infra § VII.
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Congress with respect to sensitive nuclear transactions. Senate For-
eign Relations Committee Chairman Charles Percy sounded a clear
warning that, unless the executive gave Congress "a continuing role"
through effective consultations, a "legislative remedy" would be re-
quired.233 Among the remedies which have been floated are sugges-
tions to substitute joint resolutions of approval for the present
concurrent resolutions of disapproval. If this were done, the effect
would be to replace two-House vetoes with the functional equivalent
of a one-House veto and to shift the burden of legislative inertia from
Congress to the President-hardly a desirable outcome from the Ad-
ministration's standpoint.234
G. Impoundments
The issue of impoundment-the failure of the President to spend
funds appropriated by Congress-is not linked specifically to foreign
policy. Nor did foreign policy concerns prompt Congress to enact
the Impoundment Control Act of 1974 and to incorporate in it a
legislative veto provision. Congress was galvanized into action by
President Nixon's extensive impoundment of funds for domestic pro-
grams-especially after 1972-and by his assertion of almost unlim-
ited constitutional authority to proceed in this manner. Within the
foreign policy and national security areas there had indeed (even
before the Nixon presidency) been some interbranch controversies
concerning impoundments. These had revolved mainly around the
question of weapons systems, not foreign aid,235 where, at least until
1974, the tendency had been for Congress to cut presidential requests
for funds and for the President to "spend every available dollar.
'236
233. Senate Non-Proliferation Hearing 1983, supra note 8, at 4, 51. Senators were particu-
larly angered by the recent retransfer from Germany to Argentina of 143 tons of heavy water-
a transaction of which Congress was neither consulted nor even informed. Administration
spokesmen apologized for the "goof" in this case and promised that there would be an im-
provement in the consultative process in the future. Id. at 23-29, 31, 51-52, 58, 62.
234. For recent suggestions, see Collier, supra note 61, at 13. Even without changing the
existing legislation on nuclear non-proliferation, Congress retains considerable power to influ-
ence Administration policy. See also infra § VI.
235. An interesting exception occurred in 1950, when Congress "directed" President Tru-
man to grant a loan to Spain. Truman viewed this directive as unconstitutional and apparently
intended to defy it, but eventually he approved the loan. SUNDQUIST, supra note 9, at 203.
236. Fisher, Impoundment of Funds: Uses and Abuses, 23 BUFFALO L. REV. 141, 157
(1973). This tendency has been reversed in recent years in relation to Israel, with Congress
several times appropriating more funds than requested by the Administration. On the history
of impoundments before the Impoundment Control Act was adopted, see id. at 141-200;
Fisher, Presidential Spending Discretion and Congressional Controls, 37 LAW AND CONTEMP.
PROBS. 135 (1972); Fisher, The Politics ofImpounded Funds, ADMIN. Sci. Q., Sept. 1970, at
Vol. 15
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Even while rejecting the President's contention that he possessed an
overall inherent impoundment power, legal scholars were prepared
to concede greater validity to his claim in relation to foreign pol-
icy. 237 For its part, Congress has tended to frame foreign policy leg-
islation in a way which left to the President considerable discretion to
withhold funds. Nevertheless, by its terms, the Impoundment Con-
trol Act does not differentiate between domestic and foreign aid
funds; all are equally within its procedural ambit. Thus, the Act,
containing as it does a legislative veto provision, must be considered
a foreign-policy-related statute potentially affected by the Chadha
ruling.
Along with the National Emergencies Act adopted two years
later, the Impoundment Control Act of 1974 seems, in genre, closest
to the War Powers Resolution. On the impoundment issue, as on the
question of war powers, Congress and the President were finding
themselves on opposite sides of the constitutional barricade.2 35 Thus,
President Nixon contended, in 1973, that the "constitutional right
for the President. . .to impound funds . . . when the spending of
money would mean either increasing prices or increasing taxes for all
the people . . . is absolutely clear."239 On the other hand, Congress,
basing itself on the power of the purse and the presidential obligation
to execute the laws faithfully, could find no constitutional justifica-
tion for wholesale policy impoundments (as opposed to routine ad-
ministrative impoundments).2 ° If such a right were conceded to the
President, he would in effect have an item veto, and beyond that, one
that could not even be overridden by Congress. 241 He could negate
361-77; Schick, The Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (Pub. L No. 93-344), CRS MIMEO., Jan.
31, 1975, at 1-7; SUNDQUIST, supra note 9, at 199-213. On statutory authority and legislative
veto provisions touching on presidential transfers between foreign assistance accounts, see
supra sub-section C.
237. See, e.g., Henkin, A More Effective System for Foreign Relations: The Constitutional
Framework, Statement before the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the
Conduct of Foreign Policy, May 1974 (mimeo.), at 19-20, 36; see also Fisher, Impoundment of
Funds, supra note 236, at 156-57 (concerning the claims of the Nixon Administration to an
especially broad discretion in the area of foreign relations). See also the argument of Attorney
General Rehnquist in 1971 for a national security and foreign affairs exception, permitting the
President to impound, even if the President lacked general authority to withhold congressio-
nally-authorized funds, cited in SUNDQUIST, supra note 9, at 206.
238. This constitutional debate provoked many court suits, almost all of which were de-
cided against the Administration. Most of these, however, were decided on the basis of statu-
tory provisions and did not enter the constitutional thicket.
239. See Fisher, Impoundment of Funds, supra note 236, at 141.
240. For the differentiation between the two, see id. at 142-91.
241. Fisher, Politics of Impounded Funds, supra note 236, at 370.
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legislative policy and substitute his own policy at will. Again, as in
the War Powers Resolution, Congress did not purport to resolve the
constitutional controversy definitively by statute. Nothing in the Im-
poundment Control Act was to be construed as "asserting or conced-
ing the constitutional powers or limitations of either the Congress or
the President." '242 Nor did Congress ostensibly delegate to the Presi-
dent any authority he did not already possess.243 The essential de-
sign of this Act was also procedural, involving in this case the
following main elements:2 " submission by the President to Congress
of proposals to rescind or defer spending authority;245 the require-
ment that Congress approve, by legislation within forty-five days, any
presidential proposal for rescission; the continuation of a deferral un-
til disapproved, at any time, by simple resolution of either house (the
legislative veto provision);246 the right of the Comptroller-General to
report impoundments, if the President fails to do so, and to reclassify
proposed deferrals as rescissions; and the grant of discretionary au-
thority to the Comptroller-General to initiate civil actions to release
appropriated funds.247
Notwithstanding the disclaimers and the procedural focus of the
Impoundment Control Act, its provisions-even more than those of
the War Powers Resolution-lend themselves to a different interpre-
tation. Thus, the Comptroller-General, after reviewing the admit-
tedly "complicated provisions" and confused legislative history,
242. Impoundment Control Act § 1001(1), 88 Stat. 332 (1974). For a discussion of this
provision, see Schick, supra note 236, at 8-12.
243. See Impoundment Control Act § 1001(2), 88 Stat. 333 (1974).
244. The final act represented a compromise between the Senate and the House. The Sen-
ate wanted to bar all impoundments unless specifically approved by both Houses, while the
House would have permtitted a one-House veto with respect to all impoundments. In the end,
the Senate procedure was adopted for rescissions and the House procedure for deferrals. This
scheme, it was felt, afforded flexibility while preserving the constitutional balance. See the
preliminary analysis of Chadha by Morton Rosenberg in House For. Aff. Comm. Hearings,
supra note 7, at 268. For the legislative history of the Impoundment Control Act and its
legislative veto provision, see id. at 267-69; Schick, supra note 236.
245. On the differentiation and difficulties entailed, see id. at 21-38; see also SUNDQUIST,
supra note 9, at 215 (on how easily rescissions can be masked as deferrals).
246. Impoundment Control Act § 1013, 88 Stat. 334 (1974). Whereas rescission bills may
be approved in part and amendments may be introduced, deferral proposals were subject to
approval or disapproval in their entirety. Schick, supra note 236, at 26.
It might be noted that President Nixon signed the Act without objecting to the legislative
veto provision and that none of his successors raised any specific objection to the constitution-
ality of this provision.
247. Impoundment Control Act § 1016, 88 Stat. 336-37 (1974). This authority is separate
from the right of any other party (including individual congressmen) to bring suit. See Schick,
supra note 236, at 46-47.
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concluded that the Act did indeed confer new impoundment author-
ity on the President.248 How the Act is characterized-whether as
purely procedural or as a delegation of authority-has relevance to
the issue of severability, which the Chadha ruling has thrown into
high relief. For, as Richard Ehlke notes:
If the Act is not a delegation of impoundment authority the
question of severability is conceptually different than that present
in the typical legislative veto case. The basic question underlying
severability analysis-whether Congress would have enacted the
valid portions of the statute independent of those held to be inva-
lid-is most crucial when Congress delegates authority but
reserves to itself a check on that delegation by means of the veto.
A finding of severability in such circumstances would materially
enhance executive authority, possibly forcing Congress through
the regular legislative process to muster a super-majority to over-
ride a presidential veto.2 49
Even if the Act does not involve a delegation of authority, of course,
as Ehlke concedes, the issue of severability persists.25
How the Act is characterized and whether the legislative veto
provision on deferrals is severable from the rest of the statute are
both questions with potentially far-reaching implications in future lit-
igation. Court suits might be brought by private litigants; under the
terms of the Act, they may also be initiated by the Comptroller-Gen-
eral. Potentially, such suits could relate to foreign assistance funds as
well. Before Chadha, there were two main contingencies in which
the Comptroller-General might decide to sue for the release of funds:
(1) if the President determined on a rescission without legislative au-
thority, and (2) if he deferred spending in the face of a one-House
disapproval resolution. After Chadha, with the legislative veto provi-
sion presumptively dead, does the Comptroller-General retain the
right to sue in the case of deferrals? Indeed, does he retain the right
to sue at all, even in relation to rescissions?
The executive may not be able to wait for possible future judicial
clarification before determining whether to continue to abide by the
Act's provisions on deferral. After all, proposals to defer spending
had in the past been presented fairly frequently to Congress. In
248. Id. at 18-19. Court decisions have been divided on this point. See Ehlke, The Legal
Lanscape after INS v. Chadha: Some Litigation Possibilities, 1983 CRS REV. 30 (special Fall
issue).
249. Id.
250. See infra § V on severability.
251. By the time of Chadha, of the approximately 200 proposed budget deferrals submitted
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the aftermath of Chadha, the Reagan Administration continued to
report to Congress on deferrals, and the Comptroller-General contin-
ued to review the reports and to present his comments; but it was
uncertain how the Administration would react if either House en-
tered a disapproval resolution.252
In Congress, a proposal to disapprove deferrals by bill or joint
resolution has been put forward.253 If adopted, this would enhance
executive authority considerably, because the deferral would be valid
unless disapproved by both Houses of Congress. Since presumably
the President would veto a bill to disapprove his proposed deferral,
the congressional will would prevail only if supported by a two-thirds
majority. On the other hand, were Congress to revert to the original
Senate version of the Impoundment Control Act, no impound-
ments-whether temporary or permanent-would be allowed with-
out positive congressional sanction.2" 4
H Miscellaneous
Other legislative veto provisions which, at the time of Chadha,
were incorporated in foreign policy (or foreign-policy-related) legisla-
tion included the following:255
(1) American civilian personnel assigned to Sinai might be with-
drawn if Congress, by concurrent resolution, determined that their
safety was in jeopardy or that "continuation of their role is no longer
necessary."
256
(2) The President's decision to extend the production period for
naval petroleum reserves was vetoable by either House.25
by presidents, 83 had been disapproved by Senate or House resolution without presidential
protest. See Rosenberg, House For. Aff. Comm. Hearings, supra note 7, at 269; CONG. Q. ALM.
29, 30 (Spring 1984).
252. Ehlke, supra note 248, at 30-31.
253. The proposal was submitted by Congressman Silvio Conte on August 3, 1983, (H.R.
3754) and was subsequently revised by its sponsor (H.R. 4959) in the face of Administration
objections to its constitutionality. The bill was referred to the House Rules and Government
Operations Committees. See Fisher, One Year After, supra note 8, at 9.
254. See supra note 243.
255. Consult, in addition to the enumeration in this and the preceding sub-sections, the
compilations of statutory provisions contained, e.g., in the appendices in House For. Aff.
Comm. Hearings, supra note 7, at 161-226, 249-62; and the appendix to Justice White's dissent-
ing opinion in the Chadha case, 103 S. Ct. 2811-13 (1983).
256. Pub. L. No. 94-110, § 1, 89 Stat. 572 (1975). Doubts as to the constitutionality of this
provision were voiced in Congress by Representative Eckhardt. 121 CONG. REC. H 32,391-92
(1975).
257. Naval Petroleum Reserves Production Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-258, § 201, 90
Stat. 309 (1976). With respect to strategic oil reserves and energy conservation contingency
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(3) Various presidential actions in relation to synthetic fuel
projects, including the extension of financial assistance to such
projects in the Western hemisphere, were subject to a one-House
veto.258
(4) Under the terms of the International Navigational Rules
Act of 1977, proposed amendments to the International Regulations
for Preventing Collisions at Sea could be disapproved by concurrent
resolution.259
In addtion to the legislative veto provisions actually adopted,
mention should be made of some which were in contemplation prior
to Chadha. Most prominent among these were suggestions, floated
from time to time, for making sole executive agreements subject to
congressional concurrent resolutions of disapproval within a specified
period. 2' For several reasons, these proposals never made much
plans, see the citations in House For. Aff. Comm. Hearings, supra note 7, at 170; Justice White's
dissenting opinion, 103 S. Ct. 2795 n.8 (1983).
258. See the synopsis and citations of the relevant sections of Pub. L. No. 96-294, in House
For. Aff. Comm. Hearings, supra note 7, at 166, 171, 220.
259. Pub. L. No. 95-75, § 3(d), 91 Stat. 308 (1981). Reference might also be made, inciden-
tally, to the one-House veto procedure for regulations governing access to presidential tapes
and other materials, provided for in the Presidential Recording and Materials Preservation
Act, Pub. L. No. 93-526, § 104, 88 Stat. 1696-97 (1974). Though not, in any direct sense,
foreign-policy-linked, the provision could be seen as foreign-policy-research-linked. The infor-
mation revealed by such research could have important implications for decision-makers in
foreign States. The legislative veto was used extensively in relation to the disposition of the
Nixon tapes and papers. See the case study of its use in Bruff and Gelhorn, supra note 31, at
1397-1403. Following.Chadha, the GSA regulations governing public access to White House
files were successfully challenged in the D.C. District Court, on the grounds that the availabil-
ity of a one-House legislative veto vitiated their validity. Applying Chadha retroactively, the
Court required the GSA Administrator to promulgate new, veto-proof, regulations. Allen v.
Carmen, 578 F. Supp. 1951 (D.D.C. 1983). See Fisher, One Year After, supra note 8, at 31.
260. For example, in 1974, an amended version of the Ervin Bill (S.3830) was adopted by
the Senate, and would have permitted Congress to veto an executive agreement within sixty
session days of its (obligatory) transmittal to Congress, unless such agreement was concluded
by the President "pursuant to a provision of the Constitution or prior authority given to the
President by treaty or law." See 120 CONG. REC. S36926-28 (1974); SENATE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS, S. REP. No. 93-1286
(to accompany S.3830), 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1974). Similar bills had been introduced by
Senator Ervin in 1972 (S. 3475) and 1973 (S. 1472), and hearings had been held. See Congres-
sional Oversight of Executive Agreements, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Pow-
ers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92nd Cong, 2nd Sess. (1972). In 1975, the Ervin bill
was revived by Senator Bentsen (S.632), while Senator Glenn introduced a more stringent bill
(S. 1251) which would have subjected a very broad range of executive agreements to veto by the
Senate alone within sixty days. (The bill would have applied to "any bilateral or multilateral
international agreement or understanding, formal or informal, written or verbal, other than a
treaty, which involves, or the intent is to leave the impression of, a commitment of manpower,
funds, information, or other resources of the United States, and which is made by the President
or any officer, employee, or representative of the executive branch of the United States Govern-
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headway in Congress. Primarily this was because members of Con-
gress also acknowledged that there was a category of agreements
which the President was empowered constitutionally to conclude
without congressional meddling; that this category was undefined
and possibly undefinable; and that, therefore, if it was excluded from
the proposed scheme, the entire exercise became an exercise in futil-
ity. Senate jealousy of its traditional role in consenting to treaties
was also a factor in aborting these proposals. In the post-Chadha
constitutional setting, the legislative veto approach to the executive
agreement problem will, presumably, be effectively buried. Other ap-
proaches, however-such as that embodied in the Clark Resolu-
tion-remain legally feasible, if not necessarily politically
warranted.26'
IV. FOREIGN POLICY LEGISLATIVE VETOES: THE RECORD OF
NON-USE
In contrast to the plethora of legislative veto provisions adopted
in the foreign policy field is the total non-use of these provisions to
ment.") See Congressional Oversight of Executive Agreements, Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
(For texts of the Bentsen and Glenn bills, see id. at 243-49, 254-61.) In the House, the idea of
applying a two-House legislative veto to executive agreements was incorporated in a bill spon-
sored in 1975 by Representatives Thomas E. Morgan and Clement Zablocki (H.R. 4338). The
executive agreements embraced in the bill were those concerning the establishment, renewal,
continuation or revision of a "national commitment" (defined to include agreements for "the
introduction, basing or deployment" of U.S. armed forces abroad, and for providing military,
nuclear or financial assistance or military training "to a foreign country, government or peo-
ple." Other bills along similar lines were also introduced. See Congressional Review of Interna-
tional Agreements, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Security and Scientific
Affairs of the House Comm. on International Relations, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1976). Mean-
while, by 1976-1977, the Senate was becoming less enthusiastic about the legislative-veto ap-
proach to the problem. See infra note 261. For a survey, relevant citations, and discussion of
the various proposals entertained by Congress in the 1970s for limiting sole executive agree-
ments, see Rovine, Separation of Powers and International Executive Agreements, 52 IND. L. J.
397 (1977).
261. The Clark Resolution, introduced in 1976 (S. Res. 434, subsequently renumbered S.
Res. 486) and again in 1977 (S. Res. 24), embodied a novel approach. It attempted to use the
Senate's internal rulemaking power in order to force the President to submit to the Senate as
"treaties" such executive agreements as the Senate might designate. The resolution was never
passed. See 122 CONG. REC. S5744-46, S114515-17 (1976); id. vol. 123, at S696 (1977). For a
discussion of the resolution, as well as of the Morgan-Zablocki Bill, see Treaties and Executive
Agreements, AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L L. PROC. 235 (1977); Rovine, supra note 260. In 1978, the
Senate attempted unsuccessfully to include in the State Department Authorization Bill a provi-
sion which would have allowed the Senate to determine whether international agreements
should be submitted as treaties. (See S. 3076 and S. Rep. No. 95-842). The provision was
dropped in conference as a result of opposition by the House. See 5 CONGRESS AND THE
NATION, 1977-1980, 59-60 (1981).
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negate presidential initiatives. Even in the domestic field, there is a
vast disproportion between the number of veto clauses enacted by
Congress and the occasions on which the clauses have been acti-
vated.262 Not surprisingly, congressional reluctance to block the ex-
ecutive has been more manifest in relation to foreign policy.
Nevertheless, non-use is not automatically translatable into non-im-
portance. Especially on some sensitive questions of arms exports to
the Middle East and nuclear proliferation, Congress has come very
close to adopting veto resolutions. Besides, the availability of the
veto weapon has meant that the mere threat of its use could have
important effects-pre-natal as well as post-natal--on presidential
decisions. What follows is a review of the principal abortive attempts
to use foreign policy legislative vetoes in the years preceding Chadha.
Interestingly, Congress has never exercised nor even attempted
to exercise the legislative veto provision in the War Powers Resolu-
tion-a provision viewed by many at the time of its adoption as the
ultimate sanction in any congressional-executive confrontation over
the use of force abroad. There have indeed been some interbranch
differences over the application of the War Powers Resolution, but
these have centered on different provisions. Thus, Congressmen have
complained about the inadequacy of prior consultation (Section 3);263
about the insufficiency of some presidential reports;2" about the fail-
ure, in some instances (most prominently, El Salvador) to file a re-
port altogether under Section 4;265 and about presidential
misreporting of the American presence abroad. With respect to Leb-
262. In the fifty years that elapsed from the introduction of the first legislative provision in
1932 until the summer of 1982, the legislative veto, by the estimate of the Congressional Re-
search Service, was used some 230 times. Of these vetoes, Il l related to immigration cases
(and affected 229 of the 5930 individuals whose deportation it was proposed to suspend); 65
were effected under the Impoundment Control Act and represented a very small proportion of
proposed deferrals; and the remaining 30 related to sundry other matters. See Smith and
Struve, supra note 86, at 1258; Strauss, supra note 86, at 790-91; CONG. Q., at 29, 30 (Spring
1984).
263. For examples see HOLT, THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF CONGRESS
IN U.S. ARMED INTERVENTION 11-22 (1978); Franck, supra note 108, at 614-21.
264. For illustrations see HOLT, supra note 263, at 21.
265. In the case of El Salvador, Representative George Crockett of Michigan and ten other
House members sought in vain to obtain a judicial remedy. The D.C. District Court, whose
ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, dismissed the suit on the
grounds that the question was "political" and that Congress was the proper forum for deter-
mining the applicability of the War Powers Resolution to the military situation in El Salvador.
Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983), aff'g 588 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982).
More recently, some congressmen have suggested that a report should have been filed
regarding the use of U.S. AWACS and aerial tankers in Saudi Arabia to down Iranian planes in
the Gulf. N.Y. TIMES WEEKLY REV., June 10, 1984.
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anon, Congress objected to the executive assertion that the troops
had not been introduced "into hostilities or into situations where im-
minent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circum-
stances" (Section 4 [a][1]), and that consequently the sixty-day
automatic-termination clock had not begun to run. When the U.S.
troops remained in Lebanon beyond sixty days, Congress adopted a
joint (not concurrent) resolution determining that Section 4(a)(1) had
come into effect on August 29, 1983 (when two marines were killed
in Lebanon), and authorizing the President to retain the United
States forces in the multinational force in Lebanon for a period of
eighteen months.266
Congress adopted a more assertive stance on the question of
arms exports. From the time that the first legislative veto provision
was adopted in 1974 until the Chadha ruling, numerous concurrent
resolutions of disapproval were introduced and several were exten-
sively debated. Of these, five involved serious interbranch controver-
sies-all relating to arms sales to the Middle East. A floor vote on a
veto resolution was taken for the first time in 1978; and in 1981, floor
votes in both chambers led to near-adoption of a concurrent resolu-
tion to block the proposed sale of AWACS and other equipment to
Saudi Arabia.
The first test of the Nelson-Bingham Amendment came in 1975
266. Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution, Pub. L. No. 98-119, 97 Stat. 805 (1983),
signed into law on October 12, 1983. The bill represented a compromise, and upon signing,
President Reagan expressed reservations regarding the constitutionality of the War Powers
Resolution. 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc., 1422-23 (Oct. 17, 1983). From a congressional
perspective, as explained in a memorandum transmitted on September 22, 1983 by former Sen-
ator Javits to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "Congress has established the proposi-
tion that it may set the clock running under the [War Powers] resolution even if the President
does not trigger it. . . . The President has gained the point that for the situation in Lebanon
the authority Congress gives him to continue their involvement must be by joint, not concur-
rent resolution." Markup: War Powers Resolution, Hearing Before the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Comm., 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983) at 2.
Earlier, in the Lebanon Emergency Assistance Act of 1983 (Pub. L. No. 98-43), Congress
had stipulated that any substantial expansion in the number or role of U.S. forces in Lebanon
would require statutory authorization. With the subsequent effective withdrawal of the U.S.
marines from Lebanon, the issue of the applicability of the War Powers Resolution to that
arena became moot.
In the case of the U.S. invasion of Grenada on October 25, 1983, the President's report to
Congress failed to refer to Section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution. Both Houses of
Congress moved independently to invoke that provision and thus set the Resolution's auto-
matic clock ticking. However, the actions of the two chambers were never coordinated, and
nothing came of these d6marches. For details see Glennon, supra note 35, at 572, 573, 574.
For a discussion of the question of when the automatic-termination clock is triggered, see
Franck, supra note 108, at 615-19.
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after the Ford Administration formally notified Congress of its inten-
tion to sell Jordan fourteen batteries of Hawk missiles along with
about 100 Vulcan anit-aircraft missiles and other defense equipment.
Opposition in Congress to the arms deal was heightened by resent-
ment at the Administration's handling of the notification to Con-
gress. Formal notice was not sent until July 10, 1975, just before the
summer recess; and earlier congressional requests for information
about the pending deal had elicited an evasive reply.267 Concurrent
resolutions to block the sale were soon introduced by Senator Clif-
ford Case and Representative Jonathan Bingham. Hearings were
held by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House In-
ternational Relations Committee during July. On July 24, the House
committee, citing the adverse effects of such a large sale on the re-
gional balance of power and on Israeli security, recommended adop-
tion of the concurrent resolution.26 Faced with the threat of an
immediate congressional veto of the sale before the summer recess,
the Administration decided to withdraw the notification until after
the congressional recess, thereby allowing two sets of negotiations-
congressional-executive and U.S-Jordanian-to proceed. When,
even after the summer recess, no satisfactory compromise had been
achieved, Congressman Bingham reintroduced a concurrent resolu-
tion of disapproval on September 4, 1975. Subsequently, however,
the Administration accepted changes suggested earlier by a congres-
sional staff team and involving the permanent installation of the
Hawk missile batteries at fixed sites so as to ensure that they would
be used for defensive purposes only. The new assurances, embodied
in a presidential letter to Congress, satisfied congressional opponents
of the deal, and the sale was permitted to go forward without any
further congressional action being taken to block it.
269
In 1976, the Ford Administration and Congress found them-
267. For detailed discussion of this case, see FRANCK & WEISBAND, supra note 35, at 100-
03.
268. See U.S. Missile Sale to Jordan, Hearings on S. Con. Res 50 Before the Senate Comm.
on Foreign Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); Proposed Sale to Jordan of the Hawk and
Vulcan Air Defense System, Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on International Political and
Military Affairs of the House Comm. on International Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975);
HOUSE COMM. ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, DISAPPROVING PROPOSED SALES TO JOR-
DAN OF HAWK MISSILE AND VULCAN ANTIAIRCRAFT SYSTEMS, H. REP. No. 94-392 (to
accompany H. Con. Res. 337), 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); see also Grimmett, supra note 121,
at 252-55.
269. For a while, Jordan objected, but eventually "the King's bruised ego" was soothed.
FRANCK & WEISBAND, supra note 35, at 103. On the developments in September 1975, see
Grimmett, supra note 121 and the sources cited therein.
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selves again at odds over a Middle East arms sales package, this time
involving a proposed transfer to Saudi Arabia of some 1,000 Side-
winder missiles and 1,500 Maverick TV-guided air-to-surface mis-
siles. Negotiations between the executive and members of the
Foreign Relations Committee led to the scaling down of the proposed
sale to 850 Sidewinder and 650 Maverick missiles. But this reduction
was considered quite unsatisfactory by many Senators and Congress-
men who proceeded to introduce concurrent resolutions of disap-
proval. By a vote of 8-6, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
voted to disapprove the sale of the 650 Maverick missiles to Saudi
Arabia.270 Such a sale, it considered, was unjustified and "would
have a potentially destabilizing effect on the military situation in the
Middle East."27' However, instead of reaching the Senate floor as
scheduled, the resolution was re-referred to the Foreign Relations
Committee following a parliamentary maneuver by its chairman,
Senator John Sparkman.272 The Committee later met in executive
session with Secretary of State Kissinger and was persuaded to re-
verse itself and not to re-report the concurrent resolution to the full
Senate. Further action by the House International Relations Com-
mittee then became pointless, especially since the thirty-day deadline
was fast approaching. Thus, the revised version of the Administra-
tion's arms package to Saudi Arabia was not blocked.
The following year, the new Carter Administration encountered
strong congressional opposition when it proposed to sell seven air-
borne warning and control systems (AWACS) to Iran. It was feared
that the United States was allowing the arms nexus with Iran to get
"out of control"; that Iran would inevitably depend on American
personnel to operate and maintain such sophisticated equipment,
thereby entangling the United States too greatly in Iranian foreign
270. See US. Arms Sales Policy: Proposed Sales of Arms to Iran and Saudi Arabia, Hear-
ings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations and the Subcomm. on Foreign Assistance,
94th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1976); Proposed Foreign Military Sales to Middle Eastern Countries-
1976, Hearings before the Subcomm. on International Political and Military Affairs of the House
Comm on International Relations, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1976); SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS, SALE OF MISSILES TO SAUDI ARABIA, S. REP. No. 94-1305 (to accompany S.
Con. Res. 161), 94th Cong. 2nd Sess. (1976). The Senate Foreign Relations Committee re-
jected a proposal raised by Senators Dick Clark and Joseph Biden to block some 19 sales to
Iran, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and it confined itself to the issue of the Maverick missiles to
Saudi Arabia.
271. S. REP. No. 94-1305, supra note 270, at 5-7.
272. See Grimmett, supra note 121, at 258. Senator Clifford Case, the ranking minority
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policy; and that the AWACS might be captured by the Russians and
provide them with a military information bonanza.273
Formal notification of the proposed sale was sent on July 7,
1977, and shortly thereafter opponents in both chambers introduced
concurrent resolutions to disapprove the sale.274 Prior to this, during
the pre-notification stage, Senator John C. Culver and several other
Senators had requested the General Accounting Office (GAO) to
study the issue. Its report, most of which was classified, concluded
that there was inadequate justification for the sale and that other al-
ternatives, such as a totally ground-based system, could provide more
effective air defense. Even more damaging to the Administration's
case was a statement by Admiral Stansfield Turner, Director of the
CIA, who confirmed congressional anxieties that the AWACS might,
through the defection of an Iranian crew, fall into Soviet hands,
thereby reducing significantly the American advantage in electronic
warfare. If the sensitive gear were removed, Turner testified, the
AWACS would be ineffectual. 275 The GAO Report and Turner's tes-
timony made the Administration's task of selling the sale to Congress
more difficult. While hearings were being conducted by the relevant
sub-committees in Congress, 276 Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd
formally requested from President Carter withdrawal of the sale, a
request at first refused by the President. Only after the House Inter-
273. See 1977 CONG. Q. ALM. 387. It was felt that President Carter was hastily overturn-
ing his own recently announced declaration on arms sales. On May 19, the President had
enunciated a policy of limiting sophisticated arms transfers and reducing arms sales generally.
Arms sales were to be used only as an extraordinary instrument of foreign policy and the
United States was not to introduce any qualitatively new weapons to a region.
The AWACS, the most expensive production-line aircraft in history, is a modified Boeing
707 airliner carrying sophisticated radar and electronic equipment which permits it to detect
low-flying aircraft at 175 nautical miles and high-altitude bombers at 360 nautical miles. It is
capable of simultaneously tracking hundreds of aircraft.
274. In the House, Concurrent Resolution 275 was introduced by Representative Gerry E.
Studds on July 11; and on July 15, Senator John Culver, joined by a bipartisan group of other
senators (including Thomas F. Eagleton, Alan Cranston, William W. Roth, Jr., and Henry L.
Bellmon) introduced Senate Concurrent Resolution 36.
275. See 1977 CONG. Q. ALM. 387-88; Grimmett, supra note 121, at 259-60; FRANCK &
WEISBAND, supra note 35 at 105-6. The GAO report was issued on July 14, 1977, and was
entitled, Issues Concerning the Proposed Sale of the Airborne Warning and Control System E-3
to Iran.
276. See Prospective Sale of Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) Aircraft to
Iran, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Security and Scientific Affairs and on
Europe and the Middle East of the House Comm. on International Relations, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1977); Proposed Sale of Seven E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System Aircraft to Iran,
Hearings Before the Senate Subcomm. on Foreign Assistance and the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
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national Relations Committee decided by a surprise 19-17 vote to
forward the veto resolution to the floor, and the threat of parallel
Senate Foreign Relations Committee action appeared imminent, did
Carter agree, on July 28, to withdraw his notification temporarily.
277
Before resubmitting the notification in September, the Administra-
tion conducted negotiations with Congress and endorsed a series of
assurances previously requested by the Senate's Foreign Assistance
Sub-Committee. These assurances, to which the Iranian government
later consented, involved the removal of certain highly secret coding
and communication gear from the planes; U.S.-Iranian security ar-
rangements for protecting the AWACS; use of the AWACS for defen-
sive purposes only; training of Iranian crews in the United States;
and non-participation of United States personnel in AWACS opera-
tional flights.2 78 Fulfilling their part of a bargain struck with the Ad-
ministration, Senators Hubert Humphrey and Clifford Case
(respectively, chairman and ranking minority member of the sub-
committee) now addressed a letter to their colleagues in the Senate
recommending approval of the sale. The President, they concluded,
had been "responsive to our concerns." The assurances, "if vigi-
lantly enforced by the President and closely monitored by the Con-
gress. . . should provide the increased measure of protection sought
by the Subcommittee." '279 Although the GAO was apparently not as
confident of the efficacy of the assurances, and although Senator Cul-
ver introduced a new concurrent resolution to defeat the sale, no fur-
ther congressional action was taken. The AWACS were never
delivered, but this was due to political developments in Iran, not to
congressional opposition.28°
277. See 1977 CONG. Q. ALM. 388; Grimmett, supra note 121, at 261-62. Among the
opponents of the sale was Congressman Don Bonker, who represented the district where
AWACS were manufactured. FRANCK & WEISBAND, supra note 35, at 105.
Until the House International Relations Committee vote, the Carter Administration had
been concentrating on the Senate and assuming that there was no need to withdraw the propo-
sal or even to modify it significantly, since the House would support the President's initiative.
But before the committee vote; Senator Culver testified, in closed session, using effectively the
mass of classified data he had assembled. 1977 CONG. Q. ALM. 388.
278. See Sale of AWACS to Iran, Communication from the President of the United States
Transmitting a Statement in Support of the Administration's Proposal to Sell Iran Seven Air-
borne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS), Sept. 8, 1977, H. Doc. No. 95-216, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); 1977 CONG. Q. ALM. 388; FRANCK & WEISBAND, supra note 35, at
105-6; Grimmett, supra note 121, at 262-63.
279. See Grimmett, supra note 121, at 263; FRANCK & WEISBAND, supra note 35, at 106.
280. See FRANK & WEISBAND, supra note 35, at 106. The Culver resolution was intro-
duced on Oct.1, 1977. Grimmett, supra note 121, at 263. In 1979, the new Khomeini regime
cancelled $7 billion of the $12 billion of military purchases ordered by the Shah, and the seven
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An even sharper congressional confrontation with the Carter
Administration occurred in 1978 over the proposed aircraft sales
package to Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Israel.2"' According to the pro-
posal, sixty F-15 aircraft were to be sold to Saudi Arabia and282 fifty
F-5 aircraft to Egypt, while fifteen F-15 and seventy-five F-16 aircraft
were to be sold to Israel. Members of Congress objected both to the
meager allotment to Israel-the number of aircraft proposed repre-
sented half the number requested by Israel and unofficially pledged
by Kissinger in 1975 28 3-and to the adverse effect of the Saudi sales
on the local strategic balance and Israel's security.
To forestall congressional defeat of the sales, President Carter
had at first determined to package the deal, and thus it was presented
in Secretary of State Vance's announcement of February 14, 1978.
But this very packaging led many Congressmen into the opposition
camp, since they resented what they viewed as a transparent attempt
to evade the spirit of the Nelson-Bingham Amendment. Israel also
strenuously objected to the "packaging," viewing it as a violation of
American commitments given in formal assurances to Israel follow-
ing the Israeli-Egyptian Interim Agreement in 1975, to "continue to
maintain Israel's defensive strength through the supply of advanced
types of equipment, such as the F-16 aircraft."28 4 To link military
supplies for Israel to the dispatch of similar supplies to its neighbors
was seen as a violation of the letter and spirit of the American
commitment.
Congressional opposition to the linkage tactic led the Adminis-
tration to loosen somewhat the lock on the package when it was for-
mally presented to Congress, on April 28, 1978.285 In place of the
explicit threat to withdraw all the offers if any one of them were ve-
toed, the Administration reserved its option to take appropriate ac-
AWACS were among the items cancelled. 5 CONGRESS AND THE NATION, 1977-1980, 47
(1981).
281. The case is discussed in detail in FRANCK & WEISBAND, supra note 35, at 106-11;
Grimmett, supra note 121, at 263-68; 1978 CONG. Q. ALM. 405-11.
282. The total value of the sale to Saudi Arabia was $2.5 billion. This was the first time
F-15 warplanes-America's most sophisticated jet fighters-were to be sold to a State which
was not a close U.S. ally. 1978 CONG. Q. ALM. 405-7.
283. FRANCK & WEISBAND, supra note 35, at 106; 1978 CONG. Q. ALM. 405.
284. See Agreement G, reprinted in 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS, 1469 (1975) and in 121
CONG. REC. S17970 (1975).
285. Senator Byrd advised President Carter not to "call a spade a spade" in this instance.
FRANCK & WEISBAND, supra note 35, at 107.
Although President Carter announced the proposed package on February 14, he delayed
sending formal notice until April 28, after the Senate had completed its consideration of the
Panama Canal treaties.
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tion after Congress completed its review procedure.2 8 6
Numerous concurrent resolutions of disapproval were intro-
duced in both Houses of Congress. One of the resolutions introduced
in the House was sponsored by a majority of the members of the
House International Relations Committee. 287  Extensive hearings
were held in early May in both the Senate Foreign Relations and
House International Relations Committees.288 During this period,
behind-the-scenes executive-congressional negotiations designed to
meet some of the major criticisms were taking place. These
culminated in assurances presented to Congress by the Carter Ad-
ministration that Saudi aircraft would be kept out of the northern
region, within striking distance of Israel; that the aircraft would not
be equipped with multiple ejection bomb racks or advanced Side-
winder air-to-air missiles; and that the equipment for aerial refueling
would also be denied. In this manner, the aircrafts' offensive capabil-
ities and range would be curtailed. Furthermore, such sophisticated
air surveillance aircraft as the E-2C "Hawkeye" or the E-3A AWACS
were not to be sold to Saudi Arabia. Saudi assurances that the air-
craft would be employed only for purposes of "legitimate self-de-
fense" were also relayed. 289 Additionally, the Administration agreed
to sell twenty more F-15's to Israel in 1979 for delivery in 1983-84
and to give "sympathetic consideration" to future Israeli requests for
additional combat aircraft.290
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee remained sharply di-
vided on the issue, with Senator Frank Church, the ranking majority
member, supporting the resolution of disapproval. In a formal vote,
the Committee defeated the resolution on May 11 by a tie vote of 8-8,
but determined nevertheless to send the issue to the floor. It did so
286. Id.; see also Grimmett, supra note 121, at 264-65.
287. See Grimmett, supra note 121, at 265 n.2 (for a listing of the relevant resolutions); see
also FRANCK & WEISBAND, supra note 35, at 107-8 (on the activities of the Fascell working
group).
288. Middle East Arms Sales Proposals, Hearings Before the Senate Foreign Relations
Comm on Proposed US. Sales of Fighter Aircraft to Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel, 95th
Cong., 2nd Sess. (1978); Proposed Aircraft Sales to Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, Hearings
Before the House Comm. on International Relations, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1978).
289. See the May 9, 1978 letter from Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to Senator John
Sparkman, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in 124 CONG. REC. S 13627
(1978); excerpted in Grimmett, Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia: A WACS and the F-15 Enhance-
ments, CRS Issue Brief No. IB 81078, May 12, 1981, updated Nov. 3, 1981 (mimeo.), at 13-14.
See also the testimony of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Secretary of Defense Harold
Brown before the House International Relations Committee, supra note 288, at 33 ff.
290. 1978 CONG. Q. ALM. 409; FRANCK & WEISBAND, supra note 35, at 109; Grimmett,
supra note 121, at 266.
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by adopting a concurrent resolution of disapproval bearing no formal
committee recommendation. It also repackaged the arms deal: the
plenary was given the option of voting yes or no on the entire Carter
proposal.29' Following intensive Administration lobbying and exten-
sive floor debate (some of it in executive session), the Senate on May
15 voted 54-44 to reject the resolution of disapproval.292 Thus, the
way was cleared for the Administration's aircraft package, and any
further action in the House, where opposition to the sales remained
high, was rendered futile.
Most of the items which were excluded by the Carter Adminis-
tration from the 1978 aircraft sale to Saudi Arabia as the price of
congressional acquiescence were included in a new deal offered by
the Reagan Administration in 1981. It was this deal that provoked
the most dramatic interbranch clash on arms exports and, in this
instance, Congress came within a hair's breadth of repudiating the
President's initiative.
In accordance with the proposed $8.5 billion "Royal Saudi Air
Force enhancement package, ' 293 Saudi Arabia was to receive five
E-3A AWACS (costing some $5.8 billion), six to eight KC-707 aerial
refueling aircraft (worth up to $2.4 billion) to allow in-flight refueling
of Saudi Arabia's F-15 and F-5 aircraft, 101 sets of conformal fuel
tanks (valued at $110 million) to extend the range of Saudi Arabia's
F- 15's by boosting their fuel capacity, and 1,177 AIM-9L Sidewinder
heat-seeking air-to-air missiles (worth some $200 million) to replace
the older AIM-9P Sidewinder missiles then in Saudi inventories.
(The new Sidewinder, unlike the older model, permits the F- 15 to fire
on enemy aircraft from any angle, including head-on.) Delivery of
the AWACS was scheduled to begin in 1985 and of most of the other
items, in 1983 or 1984. Clearly, the enhancement of Saudi Arabia's
offensive and surveillance capacity had grave implications for Israeli
security.
291. SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMM., ACTION BY THE CONG. ON CERTAIN PRO-
POSED SALES OF AIRCRAFT TO EGYPT, ISRAEL AND SAUDI ARABIA, S. REP. No. 95-806 (to
accompany S. Con. Res. 86), 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1978). The vote took place on May 11,
1978.
292. For the debate and vote, see 124 CONG. REC. S13624-13710. (1978). Senator Spark-
man read the Brown letter into the record prior to the vote. On the lobbying efforts of the
Administration and arguments for and against the sale, see 1978 CONG. Q. ALM. 409-11. Re-
publican votes were determinative. Among Democrats, 33 opposed the sale and 28 favored it;
among Republicans, the comparable figures were 11 and 26. Id. at 410.
293. This represented a quantum leap in U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia. In 1978, as noted
earlier, the Saudi arms package was valued at $2.5 billion. Details of the package appear in
1981 CONG. Q. ALM. 130.
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Justifying its reversal of the Carter Administration's 1978
pledges to Congress, the Reagan Administration cited the changed
political circumstances in the Gulf region since 1978. More specifi-
cally, it contended that "the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the tur-
moil of the Iranian revolution, the Iran-Iraq war and the Soviet
presence in South Yemen and Ethiopia underscore the instability in
the region and the dangers of Soviet penetration and exploitation."29
The deal was seen as an essential component of the Administration's
new policy of creating a regional "strategic consensus" to counter
Soviet expansionism and adventurism.
A period of several months elapsed between the first official an-
nouncements by the Administration of the pending deal---on March
6 and April 21, 1984 29 5-and the submission to Congress of the de-
tails of the proposed sale, on August 24, 198 1.296 The delay was
linked to the felt need to postpone congressional deliberations until
after the June 30 Israeli elections, and to requests by key Republican
Senators to defer submission until the proposal could be made more
salable to Congress. In April, Senator Baker, Senate Majority
Leader, strongly urged waiting until mid-summer in order "to give
.members of Congress the opportunity to have an input-to offer ad-
vice on the final shape and form of the package that might be submit-
ted." And in June, Senator Percy, Chairman of the Foreign
Relations Committee, advised the Administration "to take the time
294. State Department announcement of March 6, 1981. In 1980, the Carter Administra-
tion had toyed with the idea of reneging on its previous promises, but in the face of strong
congressional opposition and an impending presidential election campaign, it had desisted from
pursuing the idea. Subsequently, there was some controversy as to whether the Carter Admin-
istration had nevertheless committed itself to selling AWACS to Saudi Arabia. The Saudi appe-
tite for AWACS had been aroused in April 1979, when Carter had sent two such planes to
Saudi Arabia to monitor the border war between the two Yemens, and again, in October 1980,
when four AWACS were sent to guard against any Iranian or Iraqi threats to Gulf oil fields.
See Grimmett, supra note 289, at 38-39; 1981 CONG. Q. ALM. 129.
295. In its March 6 announcement, the State Department mentioned the F-15 enhance-
ment items, the advanced Sidewinder missiles and "aerial surveillance aircraft;" the White
House announcement of April 21 was the first to refer to the AWACS by name. From early
February, Administration spokesmen made known their intention of enhancing the effective-
ness of the Saudis' F-15 aircraft. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger mentioned it at a
news conference on February 3, 1981; and on February 26, the matter was again raised by
senior Administration officials in executive session with members of the two congressional for-
eign affairs committees. Grimmett, supra note 289, at 37-38.
296. Although the Administration submitted the advance informal 20-day notification on
August 24, it agreed to have the 20-day period computed from September 9, following the
congressional recess. Official notification, in accordance with Article 36(b) of the Arms Export
Control Act, was given on October 1, 1981, thus triggering the 30 calendar-day period for
operation of the two-House veto.
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now to put together a package that would take into full account the
security interests of Saudi Arabia, Israel, and our own interests in the
Middle East." '297 In point of fact, the long interval merely served to
crystallize and strengthen congressional opposition which, by the
time President Reagan began his counter-offensive, had reached for-
midable proportions.
Congressional reservations were conveyed to the Administration
in a steady stream beginning in February, even before the proposed
addition of the AWACS to the F-15 enhancement package was an-
nounced.298 Subsequently, on June 24, the Administration received a
clear warning that a majority in both chambers found the projected
package objectionable. A bipartisan group of 54 Senators (34 Demo-
crats and 20 Republicans) sent a letter to President Reagan, recom-
mending non-submission of the proposal to Congress; and in the
House, 224 members (174 Democrats and 54 Republicans) co-spon-
sored a concurrent resolution to disapprove the sale.299 In Septem-
ber, following the informal pre-notification, one-half of the Senate
(50 Senators led by Senator Robert Packwood) filed a concurrent res-
olution of disapproval. 3° Opponents of the sale were perturbed pri-
marily over its implications for regional and Israeli security 3°1 and
for the security of the AWACS and related sensitive technology in
the hands of the Saudi ruling family. With the precedent of the
Shah's downfall in mind, the latter fear loomed large. Additionally,
many members of Congress expressed resentment at the blatant vio-
lation of the 1978 Carter assurances and at the unwillingness of Saudi
Arabia to offer any real reciprocal strategic, political or even eco-
nomic benefits to the United States for all its defense support over the
years.3°2
297. See Grimmett, supra note 289, at 35-36.
298. A letter was sent to President Reagan on February 19, 1981, by eight of the 17 mem-
bers of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (seven Democrats and one Republican); and
on February 25, a similar letter was transmitted to Secretary of State Alexander Haig by 19
members (15 Democrats and four Republicans) of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Id.
at 37. Between March 24 and April 7, some 44 senators and 78 congressmen denounced the
sale in floor speeches. 1981 CONG. Q. ALM. 130.
299. Id. at 131; Grimmett, supra note 289, at 36.
300. Grimmett, supra note 289, at 33.
301. Israel had made known its firm opposition to the deal because of the grave threat
which it posed to Israel's security. On April 6, during Secretary Haig's visit to the Middle
East, and again on September 9, in the course of Prime Minister Begin's trip to the United
States, Israel's fears were voiced. 1981 CONG. Q. ALM. 131; Grimmett, supra note 289, at 33.
302. They pointed, inter alia, to the refusal to permit U.S. use of Saudi military facilities;
the rejection of the Camp David process; and the egocentric oil pricing policy. For further
arguments pro and con, see Grimmett, supra note 289, at 1-3, 14-15; 1981 CONG. Q. ALM. 130,
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With congressional pressure thus mounting, the Administration
strove during September to allay congressional anxieties3"3 while at-
tempting, with little success, to elicit Saudi consent to certain modifi-
cations in the original proposals-including, most prominently, a
plan (rejected by the Saudis) for joint American-Saudi control of the
AWACS through the 1990's. 3" But it was only on October 1, when
formal notification of the proposed sale was submitted to Congress,
that the presidential campaign began in earnest and the battle be-
tween the branches was joined. In this battle, the House was written
off as non-winnable and ignorable. A concurrent resolution intro-
duced on October 1, 1981 by 24 members of the House Foreign Af-
fairs Committee was adopted by that committee on October 7 by a
vote of 28-8 and by the full House on October 14 by a resounding
301-111 majority. 0 5 Thus, for the first time, a congressional cham-
ber had formally voted to veto a proposed arms sale. The Senate
seemed prepared to follow suit: the same 50 Senators who had co-
sponsored a concurrent resolution of disapproval in September rein-
troduced a similar resolution on October 1.306 To overcome this ap-
parently insurmountable opposition, the Administration aimed its
intensive campaign of persuasion at two targets-the Senate and pub-
lic opinion. 3°0 In the process, it generated one of the most emotion-
136-38, 139-40. For Senator Byrd's objections, see id., at 136-37; and on Senator Glenn's oppo-
sition because of the absence of joint control arrangements, see infra note 304.
303. Secretary of State Alexander Haig testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee on September 17, 1981, while on September 28, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger
and General David C. Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, appeared before the Senate
Armed Services Committee. Grimmett, supra note 289, at 29, 32.
304. The issue of joint control had been spotlighted by Senator John Glenn, who was will-
ing to transfer to the Saudis even the more advanced and sophisticated AWACS equipment
(which the Administration was purportedly withholding) provided joint control could be main-
tained. When the idea was cold-shouldered by the Saudis, Glenn joined the ranks of the oppo-
nents to the sale. Id. at 31-32; 1981 CONG. Q. ALM. 131.
305. See HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DISAPPROVING THE PROPOSED SALES TO
SAUDI ARABIA OF E-3A AIRBORNE WARNING AND CONTROL SYSTEM (AWACS) AIRCRAFT,
CONFORMAL FUEL TANKS FOR F-15 AIRCRAFT, AIM-9L SIDEWINDER MISSILES, AND BOE-
ING 707 AERIAL REFUELING AIRCRAFT, H. REP. No. 97-268 (to accompany H. Con. Res.
194), 97th Cong., 1st Sess (1981); 127 CONG. REC. H7236-7308 (1981); 1981 CONG. Q. ALM.
135-36; Grimmett, supra note 289, at 24, 25, 28.
306. S. Con. Res. 37.
307. On October 1, President Reagan vigorously defended the sale at a news conference,
and Secretary of State Haig testified at length before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
on the matter. Again, on October 5, Secretaries Haig and Weinberger testified before the Sen-
ate Foreign Relations Committee in executive and open session. See generally, The AWA CS
and F-15 Enhancement Arms Sales Package to Saudi Arabia, Parts I and 2: Hearings Before
the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). The Administration also
received the endorsement of former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and former Secretary of
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laden foreign policy debates in recent memory. Public opinion was
sharply divided on the issue, with the Jewish pro-Israel lobby in
America arrayed against weapon manufacturers, the oil companies
and a host of commercial interests having dealings with Saudi Ara-
bia.a08 The spectre of an anti-semitic backlash should the deal fail
was also raised in a way that shocked many Jews and other
Americans.
In the end, the Administration carried the day. Responding to
the President's appeal to preserve the power and prestige of the presi-
dency and American credibility in the eyes of foreign States,310 eight
first-term Senators (seven Republicans and one Democrat) who had
co-sponsored the concurrent resolution of disapproval switched their
votes.31' The timing of President Sadat's assassination also proved to
be a boon to the Administration in its struggle with Congress over
the AWACS.31 2 When the crucial votes were taken, the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee voted by a narrow 9-8 majority to disap-
prove the sale, while in the plenary the concurrent resolution to
disapprove fell by a 48-52 vote.313
Defense Harold Brown, and soon afterwards, of former Presidents Ford, Nixon, and Carter, as
well. Grimmett, supra note 289, at 24-28.
308. See, e.g., Jones, Saudi Lobby Comes Under Scrutiny by US Lawmen, Sunday Times,
Feb. 29, 1982, at 8, col. 1.
309. See, e.g., 1981 CONG. Q. ALM. 135; N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1981 (editorial), at 18, col. 1;
N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1981 (editorial), at 20, col. 1; Rosenfeld, Dateline Washington: Anti-
Semitism and U.S. Foreign Policy, FOREIGN POL'Y 172 (Summer 1982). President Reagan's
statement in his October 1 news conference that "it is not the business of other nations to make
American foreign policy" was widely criticized as constituting an invitation to the kind of
emotions which were subsequently aroused. See also the explanation of Senator Cohen (a Uni-
tarian whose father was Jewish) for his decision to switch his vote and support the AWACS
deal. He wished to prevent Israel from becoming the scapegoat in the event U.S. Middle East
policy suffers setbacks in the future. 1981 CONG. Q. ALM. 138.
310. Senator Edward Zorinsky of Nebraska, the only Democrat who co-sponsored the res-
olution and later voted against it, was apparently influenced by this appeal on the day of the
vote. As related by Senator Cranston: "Ed Zorinsky said the president told him, 'How can I
meet with a foreign leader and have him believe I'm in charge of the government if I can't sell
five airplanes?'" 1981 CONG. Q. ALM. 138.
311. For details of the switches, see id. at 129, 134, 135, 139; Grimmett, supra note 289, at
23-26. Press reports hinting that political favors were dangled before the senators concerned
were denied by the Administration. 1981 CONG. Q. ALM. 135-37. Whether or not the reports
were true, it is clear that to achieve success, "the president was forced at the 11 th hour to spend
large amounts of political capital wooing senators." Id. at 129.
312. The assassination was vigorously exploited by the Administration. It was cited by
Senator Orrin G. Hatch of Utah as a factor in his decision. "If there's ever a time to support
the President of the United States," he said, "this is the time." Grimmett, supra note 289, at
26.
313. For the vote and the arguments which preceded it, see 127 CONG. REc. S12337-12452
(1981); 1981 CONG. Q. ALM. 136-40; Grimmett, supra note 289, at 22-24; SENATE COMM. ON
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As in the case of the previous arms sales confrontations, the Ad-
ministration came forward with some assurances designed to soothe
Congress' ruffled feathers and consciences. These were first
presented by Secretary of State Haig in his testimony before the Sen-
ate Foreign Relations Committee on October 1 and essentially re-
peated in a letter sent by President Reagan to Senator Howard Baker
on October 28, the day of the final vote on the Senate floor.314 Saudi
Arabia was said to have consented to certain conditions regarding,
inter alia, the security of the transferred technology, the sharing with
the United States of information gathered by the AWACS, control
over third-country participation and the limitation of AWACS opera-
tions to Saudi soil for defensive purposes only. United States involve-
ment in the AWACS operations and activities, according to the
Administration's projection, would continue well into the 1990's.
The AWACS would not be transferred unless Saudi Arabia first
agreed to abide by all the conditions of the Arms Export Control Act
and the President certified to Congress that all the conditions set
forth in the Reagan letter had been complied with by Saudi Arabia.
As for Israeli security, President Reagan and Administration spokes-
men had all along spoken vaguely of maintaining Israel's "qualitative
edge"; and in the Reagan letter, the President promised to "continue
to make available to Israel the military equipment it requires to de-
fend its land and people, with due consideration to the presence of
AWACS in Saudi Arabia." He also noted the "program of closer
security cooperation with Israel."
Understandably, the Reagan letter was greeted with far more
skepticism than were the assurances given by previous administra-
tions. Not only were the present assurances deemed woefully inade-
quate;3"' they could, it was feared, be as casually overturned in the
FOREIGN RELATIONS, DISAPPROVING THE PROPOSED SALE TO SAUDI ARABIA OF E-3A AIR-
BORNE WARNING AND CONTROL SYSTEM (AWACS) AIRCRAFT, CONFORMAL FUEL TANKS
FOR F-15 AIRCRAFT, AIM-9L SIDEWINDER MISSILES, AND BOEING 707 AERIAL REFUELING
AIRCRAFT, S. REP. No. 97-249 (to accompany S. Con. Res. 37), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
In the final vote, the concurrent resolution was supported by 36 Democrats and 12 Republicans
and opposed by 41 Republicans, 10 Democrats and one independent. The Committee vote was
taken on October 15; the floor vote on October 28, 1981.
On October 15, the Senate Armed Services Comm., which was not officially involved,
voted on the matter at the initiative of its chairman, John Tower, and supported the sale by a
10-5 vote. SENATE COMM. ON ARMED SERVICES, MILITARY AND TECHNICAL IMPLICATIONS
OF THE PROPOSED SALE OF AIR DEFENSE ENHANCEMENTS TO SAUDI ARABIA, S. REP. No.
97-242, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); 1981 CONG. Q. ALM. 137; Grimmett, supra note 289, at
24.
314. For the text of the letter, see 127 CONG. REC. S12349 (1981).
315. The conditions in President Reagan's letter were said to be a repetition, basically, of
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future as the 1978 Carter promises were being overturned now.3 16
Indeed, many congressmen felt that the credibility of the Administra-
tion's commitment to a foreign State-Saudi Arabia-should not
have been placed above the credibility of the executive's commitment
to Congress and to another foreign State-Israel.
31 7
By letting the AWACS and F-15 enhancement package go for-
ward, Congress preserved its record of non-use of the legislative veto
in relation to arms sales. That it did so irn this case was especially
significant, for it demonstrated how difficult it was to repudiate and
embarrass a President (and the foreign State with whom he had con-
tracted) with respect to such a sensitive issue as arms sales. In the
crunch, Congress was unable to act-notwithstanding the formidable
array of forces opposing the sale initially and almost up to the zero
hour; the flouting of previous executive assurances; the absence of
effective consultation with Congress; and the fact that, in this in-
stance, Congress was not even permitted to take much credit for
modifying the terms of the sale.31 8
A previous case of near-use of the legislative veto in the area of
foreign policy occurred during the last months of the Carter Admin-
istration and involved the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act. The
heated executive-legislative debate generated by this episode recalled
to mind earlier bruising foreign policy battles which the Carter Ad-
ministration had had to wage in order to secure legislative support
for the Panama Canal treaties and the jet-sales package to the Middle
East.
At issue was the continued supply of nuclear fuel to India, a
State whose nuclear detonation in 1974 had been a major factor
prompting adoption of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act. Already
the terms routinely included in U.S. arms sales contracts. Nor did they go beyond the commit-
ments already alluded to by Secretary Haig on October 1. 1981 CONG. Q. ALM. 138.
316. As Senator Rudy Boschwitz said: "Frankly, I'm afraid that we are going to see quite
soon an AWACS enhancement package." Id. at 137. Senator Glenn, too, complained of the
meaningless and non-binding nature of the Reagan assurances. Id. at 138.
317. On the credibility issue, see Grimmett, supra note 289, at 12-14.
318. Theoretically, the President might have either evaded the legislative veto altogether
(or proceeded with the sale in the face of a concurrent resolution of disapproval) by invoking
the waiver authority which is available to him in two contingencies: (1) in case of an "emer-
gency" in which he certifies that the sale is in the U.S. "national security interests," (Arms
Export Control Act § 36(b)(1) Pub. L. No. 94-329); and (2) where he deems the sale "vital" to
U.S. national security interests (amendment to § 614(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,
enacted as part of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1980 (Pub.
L. No. 96-533)). On October 15, 1981, in response to a reporter's query, Mr. Reagan did not
rule out the use of waiver authority in the matter of the AWACS, but considered the issue
"hypothetical" at that point. Grimmett, supra note 289, at 23.
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in July 1978, shortly after the Act was adopted, an attempt had been
made in Congress to block the sale of some seven tons of low-en-
riched uranium to India for use in its Tarapur nuclear power plant
near Bombay. At that time the Nuclear Regulatory Commission had
been evenly divided on whether to grant an export license and Presi-
dent Carter, exercising his waiver authority, had approved the sale.
The Administration succeeded in averting congressional disapproval
of the sale by arguing that continued supply of nuclear fuel to India
would promote U.S. non-proliferation goals since it would afford lev-
erage in future negotiations designed to persuade India to accept
"full-scope" IAEA safeguards for all its nuclear installations (not
only for the U.S.-supplied Tarapur station).319 It was expected that
India would agree to these safeguards within the 18-month transition
period specified in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act;320 and if it did
not, the United States would be entitled-indeed, obliged-to cut off
further nuclear supplies.3 21  A concurrent resolution of disapproval
was rejected by the House International Relations Committee and,
by a 181-227 vote, by the full House.
322
Continued negotiations with India did not, however, lead to the
result desired by the United States. After the return to power of In-
dira Gandhi, the Indian stance hardened. By the end of the 18-
month transition period, India had refused to open all its nuclear
facilities to international inspection. It had, however, filed in the in-
319. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission vote, on April 20, 1978, was 2-2. On April 27,
President Carter forwarded to Congress his message overruling the NRC and approving the
shipment. See Message from the President of the United States: Export of Special Nuclear
Material to India, H. Doc. No. 95-327, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1978).
320. See supra § III (F),
321. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., who was chief Administration spokesman on non-proliferation at
the time, assured the House Foreign Affairs Committee that if, after the 18-month transition
period, India refused to accept full-scope safeguards, "under the new non-proliferation legisla-
tion, the president would have little alternative but to seek an amicable disengagement in our
nuclear cooperation." But Nye felt optimistic about the prospects of securing Indian consent,
since Prime Minister Desai had stated that the 1974 atomic test had been a mistake. 1980
CONG. Q. ALM. 338-39.
322. A concurrent veto resolution was introduced in the House on May 1 by Representa-
tives Richard Ottinger and Clarence Long. Before reporting the resolution out adversely, the
House International Relations Committee held hearings and consulted with the Administra-
tion and the NRC. For further details, see HOUSE COMM. ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
ADVERSE REPORT: PROPOSED EXPORT OF LoW-ENRICHED URANIUM TO INDIA, H. REP.
No. 95-1314, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1978); 1978 CONG. Q. ALM. 371; FRANCK & WEISBAND,
supra note 35, at 113. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, while adding its approval to
the 1978 shipment, gave clear warning to the executive and to India that "if full-scope safe-
guards are not achieved" within the 18-month grace period, "it is highly unlikely that a waiver
allowing continued exports would be accepted." Id. at 114.
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terim (in September 1978 and September 1979) two new requests for
a total of some 38 tons of low enriched uranium for the Tarapur
station. These requests presented the Carter Administration with an
acute dilemma and led to a lengthy internal debate. In the end,
Carter, an avowed staunch supporter of nuclear non-proliferation,
determined in May 1980 to permit shipment of the fuel and not to
follow through on the 1978 threat to cut off further nuclear supplies
to India.323 For its part, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ruled
unanimously, on May 16, 1980, that it could not issue the necessary
export licenses because the criteria of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Act had not been met. The applications were then referred to the
President, who proceeded to authorize the shipments on the basis of
his waiver authority. Notification of his action was given to Con-
gress on June 19, thus triggering the sixty session-day period for con-
gressional action.324
In explaining the executive's decision to Congress, Carter and
other Administration spokesmen cited legal and political reasons.
Legally, they argued, the "grace period" of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Act was still technically applicable to the Indian re-
quests since the applications were submitted before September 10,
1979 (the specified cut-off date), and failure to deliver before March
10, 1980 (the other cut-off date cited in the Act) was due to no fault
of India's. Thus, India could justifiably regard non-shipment of the
fuel as a breach of the United States commitment under a 1963 U.S.-
Indian agreement (and 1971 amendment) to supply fuel for Tarapur
for thirty years; and it might therefore consider itself released from
its commitment to use U.S.-supplied fuel for peaceful purposes only
and to allow U.S. inspection of the Tarapur reactors.3 25 Politically,
the shipments might bolster the weak U.S.-Indian ties and prevent
India from slipping further into the Soviet orbit-a goal which was
seen to be both more important and more attainable following the
1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.326 By means of continued sup-
323. See CONG. Q. WEEKLY R., at 1367 (May 17, 1980).
324. For text of President Carter's June 19 message to Congress, see 1980 CoNG. Q. ALM.
53E-54E.
325. The NRC had reached the opposite conclusion on the applicability of the grace period
to the Indian application. Id. at 54E. For a discussion of the legal issues, see id. at 341-42.
The Indian threat to halt U.S. supervision of Tarapur was seen as credible but "comparatively
immaterial" by congressional opponents of the sale, since India retained most of its nuclear fuel
in unsupervised plants. Id. at 342.
326. See id. at 339, 340, 342. But cf. infra note 339 (the statement by Senator Moynihan).
The United States also felt the need, after the invasion of Afghanistan, to counteract the in-
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ply, too, the United States could continue its dialogue with India and
pursue its non-proliferation goals more effectively.
Opposition in Congress to the Carter initiative was intense and
extensive. Indian policies vis-A-vis the Soviet Union and Iran
aroused widespread resentment; 327 and it was felt that U.S. nuclear
non-proliferation policy stood to be fatally undermined in its first
crucial test. In the House, Representative Jonathan Bingham intro-
duced concurrent resolutions to disapprove the two Indian requests;
and in the Senate, John Glenn, the principal opponent of the sale,
introduced a similar resolution.328
The battle in the House, where anti-Indian sentiment was partic-
ularly strong, was clearly lost for the Administration from the outset.
For this reason, the Administration devoted little persuasive effort to
that chamber. Following a resounding voice vote in the House For-
eign Affairs Committee on September 10, 1980, the full House voted
on September 18 overwhelmingly (by a 298-98 vote) to disapprove
the sales.329 But in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee the vote
on September 10 was close: 8-7 to disapprove.330 Intensive Adminis-
tration lobbying ensued, in which President Carter and Secretary of
State Edmund Muskie (a former Senator and strong proponent of
nuclear non-proliferation), Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, and
other high-level Administration officials were mobilized.331 While
some assurances were offered by the Administration-assurances
seen as totally inadequate by opponents of the sale 332-no real at-
creased aid which it was extending to Pakistan, India's traditional enemy, with concessions to
India. 1980 CONG. Q. ALM. 339.
327. Congressmen especially resented India's consent to supply Iran with food and other
economic necessities after the United States had declared an economic boycott of Iran in the
wake of the hostage crisis which erupted in November 1979.
328. The Bingham resolutions, H. Con. Res. 367 and 368, were subsequently combined
into H. Con. Res. 432; the Glenn resolution was S. Con. Res. 109. Whereas the Bingham
resolutions would have disapproved the two Indian applications for nuclear fuel and permitted
the shipment of "safety-related equipment" for the Tarapur plant, a concurrent resolution in-
troduced by Representative Edward J. Markey and co-sponsored by 65 House members would
have gone further and denied the fuel and the equipment. CONG. Q. WEEKLY R., at 1826
(June 28, 1980).
329. 1980 CONG. Q. ALM. 339. Twenty-five of the 33 members of the House Foreign Af-
fairs Committee had signed concurrent veto resolutions.
330. The votes in both House and Senate committees had been postponed in order to allow
a compromise to be worked out. Id. at 339-40.
331. Senator Glenn later complained that the Administration had engaged in "some of the
heaviest lobbying" he had ever seen. President Carter had telephoned "almost every Senator,"
and for many it was "very impressive to receive a call from Air Force One." Id. at 342.
332. On September 10, the day of the committee votes, Secretary of State Edmund Muskie
assured the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the second part of the fuel shipment
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tempt was made to compromise with the legislature on the issue.33 3
Instead, the Administration gambled on winning the day in the Sen-
ate and thereby fending off a foreign policy debacle.
During a final nine-hour floor debate, it became clear that sena-
torial opinions were closely divided and did not follow any neat
party, ideological or geographical lines. 334  Legal arguments were
prominent, 335 as were the political issues of American credibility,
336
the precedential aspect of the sale,3 37 the question whether the non-
proliferation policy could be implemented more effectively by supply-
ing or withholding the nuclear fuel, 338 and the effect of the sale on
the future of U.S.-Indian relations.339 It was also argued that since
senatorial views were so divided, the President was "entitled to the
benefit of the doubt. '3 4° In the final vote, held on September 24,341
would be withheld for a year and would not be released if India continued nuclear weapons
testing and development. Id. at 339, 342.
333. At one point, a compromise plan was put forward by Joseph S. Nye (formerly Presi-
dent Carter's special ambassador for nuclear non-proliferation matters), according to which the
two applications would be approved but the second shipment would be made only in 1982 or
1983 and after presidential certification that India was conducting no nuclear tests. Although
the proposal was welcomed by Bingham and others, it was not pursued by the Administration.
Id. at 340.
334. Liberals stressed the matter of nuclear non-proliferation, while conservatives were
more disturbed by India's pro-Russian policies. Although more Democrats voted for than
against the shipment (31 to 24), the President was abandoned by so many members of his own
party, that without the support of 17 (of 39) Republicans, he would have suffered a defeat in
the vote. Id. at 341.
335. As Senator Glenn said afterwards, "in a Senate of 60-some lawyers," the President's
contention that non-shipment would be a breach of contract was "very effective." Id. at 342.
336. The matter of credibility was stressed by both sides. One side emphasized the credibil-
ity of the United States as a reliable nuclear supplier, while the other stressed the credibility of
American nuclear non-proliferation policy. Id.
337. See id. at 341, 343 (statements of Representative Bingham and Senator Glenn). The
Administration firmly denied that the present case constituted a precedent, even with respect to
future applications from India. Id. at 340, 342. See also the statement of Deputy Secretary of
State Warren M. Christopher to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 19, 1980,
CONG. Q. WEEKLY R., at 1703 (June 21, 1980).
338. See 1980 CONG. Q. ALM. 340, 342.
339. Senator Percy, who noted that the Tarapur station provided 10-12 percent of the elec-
tricity for the Bombay region, queried dramatically: "Do we want to dim the lights of Bombay
and let the Soviets turn them back on? What impact would this have on Indian public opinion
and on United States-Indian relations?" Id. at 342. But Senator Moynihan (a former U.S.
ambassador to India), although he supported the fuel shipments, cautioned the Senate against
basing U.S. actions on unrealistic expectations: "Our relations will not deteriorate if we do not
send it [the nuclear fuel] and will not improve if we do." A hostile reaction by India would not
change matters. "The essential point about our relations with India is not that they are bad,
but that they're almost nonexistent." Id. at 340.
340. Id. at 343 (argument of Senator Church).
341. The vote was delayed to allow further last-minute Administration lobbying and it was
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the Administration squeaked through to victory with a 46-48 vote,
leaving Senator Glenn and others in the Senate with a sense of some
bitterness.
342
In foreign policy areas other than arms exports and nuclear non-
proliferation, attempted recourse to the legislative veto was infre-
quent and never entailed any real threat of an executive-legislative
confrontation.
Where foreign assistance issues were involved, Congress, as
noted earlier, preferred to employ strictly legislative methods, such as
country-specific legislation and riders. Only rarely was the concur-
rent-resolution procedure for restricting the President even proposed.
Among the proposals which were put forward were two in 1974."' 3
The first was introduced by Senator William Fulbright and would
have terminated most foreign aid programs. Its purpose was to in-
duce a thoroughgoing legislative review of all the existing pro-
grams-something which Senator Fulbright had vainly sought to
achieve previously. The second concurrent resolution proposal was
sponsored by Senator Claiborne Pell and would have barred further
aid to Turkey because of its invasion of Cyprus. Neither proposal
was acted on by Congress. In the case of Turkey, of course, Congress
subsequently imposed a legislative arms embargo.
With respect to foreign trade, some initiatives to override the
executive were taken over the years, but none of these ever reached
the stage in which they were reported out favorably by a full commit-
tee to either House. And neither House ever came close to overrul-
ing the President by congressional veto.
In the case of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, no attempt was
made to override, by one-House veto, the extension of the President's
waiver authority as such. Resolutions have been introduced, how-
ever, to prevent the application of the waiver authority to particular
countries-most frequently, to Romania, and, more recently, to
Hungary and China. Thus, in 1976, resolutions on Romania were
introduced in both Houses but not acted upon.34 In 1977, a resolu-
tion on Romania was introduced in the House; and sub-committee
kept open for 75 (rather than the more normal 15) minutes to allow senators to arrive in time
for the vote. Id. at 341.
342. See supra note 331. For charges that the Administration had made false and mislead-
ing statements to senators, see 1980 CONG. Q. ALM. 343.
343. See Collier, supra note 61, at 8. On the committee veto regarding transfers between
accounts, see supra notes 163-164 and accompanying text.
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hearings in both Houses on the matter of extending the waiver au-
thority were focussed primarily on the case of Romania.34 5 The
House Ways and Means Committee reported the resolution unfavor-
ably, and on the floor of the House the resolution was effectively bur-
ied.346 Again in 1979, it was sought to block, by House resolution,
application of the waiver authority to Romania. In this case, the
House Trade sub-committee reported it adversely, and the resolution
was subsequently defeated in the House.347 At the time of the
Chadha decision, three House resolutions were pending-relating to
Romania, Hungary and China. These were reported adversely by the
House Ways and Means Committee, and on August 1, 1983, the
House decided to defer action on the three resolutions indefinitely.348
In the matter of import relief, where a two-House veto was
available against a presidential decision not to grant the relief recom-
mended by the United States International Trade Commission, con-
current resolutions of disapproval were in one case (in 1978)
introduced in both Houses. A House sub-committee endorsed the
resolution by a narrow margin, but its recommendation was reversed
by the full Ways and Means Committee and the resolution was not
reported out to the full House. Instead, the Committee, which
wished to compromise with the Administration, recommended sim-
ply that the International Trade Commission reinvestigate the
matter.349
As noted earlier, no initiatives were taken in accordance with
the 1976 National Emergencies Act to terminate a presidentially pro-
345. Hearings were held by the International Trade Subcommittee of the Senate Finance
Committee on June 27, 1977 and by the Trade Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means
Committee on July 18. In the House, H. Res. 653 had been introduced on June 22. See Pregelj,
supra note 170, at 730.
346. H. REP. 95-534, July 26, 1977. See Pregelj, supra note 170, at 730.
347. H. Res. 317 was introduced on June 14, 1979. The Trade Subcommittee of the House
Ways and Means Committee held a hearing on the resolution on June 22, and reported it
adversely on July 13. No resolution was introduced in the Senate, but the International Trade
Subcommittee nevertheless conducted a hearing on the waiver authority extension on July 19.
On July 25, the House defeated the resolution of disapproval, leaving the waiver authority and
existing waivers in effect. Pregelj, supra note 170, at 731.
348. See Fisher, Post-Chadha Developments, 1983 CRS REV. 33 (special Fall issue); 129
CONG. REC. H6034-37, H6164 (1983); H. REP. Nos. 315, 316, & 317. No reference was made,
either in the reports or the floor debate, to the Chadha decision. In the Senate, Senator Helms
introduced a similar resolution to halt most-favored-nation treatment for Romania.
349. The Senate took no further action. For details of the case, involving bolts, nuts and
industrial fasteners, see Pregelj, supra note 170, at 719-20. For a second case in 1978, in which
a concurrent resolution was introduced (but in the House only), and in which, again, a new
International Trade Commission investigation was requested by the House Ways and Means
Committee, see id. at 720.
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claimed emergency. However, congressional committees, wishing
perhaps to underscore Congress' prerogative to act if it so desired,
conveyed to President Carter their endorsement of the continuation
of the Iranian hostages emergency.350
Regardless of how one assesses the efficacy of the legislative veto
in foreign policy in the past,35 the absence of the device in the wake
of Chadha raises questions regarding the status of present legislation
incorporating the legislative veto and the alternatives which Congress
might adopt to ensure that its opinions are heeded, on the other side
of Pennsylvania Avenue, in future foreign policy debates.
V. SEVERABILITY AND FOREIGN POLICY LEGISLATIVE VETOES
In the Chadha ruling, as noted earlier, the Court set forth a
three-pronged test for determining whether a statute or provision
which incorporates a legislative veto continues in effect with the leg-
islative veto excised, or falls together with the offensive clause. This
test-involving the presence or absence of a severability clause, the
relevant legislative history and the operability of the rest of the stat-
ute or provision 352-was applied in a very liberal fashion in post-
Chadha litigation.35 3 The upshot of these rulings, in the words of
one commentator, was to create "a strong presumption that the basic
statutory authorities will remain in place. . . and that the Court will
treat the legislative veto provision as simply a 'report and wait' provi-
sion." '354 This, of course, was the way such provisions had officially
been viewed of late by Presidents in any case; but with judicial sanc-
tion, the view carried greater weight. It meant that until new legisla-
tion was substituted (or a court pronounced an adverse ruling), the
350. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
351. See infra § VII.
352. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text. For critical appraisal of the Court's
test on severability and suggested new approaches to the problem, see Tribe, supra note 86, at
21-27; Note, Severability of Legislative Veto Provisions: A Policy Analysis, 97 HARV. L. REV.
1182 (1984).
353. In Consumer Energy Council of America v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425, 442 (D.C. Cir.
1982), there was no severability clause and the legislative history of the relevant statute did not
point unequivocally to severability; nevertheless, the Court of Appeals deemed the legislative
veto provision severable. The Supreme Court affirmed. Process Gas Consumers Group v.
Consumer Energy Council of America, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983). However, subsequent district
court judgments on the issue of severability have been more divided and somewhat confused.
See Fisher, One Year After, supra note 8, at 25-35.
354. Statement of Professor David A. Martin, in House For. Aff. Comm. Hearings, supra
note 7, at 136. Similar assessments of the Court's leniency on the severability question were
voiced by House counsel Stanley Brand, Deputy Attorney General Edward C. Schmults and
Professor Eugene Gressman. Id. at 15, 52, 60-61, 120.
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President's authority to act without congressional fetters was pre-
sumptively enlarged. If it wished to impose fetters to which the Pres-
ident objected, Congress would have to muster a two-thirds majority.
The prospects of obtaining a judicial ruling on the severability of
foreign policy legislative vetoes are admittedly limited.355 Bearing in
mind these limitations, it is nevertheless instructive to examine how
the Court's test might be applied to some of the statutes reviewed in
the earlier sections. Severability clauses are found in a number of
these statutes-notably, the War Powers Resolution, the Trade Act
of 1974, the Atomic Energy Act and the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act. But such clauses do not appear in the Arms
Export Control Act, the National Emergencies Act and the Im-
poundment Control Act. However, the presence or absence of a sev-
erability clause is merely the beginning of the inquiry: its presence
creates a rebuttable presumption and its absence is not conclusive.356
It is thus also necessary to examine congressional intent-an "elusive
inquiry," as the Court recognized 3 5 7-and the operability of the leg-
islative scheme after severance of the legislative veto provisions. The
results of such an investigation are not clear-cut. Indeed, contradic-
tory evidence abounds.
In the case of the War Powers Resolution, a persuasive argu-
ment can be made for severability, to strengthen the presumption
raised by the presence of a severability clause. 358 How crucial, it
might be asked, was Section 5(c) if the Senate, which for several
years had taken the more aggressive stand in the matter of war pow-
ers, had never included it in its versions of the Resolution? The Sen-
ate had, instead, proposed terminating American involvement abroad
355. See supra notes 93-96, 265 and accompanying text. So far, the extensive litigation
generated by Chadha has related to domestic matters.
356. See 103 S. Ct. 2774 (1983); see also supra note 353. The presence of severability
clauses in so many recent statutes was regretted by Stanley Brand, who felt that they had been
included "with pavlovian regularity . . . like legal boilerplate in contracts." House For. Aff.
Comm. Hearings, supra note 7, at 20.
357. 103 S. Ct. 2774 (1983).
358. The argument would not hinge, in this instance, on proving that Congress would have
delegated authority even if it could not reserve for itself the weapon of the legislative veto. As
noted earlier (see supra notes 107-108 and accompanying text), the War Powers Resolution did
not purport to delegate authority. Rather, the relevant inquiry is: how central was the legisla-
tive veto to the Resolution's plan and overall purpose?
For the legislative history of the War Powers Resolution, see Nanes, Legislative Vetoes:
The War Powers Resolution, in CRS VETO STUDIES, supra note 12, at 580-680; HOLT, supra
note 263, at 3-9; Rosenberg, in House For. Aff. Comm. Hearings, supra note 7, at 263-67;
Celada, supra note 109, at 315-24; Franck, supra note 108, at 611-14; WAR POWERS RESOLU-
TION: DOCUMENTS, supra note 42, at 1-36.
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(within thirty days) by means of a statute or joint resolution.359 Sig-
nificantly, the Senate version also lacked a severability clause; that
was included in the House version in the face of serious doubts in
Congress about the constitutionality of Section 5(c). 360 In fact, the
Resolution's most important provisions are those relating to consul-
tation, presidential reporting and automatic termination of American
involvement abroad after sixty or ninety days, following which the
burden of legislative inertia is shifted to the President. All of these
provisions easily survive the excision of Section 5(c), which is struc-
turally independent of them. 361 How important the reporting re-
quirement was can be seen from a House Foreign Affairs Committee
Report in 1972 which stated that "the most significant effect of the
legislation would be the mandatory reporting requirement which it
would place on the President," since it would allow Congress to be
fully informed and able to take follow-up actions if necessary.362
Moreover, as shown by a 1973 House report, the main goal of the
War Powers Resolution was to reassert a congressional role in
warmaking and allow for executive-congressional cooperation in this
sphere. This goal was clearly achievable without Section 5(c).3 63 On
a more fundamental level, the War Powers Resolution came essen-
tially to prevent future "Vietnams." For this purpose, it was less
important to preserve a congressional veto within a relatively short
sixty or ninety-day period than to assure that protracted American
involvement abroad would not occur without explicit congressional
approval. In this connection, post-Resolution congressional practice
may provide at least some corroborative evidence of congressional
intent. Congress has had little problem with short-term presidential
use of United States armed forces abroad. Where involvement be-
came more sustained and problems did arise, as with the Multina-
tional Force in Lebanon, Congress acted by means of regular
legislation.36
On the other hand, proponents of non-severability may consider
359. See S: 2956, Sec. 6, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); reprinted in CRS VETO STUDIES,
supra note 12, at 665.
360. See HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, WAR POWERS RESOLUTION OF 1973, H.
REP. No. 93-287 (to accompany H.J. Res. 542), 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in WAR
POWERS RESOLUTION: DOCUMENTS, supra note 42, at 29-32, 36.
361. See Celada, supra note 109, at 318, 322-23.
362. See HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, CONCERNING THE WAR POWERS OF CON-
GRESS AND THE PRESIDENT, H. REP. No. 92-1302 (to accompany S. 2956), 92nd Cong., 2nd
Sess. (1972), at 6-7, reprinted in CRS VETO STUDIES, supra note 12, at 672-73.
363. See Celada, supra note 109, at 320-21.
364. Id. at 322. On the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution, see supra note 266.
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that the presumption of severability raised by the separability clause
in the War Powers Resolution can indeed be rebutted. They can
point to the fact that the House insisted on the inclusion of Section
5(c) and that this clause was viewed as the ultimate sanction. In the
1973 House Foreign Affairs Committee Report, it was cited as one of
the Resolultion's "major provisions" and emphasis was placed on the
need to avoid "the possibility of a Presidential veto-and resulting
impasse-which would be possible on a bill or joint resolution., 365
On the floor of the House similar views were voiced.366 Further-
more, since one of President Nixon's principal objections to the Res-
olution related to Section 5(c), the decision of Congress to override
reflects the importance which Congress attached to this section.367
In all, the legislative veto provision, according to this view, was seen
by Congress "as a necessary and integral alternative to the provision
which preceded it-the automatic termination provision-in order to
control the President's commitment of troops. "368
If the evidence with respect to the War Powers Resolution,
though contradictory, tilts more toward a finding of severability-
not least because there is probably insufficient evidence to counter-
weigh the presumption of severability-the matter is less certain with
respect to the Arms Export Control Act. Since it contains no sever-
ability clause, severabiilty cannot be presumed at the outset; it must
rather be proven, and the evidence runs in both directions.
For non-severability of the various legislative vetoes which have
been progressively adopted since 1974, it may reasonably be con-
tended that Congress viewed the veto mechanism as perhaps the
principal means of maintaining leverage over major arms trans-
fers. 3 6 9 The concerns which prompted the adoption of the Nelson-
Bingham amendment and its subsequent extensions were grave
enough to warrant the conclusion that Congress would not have dele-
gated such extensive authority to the President unless it preserved for
With respect to El Salvador, Congress took no such action, a fact noted by the Court in Crock-
ett v. Reagan. See supra note 265.
365. H. REP. No. 93-287, supra note 360, at 10-It, reprinted in WAR POWERS RESOLU-
TION: DOCUMENTS, supra note 42, at 26-27.
366. See, e.g., 119 CONG. REC. H24689-90 (1973) (the views of House Foreign Affairs
Committee Chairman Zablocki and Representative Bingham).
367. See Celada, supra note 109, at 319-20.
368. View of Stanley Brand, in House For. Aff. Comm. Heariangs, supra note 7, at 5. To
the same effect, see Rosenberg, id. at 244 n.40. But compare the opposite conclusion reached
by Raymond J. Celada, id. at 322.
369. See generally id. at 336-55 (the analysis of Raymond J. Celada on arms sales and the
legislative veto)
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itself the ability to reverse a presidential initiative by majority vote.
Significantly, Congress refused to abide permanently by President
Ford's veto in 1976 of a statute containing a host of legislative vetoes
with respect to arms transfers; it subsequently "realized its once
thwarted goals in piecemeal but unrelenting fashion," and eventually
"garnered all it had originally sought and then some by way of legis-
lative controls on significant arms transactions. 3 7° Such congres-
sional determination cannot be lightly dismissed.
371
Not surprisingly, the arguments for non-severability have ap-
pealed to some members of Congress, whereas Administration
spokesmen have opted for the view that the legislative vetoes in the
Arms Export Control Act are severable. 72 The contentions which
can be, and have been, used to support the latter view include the
following. From 1968 to 1974 Congress did, in fact, delegate wide
authority to the President with respect to arms sales, unrestricted by
any legislative veto. The fact that the legislative veto was a later en-
graftment indicates the relatively minor significance of the veto and
the full operability of the statute without it.37 3 Moreover, although
Congress steadily expanded the scope of the legislative veto, it re-
tained throughout-and even enlarged-the "emergency" escape
hatch through which a President might circumvent the veto alto-
gether.374 "The maintenance of the waiver by Congress in the face of
disagreements with the Executive Branch over particularly sensitive
sales may indicate that in the crunch Congress regards the authority
to strengthen friendly countries"-rather than the legislative restric-
tion on arms sales-"to be the overriding consideration. ' 375 Finally,
370. Celada, id. at 351-52.
371. Moreover, some legislative veto provisions represented important components of con-
gressional-executive compromises. Thus, in 1980, as the price of congressional consent to re-
move the $35 million ceiling on commercial arms sales, the President acquiesced, in effect, in
the extension of the legislative veto to commercial arms sales as well. Id. at 347-48.
372. Cf., e.g., the argument of Senator Paul S. Sarbanes, Senate For. Rel Comm. Hearing
on Arms Export Control, supra note 8, at 29, with the views of Deputy Secretary of State
Kenneth W. Dam and Deputy Attorney General Edward C. Schmults, id. at 22, 26, 29, 30, 31;
House For. Aff. Comm. Hearings, supra note 7, at 94, 104-5.
373. House Foreign Affairs CommL Hearings, supra note 7, at 37, 104-5; Senate For. Rel.
Comm. Hearing on Arms Export Control, supra note 8, at 30.
374. See supra notes 127, 131 and accompanying text. The presidential waiver was avail-
able, since 198 1, even for sales deemed by the President "vital to the national security interests
of the United States." See supra notes 133 and 137.
375. Celada, in House For. Aff. Comm. Hearings, supra note 7, at 354. Celada also suggests
that since Congress recognizes how readily arms can be obtained from sources outside the
United States, it would not reasonably make the delegation of arms-sales authority to the Presi-
dent totally dependent on the retention of the legislative veto. Id. at 354-55.
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the Arms Export Control Act incorporates numerous important con-
trols and restrictions which can readily subsist and remain effective
without the legislative vetoes. These include eligibility standards, an-
nual monetary ceilings, and, above all, close to two dozen reporting
requirements with concomitant waiting periods in some instances.
During these waiting periods Congress may bar the transaction by
legislation.376
As summed up by one commentator, there are persuasive argu-
ments for and against severability of the legislative vetoes from the
Arms Export Control Act. "The absence of a severability clause and
[the] legislative history seem to incline in one direction; the existence
of presidential waiver authority and practical considerations seem to
cut in the other direction." Differences in "emphasis and nuance"
can lead, as in Chadha, to opposite conclusions.377
Equally uncertain is the severability of the legislative veto from
the National Emergencies Act, which also lacks a severability clause.
In this instance, too, arguments to support both sides of the issue are
readily available, although the case for severability may be stronger.
It may be argued that the National Emergencies Act should be as-
similated to the War Powers Resolution, which does contain a sever-
ability clause, since both laws are essentially similar in design and
purpose: both are primarily procedural, not substantive laws delegat-
ing authority. Moreover, despite the absence of a severability clause,
the case for severability may be even stronger in relation to the Na-
tional Emergencies Act since, as noted earlier, the desire to restrain
the President did not feature so prominently in the legislative history
of the Act. In fact, the President's competence to declare "emergen-
cies" was not in any way restricted. The more overriding concern
was to clear away past emergency-strewn debris and to regularize
future emergency procedures, while keeping Congress fully informed.
These desiderata are adequately met by the many important features
of the Act which remain fully workable after severance of the legisla-
tive veto: the procedures surrounding the proclamation and exten-
sions of the emergency, the continuous and final reports to Congress
and the automatic termination of an emergency on its anniversary
376. Id. at 338-39, 355.
377. Celada, id. at 355. In the Chadha case, compare Justice Rehnquist's views on sever-
ability with those of the Court. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2816-17.
As to the effect of non-severability on private, as opposed to governmental arms sales (and
the possibility that the former may not require special congressional authorization), see House
For. Aff. Comm. Hearings. suora note 7. at 37. 45-
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unless extended by the President.37 It may also be contended that
the severability clause in the subsequently enacted International
Emergency Economic Powers Act embraces analogously (and retro-
actively) the National Emergencies Act as well. Nevertheless, it is
not certain that Congress would have passed the Act in the form that
it did without the retention of legislative-veto power-that it would
so blithely have permitted the President unrestricted discretion to
proclaim future emergencies and to activate, in consequence, such
wide-ranging statutory authorities. The arguments for severability
may be strong but, especially in the absence of a severability clause,
controvertible.
As for the Impoundment Control Act, as noted earlier, different
conclusions may be reached on the severability issue, depending on
whether the Act is viewed as procedural-along the lines of the War
Powers Resolution and National Emergencies Act-or as a delega-
tion of new authority. If the former, the case for severability, on the
basis of the legislative history, is stronger.379 On the other hand, in
the latter case, non-severability may be a more logical conclusion.
As noted by Richard Ehlke, "it seems highly unlikely that Congress,
on the heels of nearly unanimous judicial rejection of presidential im-
poundment authority and as part of comprehensive legislation
designed to wrest control of the budget process from the President,
would have delegated such an impoundment authority without the
veto.
' 380
With respect to the Trade Act of 1974 and the Atomic Energy
Act, the Administration has argued that the remaining provisions are
fully effective without the legislative vetoes and that this reinforces
the presumption of severability raised by the presence of severability
clauses in both cases.381 (The contention has not, so far, been seri-
ously challenged.)
A further argument to buttress severability in all of the cases
surveyed might be the post-legislative history of consistent non-use of
378. See generally Celada study on the legislative veto and national emergencies, supra note
194, in House For. Aff. Comm. Hearings, supra note 7, at 368-71; EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE
CONSULTATION, supra note 132 at 79; the statement of Assistant Attorney General Antonin
Scalia to the House Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the
Committee on the Judiciary during its hearings on the National Emergency Act in 1975, CRS
VETO STUDIES, supra note 12, at 774.
379. See supra § III(G), and especially notes 248-250 and accompanying text.
380. Ehlke, supra note 248, at 30.
381. See, e.g., the statement by Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth W. Dam, House For.
Aff. Comm. Hearings, supra note 7, at 78-79.
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the legislative veto. How essential, it may be asked, is a provision
which Congress never found it possible to employ in practice?
38 2
Furthermore, in the Chadha case, the fact that the relevant provision
included a reporting requirement was deemed significant; it meant
the retention of congressional oversight and the continued workabil-
ity of the legislative scheme even after severance of the veto.383 No
less workable, it might be argued, are the foreign policy statutes sur-
veyed, most of which embody, apart from the legislative veto, report-
ing and other provisions designed to enhance the executive's
accountability to Congess.
Clearly, Congress will not be content in all cases to leave the
matter of severability to speculation, indeterminacy and the possible
vagaries of future litigation. It may also find that severability and
non-severability are equally unacceptable findings. As Senator Byrd
argued with respect to the Arms Export Control Act:
There could be concerns regarding the separability issue. If
our "veto" power has been removed, and if that "veto" power is
"separable" from the rest of the statute, then that would mean
that the Executive now has total, unrestricted authority to engage
in any and all arms transfers it chooses. And Congress would be
without any role whatsoever.
On the other hand, an argument could be made that our now
invalid "veto" powers cannot be "separated" from the rest of the
Arms Export Control law. If that were so, then that would mean
that the entire statute is invalid. And that, in turn, would mean
that the President is now without any authority to engage in any
arms transfers.
It seems to me that either of these results is intolerable. No
matter which conclusion is reached on this issue of "separability"
there is a void which must be filled.38 4
To fill the void created in this and other acts, Congress embarked on
a search-which is still continuing-for effective alternatives to the
device of the legislative veto.
VI. ALTERNATIVES TO FOREIGN POLICY LEGISLATIVE VETOES
Permeating the congressional post-Chadha quest for alternatives
to the legislative veto was a recongition that, for practical and consti-
tutional reasons, foreign policy had to be seen as a distinctive area in
382. As asserted by Dam, "this pattern clearly indicates that these statutes are capable of
independent operation with no further Congressional action." Id. at 79.
383. 103 S. Ct. 2775-76 (1983).
384. Senate For. Rel. Comm. Hearing on Arms Export Control, supra note 8, at 11.
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which special caution was to be exercised. From a practical stand-
point, there was a need to preserve flexibility, sensitivity to the con-
cerns of other States and American credibility. Constitutionally, the
President admittedly possessed independent, inherent powers in re-
spect to foreign relations. All this signified, even for those most sym-
pathetic to congressional concerns, that options suitable in the
domestic field might not necessarily be appropriate in the realm of
foreign policy.385
The alternatives to the legislative veto which were discussed fell
into two main categories: formal statutory devices and informal con-
trols. In the immediate aftermath of Chadha, the latter received
greater emphasis, reflecting executive preference and congressional
acquiescence. Essentially, Congress was giving itself a breathing
spell and subjecting the Administration to a trial period. If the infor-
mal arrangements failed to give satisfaction, the Administration
could expect the imposition of less palatable formal restrictions in the
future.386 This threat in itself would presumably lend efficacy to the
informal methods, despite their nonbinding character.387
Informal accommodations between the branches, involving con-
sultations with, and heeding the views of, the appropriate congres-
sional committees and sub-committees were common before Chadha.
They were most prominent, perhaps, in such matters as the
reprogramming of funds. Thus, for example, in early 1983, when the
Reagan Administration sought to reprogram funds for El Salvador, it
did so only after securing the informal support of the authorizing and
appropriations committees.3"8 Following Chadha, it has been confi-
dently predicted, such informal arrangements will likely proliferate
and assume greater importance. These understandings, in the words
of Louis Fisher, "are not legal in effect," but "they are . . . in effect
legal." '389
385. See, e.g., the remarks of Stanley Brand, House For. Aff. Comm. Hearings, supra note 7,
at 8, 27; see also the comments of Deputy Attorney General Edward C. Schmults and Professor
David A. Martin, id. at 51, 57, 131.
386. As Representative Les Aspin observed, "if you alienate Congress you may pay for it in
other ways," as quoted in Mann, supra note 86, at 23.
387. See Bruff and Gellhorn, supra note 31, at 1421 (on the effectiveness of informal
methods).
388. See Fisher, Chadha's Impact on the Budget Process, 1983 CRS REV. 14 (special Fall
issue).
389. Id; see also infra note 401 (observations of former Under-Secretary of State Matthew
Nimetz on the efficacy of informal arrangements respecting arms sales). Cf., however, the
recent Court of Claims case of October 20, 1983, reviewed in Fisher, One Year After, supra note
8, at 31-32, which threw into doubt numerous "report and wait" provisions. The Court consid-
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Significantly, however, the Reagan Administration refused in
the aftermath of Chadha to commit itself to acting "as if" the legisla-
tive veto was still valid. As noted earlier, a suggestion that such a
commitment be made with respect to arms exports was raised by
Senator Charles Mathias and quickly rejected by Deputy Secretary of
State Kenneth Dam. 390  Thus, whereas the Carter Administration,
even while challenging the constitutionality of the legislative veto,
seemed prepared to abide by it "as a matter of comity,"39 the Rea-
gan Administration was unwilling to go that far once the consitu-
tional issue had been settled definitively in the executive's favor.
In conjunction with informal processes, or as a replacement for
those which may prove ineffective, Congress may seek to adopt, sin-
gly or in combination, formal methods designed to salvage (or even
strengthen) congressional influence lost with the demise of the legis-
lative veto. Indeed, as noted in previous sections, some of these
methods have already been adopted or actively considered by Con-
gress in relation to some foreign policy statutes.3 92
In the first place, Congress might, of course, "wipe the slate
clean," by repealing all the delegations that it had granted and wait-
ing for the Administration to initiate new legislation to receive the
authority it requires. Congress would then have to be convinced of
the justice of each of the Administration's requests. This suggestion,
raised before the House Foreign Affairs Committee by Stanley
Brand, legal counsel to the House, 3 9 3 was dismissed by Chairman
ered a statute requiring agency notification to appropriate committees to be tantamount to a
committee veto and thus within the scope of the Chadha proscription. City of Alexandria v.
United States, 3 Ct. Cl. 667, 675-78 (1983). The ruling was greeted with displeasure by both
the executive and legislative branches. It was characterized (in an amicus curiae brief filed in
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit by representatives of the House committee
concerned) as a "quantum expansion" of Chadha. The "self-imposed agency deference to con-
gressional sentiment" could not be considered a legislative veto; if it were, "every statute re-
quiring transmittal or submission of information to Congress" would be rendered "void on the
implicit assumption that furnishing information produces intuitive influence or interference in
the agencies' decision making." As quoted in Fisher, One Year After supra note 8, at 32 (em-
phasis in original).
390. See supra notes 142-143 and accompanying text.
391. See supra note 141 and accompanying text. As noted, the Administration's statements
were, however, made retrospectively.
392. See, e.g., the draft Export Administration Amendments Act, supra note 189 and ac-
companying text; and the amendment to the War Powers Resolution, supra note 114 and ac-
companying text.
393. House For. Aff. Comm. Hearings, supra note 7, at 8-9, 27, 29; see also the statement of
Professor Eugene Gressman, id. at 126. Subsequently, Congressman Elliott Levitas introduced
a "super sunset" act (H.R. 4535, November 18, 1983), by which all authority delegated subject
to a legislative veto would be repealed, unless Congress specifically reaffirmed the authority.
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Clement Zablocki. "While this approach may be the logical theoreti-
cal answer" to the problem posed, it did not, he felt, "address the
practical problems that will arise," especially since it would increase
the congressional workload "to an unacceptable level." '394 Nor did
either of the congressional foreign affairs committees find much ap-
peal in the suggestion that the "clean slate" approach be applied, as a
minimum, to government-to-government arms sales (or to govern-
ment sales above a certain dollar threshold).395
A more obvious and "quick way to 'doctor' statutes tainted by
the legislative veto ' 396 is to substitute joint resolutions for the simple
or concurrent resolutions incorporated in current legislation. In-
deed, where Congress has been called upon to enact new legislation,
as in the case of the Export Administration Amendments Act, it has
opted for this approach. But this approach, too, is not free of difficul-
ties, and it is clearly not a panacea.
397
There is, of course, an enormous difference between requiring a
joint resolution of disapproval to block an executive initiative and
making executive action dependent on the adoption of a joint resolu-
tion of approval. In the former case, the congressional workload is
not significantly increased, but for Congress to make its will prevail it
would presumably need to muster a two-thirds majority to override a
presidential veto. On the other hand, a joint-resolution-of-approval
process increases the congressional workload but also enhances con-
gressional power since it is tantamount to a one-House veto. More-
over, as with the "clean-slate" method, it shifts the burden of
legislative inertia to the President. The Byrd amendment to the
129 CONG. REC. H10589-91, E5766-67 (1983), cited in Fisher, One Year After, supra note 8, at
10.
394. House For. Aff. Comm. Hearings, supra note 7, at 30.
395. Senator Sarbanes suggested that, in the absence of the legislative veto, "the Congress
could very easily say we go back to the basic constitutional allocation of powers, and if you seek
the power, you then come to us, and if we think it is advisable, we will give it to you." Senate
For. Rel Comm. Hearing on Arms Export Control, supra note 8, at 34. This option was also
raised as a possible (not necessarily recommended) alternative to the legislative veto by Profes-
sor David A. Martin, who noted that its workability hinged on streamlining Congress' proce-
dures. House For. Aff. Comm. Hearings, supra note 7, at 140-41. Cf id. at 47, 96-97
(comments of Rep. Stephen J. Solarz); see infra note 399 for the Solarz amendment to the
Arms Export Control Act.
Whether and how to amend arms export legislation was a question which, in the end,
depended, as Professor Martin cogently observed, on Congress' "substantive judgment about
the risks and merits of arms sales as a component of. . . [U.S.] foreign policy." House For.
Aff. Comm. Hearings, supra note 7, at 142.
396. Fisher, Legislative Vetoes, Phoenix Style, supra note 86, at 2.
397. See Fisher Statement, House Rules Comm., supra note 86, at 2.
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Arms Export Control Act embodies this approach, but only for very
large arms transfers (worth $200 million or more).,98 Understanda-
bly, the Administration argued forcefully against its adoption, con-
tending that it was unwise and unnecessary. It was unwise because it
would weaken the President's ability to use arms transfer policy as a
flexible, expeditious, effective and credible foreign-policy tool. Fur-
thermore, if certain countries were excluded from the ambit of the
proposal (the approach followed in the Solarz amendment intro-
duced subsequently),399 the legislation would be seen as discrimina-
tory by the remaining countries, and the "legislation in itself' would
become "a kind of foreign policy act."'  Nor was such an amend-
ment necessary, since the executive had no intention of taking advan-
tage of present ambiguity; and Congress, for its part, possessed
sufficient legislative and budgetary powers to affect arms policy. It
could place general conditions or country-specific restrictions on
arms transfers, and it could use the budget process for regulating
arms sales based on United States credit or loans."' If any formal
398. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. Senator Byrd thought his proposal struck
the proper balance between too unfettered a delegation to the President and too multiplied a
workload for Congress. Senate For. ReL. Comm. Hearing on Arms Export Control, supra note
8, at 12.
399. According to the Solarz amendment to the Arms Export Control Act (H.R. 5759,
May 31, 1984), arms sales above a certain dollar threshold would be divided into two catego-
ries. Whereas arms sales to NATO countries, Japan, New Zealand, Australia, and Israel
would be subject to a joint resolution of disapproval within 15 days, arms sales to all other
countries would go forward only if Congress adopted a joint resolution authorizing the sale.
Design and construction services valued at $200 million or more would be subject to veto by
joint resolution of Congress within 30 days. The "national security" emergency waiver would
be retained. The Solarz bill was referred to the House Foreign Affairs and Rules Committees.
See Fisher, One Year After, supra note 8, at 11.
400. Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth W. Dam, in Senate For. Rel. Comm. Hearing on
Arms Export Control, supra note 8, at 28. Of course, present legislation exempts NATO and
some other countries from certain provisions and loosens the congressional reins with respect
to arms sales to these countries. See supra § III (B).
401. Senate For. Rel. Comm. Hearing on Arms Export Control, supra note 8, at 29. In his
testimony, former Under-Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology,
Matthew Nimetz, presented further arguments against Byrd-type legislation. It would, he said,
increase the load of an already overburdened Congress; induce a built-in automatic and forced
(rather than planned) referendum on the country in question; and inadvertently worsen bilat-
eral U.S. relations with that country. The identity of the recipient country was a more impor-
tant criterion than the dollar threshold, which was a blunt and inadequate measure. Nimetz's
own recommendations were to increase significantly the advance informal pre-notification pe-
riod for sensitive and important transactions and to enhance the informal consultations with
the relevant committees. Such informal arrangements, though not binding in law, were "criti-
cal to making ... [U.S.] foreign policy work effectively", were even more important after
Chadha, and were likely to be potent because neither the President nor the prospective foreign
arms recipient desired a confrontation with Congress. Id. at 36-42.
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new restrictions were to be adopted, the Administratrion obviously
preferred that joint resolutions of disapproval be substituted for the
present concurrent resolutions of disapproval, thus weakening the
pre-Chadha system of congressional control over arms exports. 4°2 In
contrast, many members of Congress and those adopting a congres-
sional perspective tended to favor provisions for joint resolutions of
approval' 3-particularly in the area of arms sales, thus allowing
Congress to reap the advantages of inertia and indecision. There was
less agreement in Congress on the need to introduce a parallel provi-
sion in the War Powers Resolution, perhaps because, after the initial
sixty (or ninety) day period, the President cannot in any event benefit
from legislative inertia.'
In a sense, of course, requiring that Congress pass a joint resolu-
tion of approval adds nothing to congressional powers, since Con-
gress is always free to enact a statute or joint resolution. The
attractiveness of the joint-resolution approach is, however, linked to
the use of expedited or priority procedures in Congress." 5 But this
streamlining of congressional procedures is a mixed blessing. If too
many items are given expedited treatment, there is a danger that
many important matters will be crowded out of the legislative calen-
dar and that "the discretion, deliberation, selectivity, and judgment




Country-specific legislation, which has proliferated in recent
years in relation to human rights concerns, is another ever-available
alternative to the legislative veto, but may be far more objectiona-
ble-even insulting-to foreign States than the legislative veto was
402. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
403. See, e.g., the comments of Professor Eugene Gressman, House For. Aff. Comm. Hear-
ings, supra note 7, at 115, 128, 147.
404. See the comments of Professor David A. Martin, id. at 131, 145.
405. See the observations of Representative Solarz, Professor David A. Martin, and Mor-
ton Rosenberg, id. at 97, 141-42, 246. See also Destler, supra note 86, at 185; supra note 114
and accompanying text, with respect to expedited procedures for joint resolutions in the
amended version of the War Powers Resolution.
406. Fisher statement, House Rules Committee, supra note 86, at 4. See also the assess-
ments of Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam, House For. Aff. Comm. Hearings, supra note
7, at 97, and of Morton Rosenberg, id. at 246. On recently expressed dissatisfaction by the
House Rules Committee with the proliferation of measures receiving priority treatment in Con-
gress, see HOUSE RULES COMM., EXPORT ADMINISTRATION AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1983, H.
REP. No. 98-257, Part 3, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), at 3-7, cited in Rosenberg, Congressional
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considered to be." 7 Endowing legislation with more specificity may
be seen as necessary after Chadha, but more difficult to achieve and
less desirable in foreign-policy than in domestic legislation." 8 In
general, the authorization and appropriation process may be used to
introduce restrictions and keep a tighter rein over executive discre-
tion. Authorizations may be expected to be more frequently short-
term (although this too increases the congressional workload)" 9 ; and
Congress may be tempted at times to adopt two-step authorizations,
requiring a further joint resolution for releasing money already au-
thorized.41° More generous use of the already overused device of ap-
propriation riders has been seen by many commentators as a natural
corollary of the blocking of the legislative-veto route of restraining
the President.41 But this possibility has been viewed with some con-
sternation by members of authorizing committees (including the con-
gressional foreign affairs committees)412 who have bridled at what
they regard as the skewing of the legislative process toward the ap-
propriations committees.413
The post-Chadha period may also see the adoption of more "re-
port-and-wait" provisions (in addition to current legislative veto pro-
407. See Destler, supra note 86, at 184-85.
408. Even with respect to domestic legislation, introducing greater specificity is not easily
accomplished. See Justice White's explication of the "Hobson's choice" facing Congress after
Chadha, supra note 82. See also the prediction by Louis Fisher that Chadha will not "prompt
Congress as a general rule to write statutes with more detail and precision" since "a decision by
the Supreme Court cannot override the lessons of the last one hundred years." Fisher state-
ment, Senate Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure, supra note 86, at 10. Cf.
Stanley Brand, in House For. Aff. Comm. Hearings, supra note 7, at 35.
409. Fisher statement, Senate Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure, supra
note 86, at 11-12. See also CONG. Q., at 30 (Spring 1984).
410. See, e.g., the House action in June 1984 authorizing funding of the MX missiles. To
make congressional concerns regarding arms control more effective, the House authorized 15 of
the 40 MX missiles requested by President Reagan and made release of the funds contingent on
a further joint resolution in April 1985. N.Y. TIMES WEEKLY REV., June 17, 1984.
411. The tendency to resort to riders was accelerating before Chadha. See SUNDQUIST,
supra note 9, at 358-59.
412. The following exchange in the House Foreign Affairs Committee illustrates well the
depth of feeling on the issue:
Mr. [Stanley] Brand: There is one other alternative which I dare not talk about
to an authorizing committee, I don't think, and that is the appropriations rider ....
Chairman [Clement J.] Zablocki: . . . You have certainly presumed correctly
that your last alternative would not be acceptable to this committee. . . . Unless we
returned way back in history, when the authorizing and the appropriating committee
were one and the same, I wouldn't agree to that last alternative.
House For. Aff. Comm. Hearings, supra note 7, at 31.
413. See e.g., the Brand-Pritchard exchange, id. at 35. Several months prior to Chadha, in
January 1983, the House had made riders from the floor to appropriations bills more difficult of
acceptance. CONG. Q., at 26 (Spring 1984).
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visions which, in the wake of Chadha, may have been transformed
into "report and wait" provisions). Such provisions were explicitly
legitimated by the Court, which noted that during the waiting period
Congress might adopt suitable legislation to bar actions which it
deemed objectionable.414
Theoretically, Congress is also free to recommend the amend-
ment of the Constitution so as to legalize some forms of the legisla-
tive veto, and some draft amendments have been introduced and
debated in Congress.415 The idea has also been floated of offering the
President a quid pro quo in this respect-an item veto in return for a
two-House congressional veto.416 But it is highly improbable that
the cumbersome amendment process will be followed. Rather, Con-
gress will more likely pursue a piecemeal, cautious and selective ap-
proach as it and the executive grope their way through the present
interim period.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In evaluating the impact of the Chadha decision on foreign pol-
icy legislative vetoes, the starting point must be the assumption that
all such provisions have been shorn of their constitutional legiti-
macy.41 '7 As Stanley Brand warned: "We in the Congress delude
ourselves to the extent that we ignore the clear 'storm warnings' of
the Chadha ruling and insist, like those who after the discovery of
America continued to believe the earth was flat, that legislative ve-
toes are still valid." '418 Once this assumption is accepted, conclusions
may differ because of divergent assessments regarding the primary
concerns which prompted the adoption of the veto provisions; the
leverage which such provisions actually furnished Congress; and the
414. 103 S. Ct. 2776 n.9 (1983), citing Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1 (1941). But cf. the
recent Court of Claims case, supra note 389.
415. See H.J. Res. 313, introduced on June 30, 1983, by Congressman Andrew Jacobs, Jr.;
S.J. Res. 135, introduced on July 27, 1983, by Senator Dennis DeConcini, and considered by
the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on March 2,
1984; H.J. Res. 436, November 18, 1983, introduced by Congressman Bill Green. For more
details, see Fisher, One Year After, supra note 8, at 6, 8, 10; see also DeConcini and Faucher,
supra note 86.
416. The Green Amendment (H.J. Res. 436, Nov. 18, 1983) incorporates this quidpro quo.
See also the similar suggestion by Congressman Henry J. Hyde, House For. Aff. Comm. Hear-
ings, supra note 7, at 41-42. Compare the comment by Stanley Brand that the Court had, in a
sense, endowed the President with an item veto already, at least with respect to legislative veto
provisions. Id. at 42.
417. Strangely enough, however, Congress has continued to enact some new legislative veto
provisions since Chadha. See Fisher, One Year After, supra note 8, at 19-23.
418. House For. Aff. Comm Hearings, supra note 7, at 15-16.
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likely future course of Congress as it seeks to fill the void created in
the congressional arsenal by the Chadha decision. Initial reactions of
alarm have given way to more sober afterthoughts. As Representa-
tive Les Aspin explained: "The first reaction up here was, 'It's a dis-
aster.' The second reaction was, 'It isn't quite a disaster.' And it
isn't settled yet." '419
Clearly, most of the concerns which led Congress to turn to the
device of the legislative veto in foreign policy legislation persist. In
such matters as commitments to foreign States (including indirect
commitments by means of arms sales) and the use of force, congres-
sional consciousness was acutely raised in the wake of Vietnam; and
once raised, it does not readily disappear. It is safe to assume that
Congress will not again relinquish these areas of concern to unfet-
tered executive discretion but will strive to maintain a modicum of
control over them.
But was the legislative veto device the effective fetter which its
proponents claimed it to be? The answer depends to an extent on
whether one views the matter from a "half-empty" or "half-full" per-
spective. This point is well illustrated by focussing on the cardinal
area of arms exports.
From the "half-empty" perspective, primary emphasis would be
placed on the fact that the veto was never used, even when congres-
sional displeasure reached seemingly overwhelming proportions, as
in the case of the AWACS. In fact, over time the legislative veto,
paradoxically, was becoming less potent even as a threat. Thus, just
prior to Chadha, an expert at the Congressional Research Service,
Richard F. Grimmett, who had studied the working of the legislative
veto in respect to arms sales, arrived at the following conclusions:
While at first Congress was able to use the threat of a legisla-
tive veto to force consultation in a manner that led to changes in
the number or types of items proposed for sale, in more recent
years, it has not been able to do this as successfully. When a veto
resolution has actually come to a vote, the President has demon-
strated the ability to define the issue in a way that makes it ex-
tremely difficult to overrule his decision. He has been able to
defeat serious criticisms of the merits of the sales proposals by ar-
guing that the national security, or bilateral relations with an im-
portant nation, or the basic power of the Presidency would be
damaged . . . . [In confrontations with Congress] the President
has regained the upper hand in the continuing struggle over the
419. Cited in Mann, supra note 86, at 24.
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process of making arms sales. It appears that only further tighten-
ing of existing reporting requirements or the actual exercise of a
legislative veto by the Congess might restore the power balance in
this policy area.
420
Perhaps the problem, at root, was that Congress was pursuing a
will-o'-the-wisp: timely congressional input into the arms-sales pro-
cess. Desiring to be "in on the take-offs" before deals were signed
and sealed and before the executive branch and friendly foreign
States could be embarrassed, Congress had introduced the legislative
veto in the first place.421 But the undesired confrontations and em-
barrassments were not thereby avoided; nor did Congress achieve the
measure of influence it had hoped for. Even before Chadha, Congress
therefore continued its quest for alternative and supplementary
mechanisms of control. That quest remained elusive. Arguably, the
President's position as chief negotiator meant that Congress could
not really, except by executive sufferance, be "in on the take-offs." It
also meant that foreign States would, regardless of the legal situation,
view congressional negation or modification of executive understand-
ings as the repudiation of an American commitment to them and as
public humiliation.
Those who regarded the legislative-veto process with skepticism
also pointed to the large number of arms transactions which were
subject to report and congressional veto. The procedure became, in
their view, too onerous for the executive and too unselective for Con-
gress, involving the legislature in excessive operational details.422
From the "half-full" perspective, the past record of non-use of
the legislative veto is less important than the near-use, the ever-pres-
ent threat of use and the leverage which Congress thereby gained.
Without it, "the dynamics of the whole situation . . . [will] change
tremendously, '4 23 and congressional influence over arms sales will
likely decrease. Although formally Congress was called upon to re-
view a large volume of transactions, even an Administration spokes-
man conceded that "the genius. . . of the veto idea. . . was that it
420. EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE CONSULTATION, supra note 132, at 35.
421. See, e.g., Javits & Klein, supra note 22, at 464; see supra § III (B).
422. EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE CONSULTATION, supra note 132, at 81.
423. Senator Charles Mathias, in Senate For. ReL Comm. Hearing on Arms Export Control,
supra note 8, at 34. Note also, Professor David A. Martin's comment that "if Section 36(b)
remains as a 'report and wait' provision,. . . this.., does signify a notable shift in decision-
making power and political dynamics affecting arms sales." House For. Aff. Comm. Hearings,
supra note 7 at 141.
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permitted committees to concentrate on the controversial cases." '4 24
Arms salesmen,425 foreign governments and the executive all came to
learn the new rules of the game, to abide by them, and even to see
some advantage in them. While the President feigned embarrass-
ment (and was expected to do so), he could employ the legislative
veto process to advantage in his dealings with foreign governments.
He was able to induce modifications and extract concessions, while
conveniently shifting the blame for his actions to Congress. And
once Congress failed to disapprove, the entire transaction gained in
legitimacy by the addition of the legislative imprimatur to the execu-
tive decision.426 As a State Department official who worked to galva-
nize congressional backing for the 1978 Middle East jet package
observed: "If Congress hadn't forced it [the legislative veto proce-
dure] on us, we'd have had to invent it. Now, when we send a signal
to the Saudis or to Jerusalem, it carries all the voltage of Congress, as
well as of the Presidency. The Middle East knows this decision was
made by the entire American government, not just by the
President." '427
The "half-empty" and "half-full" perspectives may be recon-
ciled on the basis of a differentiation between the earlier and later
periods. Perhaps the key to congressional effectiveness lay in retain-
ing the veto as a threat and avoiding an open confrontation with the
President. For there seemed to be an inverse relationship between
confrontation and influence. In the AWACS case, where the con-
frontational aspect was greatest, congressional influence over the
contours of the final package proved to be minimal. The President
was able to call Congress's bluff by shifting the focus of attention
from the merits of the sale to such issues as presidential prestige and
American credibility.
Outright confrontations are, in any event, not Congress' pre-
ferred mode of action in the area of foreign policy; and obviously, the
President and foreign States also strive to avoid them. To the extent
that the occasions for direct confrontations have been diminished by
the loss of the legislative veto procedure, congressional influence may
424. Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth W. Dam, Senate For. Rel. Comm. Hearing on
Arms Export Control, supra note 8, at 28.
425. As Congressman Jonathan Bingham predicted in 1974: "The watchword of our arms
salesmen must now become we'll see if we can sell it to Congress." Cited in FRANCK & WEIS-
BAND, supra note 35, at 103.
426. See the comments of Senator Paul Sarbanes, in Senate For. Rel. Comm. Hearing on
Arms Export Control, supra note 8, at 35; FRANCK & WEISBAND, supra note 35, at 110.
427. Robert A. Flaten, cited in FRANK & WEISBAND, supra note 35, at I10-11.
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not necessarily have suffered a net decrease. As for the threat of con-
gressional blocking action, this persists after Chadha. However, un-
less institutionalized in a new form (along the lines, for example, of
the Byrd or Solarz amendments), the threat cannot be effectuated
without the support of a two-thirds majority of both Houses.
If the past effectiveness of the legislative veto process for arms
sales is a matter of controversy, a skeptical attitude regarding the
legislative veto in the War Powers Resolution is more patently sus-
tainable and difficult to rebut. In fact, the skepticism might be
broadened to embrace the effectiveness of the War Powers Resolu-
tion in general as an additional constraint on the President. In the
words of the late Senator Frank Church:
I voted for the bill because it came in the aftermath of the
Vietnam experience and it seemed that Congress should at least
endeavor to prevent another war initiated and pursued on the basis
of executive decision.
Still, I have had my doubts that it is possible to accomplish
such an objective by statute . . . . [I]f the President. . . uses the
Armed Forces in an action that is both swift and successful, then
there is no reason to expect the Congress to do anything other
than applaud.
If the President employs forces in an action which is swift,
but unsuccessful, then the Congress is faced with a fait accompli,
and although it may rebuke the President, it can do little else.
If the President undertakes to introduce American forces in a
foreign war that is large and sustained, then it seems to me that
the argument that the War Powers Resolution forces the Congress
to confront the decision is an argument that overlooks the fact that
Congress in any case must confront the decision, because it is the
Congress that must appropriate the money to make it possible for
the sustained action to be sustained.
So, I wonder really whether we have done very much in fur-
thering our purpose through the War Powers Resolution.
428
In any event, the. legislative veto provision-Section 5(c)-is, ar-
guably, of minor significance. As Professor David Martin testified
before the House Foreign Affairs Committee:
The legislative veto would have come into play under the war
powers resolution only if Congress wished to insist on removal of
the troops before 60 days had elapsed. But only in the most ex-
traordinary of political circumstances. . . would Congress defy a
sitting President in this fashion.
428. Cited in HOLT, supra note 263, at 38-39.
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Realistically, Congress is not likely to rally even a simple ma-
jority for a veto resolution of that kind unless the President has
virtually gone off the deep end, introducing troops in a way that is
immediately condemned by the overwhelming majority of the
public.
In those unlikely circumstances, it would usually be possible
to rally a two-thirds majority as well, and thereby overcome a veto
of any legislation bringing an early end to the military adventure;
that is before the 60 days have passed.42 9
The remaining provisions of the War Powers Resolution, related
to consultation, reporting and automatic termination, might be con-
sidered more effective, potentially and actually. In other foreign pol-
icy legislation too, as noted earlier,4 3 ° the loss of the legislative veto
provision need not be seen as fatal to the general schemes, most of
which embody significant reporting requirements and other legisla-
tive limitations. A Congress adequately informed, it may be said, is a
Congress more adequately armed to confront and constrain the
executive.
However, even if objectively the loss of the legislative veto is not
disastrous in most cases, Congress may subjectively arrive at a differ-
ent conclusion. Like an insurance policy, the legislative veto pro-
vided Congress with a sense of power and security which reality may
or may not have justified; and Congress may eventually be persuaded
of the need to replace the lost policy with a new one-in a wholesale
or, more likely, piecemeal fashion. Much will depend on the solici-
tude with which congressional sensitivities (heightened, perhaps, by
the loss of the legislative veto) will be treated by the executive.
Clearly, the last thing the executive wishes is to reap a strategic de-
feat from the jaws of a tactical judicial victory. It would surely seek
to avoid the imposition of constitutional, but more stringent, con-
trols, especially in the field of foreign policy.
Nor are all the statutory alternatives really palatable to Con-
gress and to key congressional committees, whose calendars suffer
already from overcrowding and too many mandatory intrusions.4 31
A situation in which Congress became "weaker on the large issues
429. House For. Aff. Comm. Hearings, supra note 7, at 131.
430. See supra § V on severability.
43 1. As Louis Fisher has noted, the Supreme Court, in this respect, has moved in an oppo-
site, and more desirable, direction: "A main trend over the past half century has been to make
the Court's caseload less mandatory and more discretionary." Fisher statement, House Rules
Comm., supra note 86, at 4.
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and more intrusive on the small" '432 would please Congress no more
than the executive. Rather, the approach which Congress will pre-
sumably strive for will be selective intrusion-for example, by requir-
ing affirmative congressional action for higher-threshold arms sales
(as in the Byrd amendment) or for arms sales which are particularly
important or controversial.
In the interim "holding" period, the interests of both branches,
it would seem, converge to dictate a greater emphasis on informal
non-statutory controls, consultations and understandings. This does
not rule out probing actions, such as modest sales to the Middle East,
"to test the new limits and boundaries of executive power." 433 But
the probing will probably be limited, for fear of alienating Congress
and "pay[ing] for it in other ways."
434
Any long-term assessment of the impact of Chadha on foreign
policy legislation is obviously premature. But it can confidently be
predicted that life after Chadha, just as life before Chadha, will be
determined by political realities and especially by the degrees of ten-
sion and accommodation between the branches.
432. Destler, supra note 86, at 186.
433. Congressman Les Aspin, cited in Mann, supra note 86, at 23. Compare the with-
drawal in March 1984 of the proposed sale of Stinger anti-aircraft missiles to Jordan and Saudi
Arabia with the subsequent swift dispatch of Stingers to Saudi Arabia (a few months later), in
the face of a threat to Gulf shipping. Of course, the emergency waiver of the Arms Export
Control Act was, in any case, available.
434. Id. at 23 (citing Grimmett).
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